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Abstract 
 
As many scholars have noted, in the immediate years after the First World War, the 
British Empire faced important challenges to its future survival, not least of which 
was the growth of three key movements: Bolshevism, Islamism and nationalism. 
This thesis examines how Britain coped with these problems, by exploring the 
internal government debates regarding foreign policy formulation towards South 
Asia, specifically in the countries of Persia and Afghanistan. It is the contention of 
this work that the current literature on this subject suffers from certain flaws, the first 
being that not enough writers have discussed the interrelation of these three 
movements. Secondly, there has been a lack of focus on how officials in London and 
in Delhi thought quite differently on the issue of Britain’s foreign policy in South 
Asia after 1918. This thesis will address these, and other, gaps in the literature. It will 
contend that there were those within the Home government who displayed a 
particular mode of thought – a ‘Great Game mentality’ – towards this region. This 
mentality was influenced by the legacy of the earlier, 19
th
-century rivalry between 
Britain and Russia, and resulted in a tendency to over-emphasise the threat of 
Russian Bolshevism to Britain’s imperial interests in South Asia, whilst at the same 
time under-emphasising the threat of nationalism and pan-Islamism across Persia, 
Afghanistan and India. When the Indian government questioned this Great Game 
mentality, it was largely ignored and frequently maligned. The work will 
demonstrate how those of the Great Game mind-set dominated the creation of 
Britain’s policy towards Persia, Afghanistan and adjoining regions in 1918 and 1919, 
how events of 1920 and 1921 forced London to reassess this Great Game thinking, 
and how (by 1922 and 1923) this re-evaluation had developed into re-formulation of 
British foreign policy in South Asia.  
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Introduction  
 
‘The East will help us to conquer the West. Let us turn our faces towards Asia.’ 
        Vladimir Lenin
1
 
 
‘It is the prestige and the wealth arising from her Asiatic position that are the 
foundation stones of the British Empire.’ 
George Nathaniel Curzon
2
 
 
 
This thesis was conceived while researching the little-known case of the 26 Baku 
Commissars – the execution of a number of members of the Azerbaijani Baku 
Commune on the night of 18 September 1918 outside the city of Krasnovodsk. In the 
context of the First World War and the Russian civil war, the murder of a few men 
might not appear very significant, but the incident quickly became a cause célèbre 
for Russia’s new rulers, who blamed the British for the act.3 Essentially, the case of 
the 26 Commissars was a small but distinct example of just how important this 
region of the world has always been to Anglo-Russian relations. Indeed, it was only 
because a small British contingent had been in Baku to defend the area from Turkish 
encroachment that Britain was in a position to be accused of executing the 
Commissars.
4
 It was such considerations which led to one of the founding questions 
of the work at hand – how did Britain’s foreign policy towards South Asia affect its 
                                                 
1
 As quoted in P. Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin’s Dream of an Empire in Asia (Oxford: 
Oxford University, 1986), p. 102. 
 
2
 As quoted in H. Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919–1925: A Study in Post-War Diplomacy 
(London: Constable, 1934), p. 38. 
 
3
 B. Pearce, ‘The 26 Commissars’, Sbornik (1981), pp. 54–66; P. Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of 
Constantinople (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 366–370; J. Stalin, ‘The Shooting of the 
Twenty-Six Baku Comrades by Agents of British Imperialism’, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1919/04/23.htm [8/8/13] and C.H. Ellis, 
‘Operations in Transcaspia, 1918–1919, and the 26 Commissars Case’, St. Antony’s Papers, No. 6 
(1959), pp. 131–150. 
 
4
 Dunsterforce was a small military group under the command of General L.C. Dunsterville, sent from 
Baghdad to Baku in the summer of 1918.  See: A.H. Arslanian, ‘The British Decision to Intervene in 
Transcaucasia during World War I’, Armenian Review Vol. 27 (1974), pp. 146–159; A.H. Arslanian, 
‘Dunsterville’s Adventures: A Reappraisal’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12 
(1980), pp. 199–216; R. Teague-Jones, The Spy Who Disappeared: Diary of a Secret Mission to 
Russian Central Asia in 1918 (London: Victor Gollancz, 1991).  
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relationship with Soviet Russia?
5
 If Britain had not been busy trying to protect its 
Indian empire from Germany and Turkey, it would not have come into conflict with 
Russia over the case of the Commissars. 
The importance of Asia to Anglo-Russian relations has certainly been 
recognised by historians of the pre-1917 period, and the Great Game is a well-
established area of historical research. It is in Asia that Britain and Russia battled for 
supremacy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; where adventure and 
intrigue were sought by some of the most colourful characters of history; and where 
Rudyard Kipling found his inspiration for Kim.
6
 Contemporaries of the post-Russian 
revolution period also recognised the continued importance of this region of the 
world, as the above quote from Lenin shows. As S.D. Gupta and I. Spector (among 
others) have demonstrated, the Bolsheviks were keenly aware of the benefits of 
spreading revolution among the discontented Asian masses.
7
 An ‘Appeal to the 
Working Moslems of Russia and the East’ was among the first declarations made by 
the party upon its seizing power,
8
 and in Spector’s opinion this suggests ‘that the 
Soviet government believed the success of the Bolshevik Revolution to be contingent 
upon its alliance with the Muslim Orient’.9 At the founding of the Comintern in 
1919, ‘there was certainly a distinct awareness of the colonial question’, notes 
Gupta.
10
 And, as Stephen White explains, as the chances of revolution breaking out 
                                                 
5
 As research progressed, this question would actually morph to ask, instead, how Britain’s opinion of 
Soviet Russia influenced the creation of its policies towards South Asia? – more on which later.   
 
6
 More will be said about the Great Game in Chapter One. 
 
7
 S.D. Gupta, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India, 1919–1943 (Kolkata: Seribaan, 
2006) and I. Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917–1958 (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1959). See also Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze; M.A. Persits, Revolutionaries of 
India in Soviet Russia: Mainsprings of the Communist Movement in the East (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1973); Z. Imam, ‘The Effects of the Russian Revolution in India, 1917–1920’, St. 
Antony’s Papers, No. 18 (1966), pp. 74–97 and D.N. Druhe, Soviet Russia and Indian Communism, 
1917–1949 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1959). 
 
8
 J. Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1918: Documents and Materials 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), pp. 467–469. 
 
9
 Spector, Soviet Union, p. 37.  
 
10
 Gupta, Comintern, p. 53.  
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in Europe faded in the years after 1917, so the Bolshevik regime looked increasingly 
to southern Asia to deliver them from isolation.
11
  
Given the state of Asia in the period after the First World War, it is 
unsurprising that Lenin and his comrades looked keenly at the revolutionary potential 
there. Nationalist fervour, combined with a resentment against Western imperialism, 
had been growing among the populations of Asia for some time, and after 1918 
would only increase in potency, while Muslim discontent (also apparent before the 
First World War) was inflamed by the involvement of Turkey in the conflict. Great 
Asian leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Reza Khan and Kemal Ataturk would 
harness these feelings to initiate mass popular movements within their respective 
countries, and everywhere in the region the oppressed would start pushing back 
against their domineering rulers. For Britain, this heady combination of nationalism 
and pan-Islamism was to provide a particular set of difficulties; for the Bolsheviks, it 
appeared a perfect opportunity. All of which has been well documented by other 
scholars. A number of good works have discussed Britain’s policies in the Middle 
East and South Asia in the years after 1918, while the relationship between the 
Bolsheviks and their southern neighbours has also received an adequate amount of 
attention.
12
 The nature of some aspects of Anglo-Soviet affairs in this period have 
been studied and a few have even tried to address the three way dynamic between 
Britain, Russia and southern Asia.
13
 And yet, despite all of this, there still remain a 
                                                 
11
 S. White, ‘Soviet Russia and the Asian Revolution, 1917–1924’, Review of International Studies, 
Vol. 10 (1984), pp. 219–220. One of the most recent works on Soviet foreign policy, however, 
entirely ignores Asia. In Spies and Commissars, despite claims that he is ‘attempting to see things in a 
different light’, Robert Service repeats an all-too familiar discussion on the Bolshevik attempts to 
spread revolution through Europe.
 
No real discussion of Bolshevik policy towards Asia is given, and 
Service all but ignores this consideration when looking at British policy towards Soviet Russia. R. 
Service, Spies and Commissars: Bolshevik Russia and the West (London: Macmillan, 2012). 
 
12
 For example: G.H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy in the Curzon Period, 1919–1924 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1995); B. Cooper-Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 
1918–1923 (New York: University of New York Press, 1976); J. Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the 
Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War, 1918–1922 (London: Macmillan Press, 1981); 
J. Fisher, Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East, 1916–1919 (London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 1999); B. Porter, The Lion’s Share (London: Longman, 2004); H. Carr re d'Encausse, 
Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988); C. Chaqueri, The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–1921: Birth of the 
Trauma (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); M. Volodarsky, The Soviet Union and its 
Southern Neighbours Iran and Afghanistan, 1917–1933 (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994) and H. Kapur, 
Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan 
(Geneva: Victor Chevalier, 1965).  
 
13
 For example: M.G. Fry, ‘Britain, the Allies and the Problem of Russia, 1918–1919’, Canadian 
Journal of History, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1967), pp. 62–84; M. V. Glenny ‘The Anglo-Soviet Trade 
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number of flaws in the current state of literature, and gaps when it comes to 
understanding exactly how British foreign policy towards both South Asia and 
Russia interacted in the years after 1918 – this thesis aims to complete the picture. 
 
One clear example of how this topic requires further attention is the creation of the 
Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919. The brain-child of Lord George Nathaniel 
Curzon, this diplomatic arrangement between Britain and Persia was essentially 
designed to create a stable and secure buffer zone between Soviet Russia and India. 
British money and expertise was to be used to reform Persia’s financial and military 
structures, which would ultimately protect that country from potential Russian 
advances from the north.
14
 As most authors have noted, Britain’s fear of Bolshevism 
taking hold in Persia (and subsequently the rest of southern Asia) was a seemingly 
crucial motivator in the creation of this agreement: anti-Bolshevik rhetoric fills the 
pages of the Foreign Office files of this time. And yet, what also emerges from these 
documents is a far more complex debate on Britain’s Persian policy than many 
writers have hitherto shown. For one thing, some British officials could not appear to 
decide who they were more afraid of: Lenin’s newly formed government or a re-
constituted imperial Russia. More important, however, is the vigorous opposition 
which the Government of India had to the creation of the Anglo-Persian agreement. 
While London was busy worrying about the catastrophe to be wrought on the world 
should Bolshevism infiltrate Persia, Delhi was unafraid. Instead, the viceroy and his 
men were adamant that it was the growth of pan-Islamism and Asian nationalism 
which Britain should be concentrating on, not Bolshevism. They believed that the 
agreement was likely to inflame nationalist and Muslim feeling and therefore 
advocated a less intrusive policy towards Persia. But what made the Indian 
government view things differently to the Home government? And if the whole point 
of the Anglo-Persian agreement was to protect India, why were the protests of the 
Indian government ignored? 
                                                                                                                                          
Agreement, March 1921’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1970), pp. 63–82; R.H. 
Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961–1972); S. White, 
Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920–1924 (London: 
Macmillan, 1979); Z. Imam, Colonialism in East-West Relations: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards 
India and Anglo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Eastman Publications, 1969) and C.S. Samra, India and 
Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1947 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959). 
 
14
 The Anglo-Persian agreement will feature heavily in the following chapters. 
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The current work on this topic does not adequately answer these questions. 
While the central role of Curzon is discussed, little more is said about the difference 
in thinking between the Indian and Home governments. One biographer of Curzon’s, 
for example, mentions debates over the agreement, but attributes the controversy to 
the India Office, and not the Indian government.
15
 Even those who do acknowledge 
the conflict between Delhi and London do not go far enough in explaining why it 
existed. Indeed, further investigation shows that this phenomenon was not isolated to 
Persia. Comparing the internal government debates on that country with what was 
said about Afghanistan is even more illuminating.
16
 One would think that with India 
being in such close proximity to Afghanistan, London would largely follow Delhi’s 
lead in its relations with that country (especially given that the Indian government 
had been administering Afghanistan’s foreign relations since 1880). What is evident 
from the archives, however, is that similar debates which were occurring over Persia 
were being repeated when it came to Afghanistan. Again, there was a propensity for 
the Home government to emphasise the threat of Bolshevism taking hold in 
Afghanistan, while the Indian government was continuously pre-occupied with pan-
Islamist and nationalist agitation. What also quickly becomes apparent from studying 
the numerous telegrams, letters and memorandum which flew between departments 
and across continents, is that there were some within the British government who 
seemed highly reluctant to accept that the international scene may have changed 
since 1914. Much of Delhi’s time appeared to be spent trying to convince London of 
the empire’s limitations in the post-war world. By 1922, the progress of events in 
Russia, South Asia and within Britain itself would conspire finally to show the Home 
government the error of its ways. Little by little through the early 1920s London 
would be forced to adapt its relations towards Tehran, Kabul and Moscow, until by 
1923 things would stand much closer to what the Indian government had advocated 
in 1918. 
                                                 
15
 Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, Volume Three (London: Stanhope Press, 1928), pp. 
214–215. 
 
16
 Christopher Ross’s PhD work, for example, focusses almost entirely on Curzon’s relationship with 
Persia, with no mention of Afghanistan. Thus, while his work is excellent for understanding Curzon’s 
relationship with Persia, it lacks a dimension which consideration of Afghanistan could have given it. 
Ross’s thesis will be discussed further in the Conclusion. C.N.B. Ross, ‘Lord Curzon, the “Persian 
Question”, and Geopolitics, 1888–1921’, PhD (July, 2012; University of Cambridge).  
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As the research for this work has thus progressed, each question has 
ultimately led to more questions, each of which has revealed further important points 
of study. For example, returning to the issue about why the opinion of the Indian 
government was so consistently ignored by the Home government, the answer 
appears to hinge on the matter of who was responsible for Britain’s foreign policy in 
this period. Who were the key officials in the British government, and how did they 
influence policy making? What, in turn, influenced their decision-making process? 
What place did Russia hold within this decision framework? How did perception of 
Bolshevik Russia affect Britain’s policy towards Persia and Afghanistan? Did the 
likes of Curzon really fear the influence of Bolshevik ideology as much as he 
purported to? If not, why was anti-Bolshevik rhetoric used to justify actions towards 
Persia and Afghanistan in the immediate post-war years? And last but not least, have 
other writers answered these questions, and if not, why not? The following chapters 
of this thesis will aim to answer comprehensively these questions, but before then, let 
us look at this last question first, and discuss the current state of the literature on this 
topic. 
 
The Foreign Office 
Perhaps the most fundamental of these questions is that of who was making Britain’s 
foreign policy in the years after the First World War. Once we understand the answer 
to this question, we also begin to comprehend the others. And the first place to start 
is with the British Foreign Office. Indeed, it might initially seem obvious that the 
officials of this government department would be the ones in charge of foreign 
policy. As a foremost authority on the British Foreign Office has noted, traditionally 
the foreign secretary had always ‘enjoyed a position of special importance in the 
Cabinet, second in prestige only to the Prime Minister’.17 Many have argued, 
however, that in the post-war period this situation changed and a large amount of 
literature has been written debating how far officials of the Foreign Office 
experienced a decline in their authority in the years after 1914. The idea that ‘the 
Foreign Office lacked the influence over British foreign policy that it had exercised 
                                                 
17
 Z. Steiner, ‘The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Resistance and Adaption to Changing Times’ 
in G. Johnson, ed., The Foreign Office and the British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), p. 13. Also: Z. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 
 
10 
 
before the outbreak of the Great War’ is common place in the historiography of this 
topic.
18
 The claims that ‘British foreign policy from the Paris conference of 1919 
until the Genoa conference of 1922 was largely determined by [the prime minister] 
Lloyd George’ and that ‘The Foreign Office in this period was all but ignored – the 
India Office had more influence’ further suggest that the makers of Britain’s post-
war foreign policy did not reside in the Foreign Office.
19
 Roberta Warman is one 
such writer who has argued that during the war the Foreign Office’s prestige was 
eroded further than was necessary by the weakness of the foreign secretary, Arthur 
Balfour, in the face of an over-bearing prime minister, David Lloyd George.
20
 The 
exclusion of Balfour from Lloyd George’s War Cabinet is one such example of the 
Foreign Office being edged out of government decision-making.
21
 Even following 
the conclusion of the conflict, Balfour did not make an effort to exert his position: 
during the Paris Peace Conference, Curzon, complained that Balfour ‘did not know, 
was not told, and was as a rule too careless to inquire, what was going on’.22 
In 1919, contemporaries hoped that Curzon’s arrival at the Foreign Office 
would stem its loss of influence.
23
 Yet clashes between Curzon and Lloyd George 
were commonplace, the prime minister feeling particular animus towards his foreign 
secretary, teasing him publically on his aristocratic origin and pompous manner.
24
 
However, more troublesome for the Foreign Office than this personality clash was 
Lloyd George’s inherent dislike of traditional diplomacy in general. Believing that 
‘diplomatists were invented simply to waste time’ the prime minister was happy to 
                                                 
18
 B.J.C. McKercher, ‘Old Diplomacy and New: the Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919–1939’ 
in M.L. Dockrill and B.J.C. McKercher, eds, Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign 
Policy, 1890–1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 79. 
 
19
 C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy 1902–1922 (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 335–336. 
 
20
 R. Warman, ‘The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916–
1918’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 15 (1972), pp. 133–159.  
 
21
 Ibid., p. 135. 
 
22
 As quoted in G. Johnson, ‘Preparing for Office: Lord Curzon as Acting Foreign Secretary, January–
October 1919’, in Johnson, Foreign Office, p. 57. 
 
23
 Lord George Nathaniel Curzon was an indomitable figure who will feature heavily in this work. 
More on his background and personality will be discussed in Chapter One. 
 
24
 E. Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919–1926 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 
1994), p. 84. 
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evade the Foreign Office when it came to matters of foreign affairs as frequently as 
he could get away with.
25
 Indeed, Lloyd George’s distrust of the officials of the 
Foreign Office was demonstrated by his creation of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, 
otherwise known as the notorious ‘Garden Suburb’ – staff housed in a number of 
huts in the garden of No. 10 whose responsibilities appeared to be everything from 
drafting Lloyd George’s speeches to making special enquiries on his behalf.26 By 
giving men such as Philip Kerr such a wide remit, the prime minister effectively 
circumvented the Foreign Office and undermined its traditional role as sole advisor 
on foreign affairs.
27
 The feeling that the Foreign Office was being usurped was 
compounded by the creation, at the same time, of the Cabinet Secretariat.
28
 While the 
Cabinet Secretariat’s role was essentially administrative, it also included the 
organisation of international conferences, and the handling of relations with the 
League of Nations.
29
 As John Naylor has discussed, in the eyes of many 
contemporaries both the Cabinet Secretariat and the Garden Suburb were part of 
Lloyd George’s ‘system’, and represented his prime ministerial style of government, 
often seen as domineering and dictatorial. For the purposes of this work, it was Lloyd 
George’s apparent intent to bypass the Foreign Office for his information on foreign 
affairs that is important.
30
  
The Foreign Office had always believed that it was the only body with 
expertise to present foreign policy issues clearly and objectively.
31
 In the post-war 
period, however, it would seem that anyone within the government could express 
                                                 
25
 Warman, ‘Erosion’, p. 142. 
 
26
 Bennett, Curzon Period, p. 4. 
 
27
 Maisel, Foreign Office, pp. 68–69. 
  
28
 The head of the Cabinet Secretariat, Sir Maurice Hankey, complained that he was often blamed for 
actions which were in fact taken by the Prime Minister’s Secretariat: J.F. Naylor, A Man and an 
Institution: Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Custody of Cabinet Secrecy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 50. The work of C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill 
provides one example of the confusion of historians on the matter. In it the Cabinet Secretariat is 
mistakenly identified as the ‘Prime Minister’s secretariat’: Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage, p. 336. 
 
29
 Naylor, Hankey, p. 27. 
 
30
 For details of Lloyd George’s general prime ministerial style, see K.O. Morgan, ‘Lloyd George’s 
Premiership: A Study in ‘Prime Ministerial Government’’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 13 (1970), pp. 
130–157. 
 
31
 Maisel, Foreign Office, pp. 73–74. 
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their opinion on foreign affairs, a trend the Foreign Office deeply resented. As Eyre 
Crowe (assistant under-secretary of state) put it: 
This growing system of enquiring into other people’s conduct by unqualified 
outsiders instead of entrusting the proper administration of an office to its own 
responsible head is going to introduce more and more anarchy into the whole 
service...
32
 
Clashes between the War Office and Foreign Office over foreign policy were almost 
as frequent as those with Lloyd George. As Charles Hardinge (permanent under-
secretary of state from 1916 to 1920) caustically observed: ‘All soldiers regard 
themselves as Heaven born diplomatists and much prefer diplomacy to military 
strategy…’33 As shall be seen, even the India Office would not escape Foreign Office 
censure when it tried to weigh in on foreign affairs. Coping with a distrustful prime 
minister, as well as facing various forms of rivalry for its remit over foreign 
relations, it is perhaps no wonder that the demise of Foreign Office powers has been 
a dominant theme in the literature. It certainly was for contemporaries. For example, 
the New Europe noted in 1920, ‘The Foreign Office seems incapable of asserting its 
rights to control policy, and has irresponsible competitors, not only in the Garden 
Suburb of Downing Street, but in the War Office, the Admiralty and the India 
Office’.34  
 
On initial viewing, then, it would appear that Kerr, Hankey, Lloyd George and even 
officials of the War and India Offices were all more influential in creating Britain’s 
foreign policy after 1918 than the Foreign Office itself. And yet there is reason to 
believe that actually the Foreign Office was just as important in the post-war period 
as it had always been. Instead, it would appear that some historians have been too 
quick to accept at face value the testimony of certain contemporaries. Gill Bennett 
(chief historian of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office) argues that the 
tone of historical debate on British foreign policy in this period was essentially set by 
                                                 
32
 Z. Steiner & M.L. Dockrill, ‘The Foreign Office Reforms, 1919–21’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 
17 (1974), p. 147. Crowe would become permanent under-secretary of state in 1920 following after 
Hardinge. 
 
33
 Maisel, Foreign Office, pp. 76–77. 
  
34
 A. Sharp, ‘Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policy in the 1920s’, in Johnson, Foreign 
Office, p. 76. 
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Lord Beaverbrook, whose biography of Lloyd George laid the idea of a dictatorial 
prime minister who had almost entire control of foreign affairs.
35
 In Beaverbrook’s 
work ‘Foreign Secretary and Foreign Office recede to the distant horizon’.36 Writings 
by contemporaries appeared to support this concept of a presidential-style foreign 
policy and historians have been happy to take this idea and run with it.
37
 One of 
Curzon’s early biographers, for example, claims that throughout the first four years 
of his period in office, control of foreign policy was vested almost entirely in the 
hands of the prime minister rather than the foreign secretary.
38
  
As has been shown more recently, however, the relationship between the 
Foreign Office and other government departments was quite complex. For example, 
despite contemporary apprehension, the Cabinet Secretariat actually constituted very 
little challenge to the Foreign Office: the Secretariat held no executive or 
administrative function and had no authority to take the initiative in any matter.
39
 
And while it has been taken for granted that the Garden Suburb was a threat to the 
Foreign Office, Warman has pointed out how hard it is to evaluate the influence of 
Kerr and his colleagues on policy-making, since their contact with Lloyd George was 
unofficial.
40
 Indeed, Bennett believes that ‘the influence of the “Garden Suburb” was 
massively over-estimated at the time’.41 John Darwin even insists that Lloyd 
George’s great involvement in foreign affairs after 1918 was a consequence of the 
nature of the peace-process which required the prime minister to be present at large 
international conferences.
42
 Part of the problem is that the foreign secretary was 
                                                 
35
 Lord Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George (London: Collins, 1963). 
 
36
 G.H. Bennett, ‘Lloyd George, Curzon and the Control of British Foreign Policy 1919–1922’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 4 (1999), p. 470. 
 
37
 As a slight aside, it is worth mentioning that both Zara Steiner and B.J.C. McKercher have written 
excellent chapters on the nature and value of Foreign Office memoirs. See Z. Steiner, ‘The Diplomatic 
Life: Reflections on Selected British Diplomatic Memoirs Written before and after the Great War’, in 
G. Egerton, ed, Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 
167–187, and B.J.C. McKercher, ‘Shield of Memory: Memoirs of the British Foreign Policy-Making 
Elite, 1919–1939’, in Ibid., pp. 188–206. 
 
38
 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 5. 
 
39
 Naylor, Hankey, pp. 76–88. 
  
40
 Warman, ‘Erosion’, p. 138. 
 
41
 Bennett, ‘Control’, p. 470. 
 
42
 Darwin, Britain, p. 14. 
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highly alert to even the slightest indication that his authority might be being 
questioned: ‘Upon a nature as sensitive and egocentric as that of Curzon the very 
existence of the garden suburb...had...a most unsettling effect.’43 Such sensitivity 
thus led to an exaggeration of the threat posed by the likes of Hankey and Kerr. 
Curzon’s issues were not reserved for Lloyd George and his ‘system’ either. In 1921, 
the foreign secretary exchanged a series of heated notes with the then secretary of 
state for the colonies, Winston Churchill, on the latter’s supposed encroachment on 
Foreign Office issues.
44
 And while some have argued that the end of Lloyd George’s 
term as prime minister ‘freed’ Curzon, the foreign secretary continued to chafe under 
his successors. As Bennett explains, ‘if Curzon was unhappy under Lloyd George, 
then he was also equally unhappy under the Bonar Law and Baldwin regimes’.45 
Furthermore, as Kenneth Morgan puts it, ‘…it may be that too much has been made 
of the clashes between Lloyd George and Curzon’.46 Despite his personal contempt 
for Curzon’s aristocratic background, Lloyd George did appreciate his foreign 
secretary’s capabilities and realised the importance of having him in the coalition.47 
One did not have to like the foreign secretary to respect him.  
It was also not only Curzon who fought against a demotion of Foreign Office 
influence in the years after 1918. Charles Hardinge was almost as important a 
political operator as Curzon. He had many years of experience in service of the 
foreign and diplomatic corps, and (like Curzon) had been Viceroy of India. While 
Hardinge’s relationship with Curzon was often contentious, both men did agree on 
the need to maintain Foreign Office hegemony over Britain’s foreign affairs.48 In 
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March 1918, Hardinge created the Political Intelligence Department (PID) under the 
tutelage of the Foreign Office in an effort to counter the Garden Suburb. Sometimes 
known as the ‘Ministry of All Talents’, the PID was an elite group of specialists 
tasked with providing the essential information needed for Britain to formulate its 
policy during the peace process.
49
 How Lloyd George and his entourage chose to use 
such information while in Paris is another matter.
50
 The important point is that the 
Foreign Office was not willing to go quietly into the night. Brian McKercher has 
even demonstrated that, while Foreign Office officials were largely excluded from 
the high level decision making at Paris, their participation in the various sub-
committees and commissions meant they were still able to influence the peace 
settlement. Eyre Crowe played a particularly strong role in Paris, occupying Britain’s 
seat when the senior statesmen were away, and ensuring the Foreign Office’s 
influence was felt.
51
 
All of which is important in answering the question of who was ultimately 
responsible for the creation of Britain’s foreign policy in the post-war years. 
Together with housing some of the most experienced and capable men in the 
government, the Foreign Office was still the preeminent department for information 
on international affairs, whatever contemporaries might have felt about the Garden 
Suburb and Cabinet Secretariat. Into the Foreign Office came reports from embassies 
all over the world, while Curzon’s promotion of the government’s Code and Cipher 
School ensured he had access to all the latest intelligence from abroad.
52
 Even the 
Passport Control Office – which often proved useful in monitoring movements of 
certain persons abroad – came under the Foreign Office’s remit. As Bennett has 
pointed out, Curzon had control of a vast amount of information on Britain’s foreign 
                                                 
49
 Erik Goldstein, ‘British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question: The Political Intelligence 
Department and the Eastern Committee, 1918’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23 (1987), pp. 419–436.   
 
50
 The most common complaint made against Lloyd George is that of his conduct at the Paris Peace 
Conference and the various other conferences which occurred in the aftermath of the war. As 
Hardinge observed, the problem with the prime minister was not only his own lack of knowledge but 
his inability to listen to the advice of experts: ‘If ever he consulted his own Delegation and their 
advice was not such was not such as he desired, he would take and act upon the opinion of anybody 
whose views might coincide with his own, whether they really knew anything of the subject or not.’ 
Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 241. 
  
51
 McKercher, ‘Old Diplomacy’, pp. 90–91.   
 
52
 In 1922 the GC&CS and Secret Intelligence Service officially came under Foreign Office control: 
Maisel, Foreign Office, p. 6.  
 
16 
 
affairs, while his colleagues in government only had what the Foreign Office 
supplied or what they could somehow glean for themselves through alternative 
sources.
53
 This point about information is also worth bearing in mind, for it relates to 
the broader question of how the Foreign Office (and Curzon) formulated policy 
towards southern Asia and Russia in the years after 1918. If knowledge is power, 
then the officials of the Foreign Office should have been well prepared to handle 
affairs in Persia, Afghanistan and Russia – they certainly could not blame any 
mistakes made on ignorance. Nevertheless, as Victor Madeira has shown, 
information is only as useful as what people choose to do with it.
54
 In the end, as 
McKercher summarises, while the Foreign Office may have had ‘less influence after 
1919 than before 1914...it certainly existed as primus inter pares amongst the 
departments of state concerned with Britain’s external position’.55  
 
So far the discussion has been based on a rather broad definition of foreign policy 
after the First World War, but what of southern Asia specifically? Indeed, it could be 
argued that part of the reason for this debate on Lloyd George versus Curzon stems 
from a focus on European affairs. If attention is shifted to South Asia, it quickly 
becomes apparent how significant a figure Curzon really was in the creation of 
Britain’s foreign policy. For, given that this was the foreign secretary’s area of 
apparent expertise, Lloyd George was quite willing to let Curzon run affairs in this 
region, while in turn Curzon was essentially happy to let the prime minister take the 
lead when it came to Europe.
56
 As Gaynor Johnson has put it, in effect ‘the two men 
built up their own spheres of influence within the conduct of British foreign policy 
that were mutually compatible’.57 This is not to say that there was not the occasional 
clash; when it came to relations with Russia, for example, Lloyd George would insist 
on the creation of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement in 1921, despite Curzon’s avid 
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protests.
58
 Yet, Curzon’s personality, knowledge and position of power would enable 
him to exercise great authority, particularly when it came to Persia. 
Before his elevation to the Foreign Office, Curzon initially flexed his muscles 
over the Mesopotamia Administration Committee, of which he became chair in 
March 1917. By 1918, the organisation had developed into the Eastern Committee 
and included members from the War, India and Foreign Offices.
59
 Ostensibly, it was 
the Eastern Committee that was the co-ordinating body for Britain’s overall strategy 
in places such as Persia and Mesopotamia.
60
 If one is looking for where the decisions 
on foreign policy in this region were being made, this should have been the place. 
However, as Erik Goldstein has shown, rather than being a place to discuss and 
formulate policy, the committee was essentially a vehicle for Curzon’s own ego: 
‘Curzon’s practice was to provide the committee with a set of draft resolutions he 
had prepared, the debate which followed therefore concerned not so much the setting 
of policies as the modification or acceptance of Curzon’s version of policy.’61 Sir 
Robert Cecil (assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs) put it aptly when he 
complained to Balfour, that the existence of the Eastern Committee seemed ‘mainly 
to be to enable George Curzon and Mark Sykes to explain to each other how very 
little they know about the subject [of the East]’.62 As will be discussed further in 
Chapter Two, attempts in 1918 to address the problems of co-ordination and 
organisation of Britain’s affairs in this region of the world would fail, in large part 
because of Curzon’s refusal to cooperate. Not until 1920 would a Middle Eastern 
Department be created, and even then Curzon would be quick to quarrel with its 
head, Winston Churchill, every time he felt the department to be encroaching on 
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Foreign Office territory.
63
 A number of short-lived organisations and committees 
would be created during this time with general remits to collect information and 
make policy recommendations on issues in this region which might be of importance 
to the British Empire.
64
 Ultimately, however, when it comes to who effectively had 
the greatest say over foreign policy towards Persia and Afghanistan, George 
Nathaniel Curzon was first among equals. 
 
The Foreign Office Mind and Mental Maps 
It would seem then, that Curzon and his Foreign Office held ultimate sway over the 
creation of Britain’s foreign policy towards Persia and Afghanistan, with the India 
Office, the War Office and the prime minister occasionally contributing to discussion 
and the Indian government relentlessly trying to have its voice heard, to no avail. The 
next question, therefore, is what factors affected the thinking of those involved in the 
formulation of foreign policy at this time? To answer it, we must look more closely 
inside the Foreign Office. Indeed, this was just the thing that many contemporaries 
were doing immediately after 1918. For in the aftermath of the First World War 
public opinion towards the Foreign Office had become highly critical. A common 
belief developed among strands of the population that it had been the secret 
machinations of the foreign policy-making elite which had brought Britain into a 
pointless war, and by 1919 ‘the unpopularity of the British foreign service was at its 
height’.65 This criticism led to calls for reform of the Foreign Office, both in the way 
it operated Britain’s foreign policy and in the very make-up of its personnel.66 The 
notion of the Foreign Office as an exclusively aristocratic, nepotistic, secretive 
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institution, conducting Britain’s foreign affairs with almost unlimited latitude also 
did much to damage the department’s image in the post-war years.67 That in order to 
support oneself while working for the Diplomatic Service one needed a large 
independent income compounded the concept of an elitist organisation.
68
 New 
Europe produced several articles in 1919 which advocated complete reform of the 
Foreign Office from the ground up.
69
 Indeed, even prior to the war, the MacDonnell 
Royal Commission had recommended wholesale reform, particularly in the 
recruitment process of the Foreign Office.
70
  
However, many in the Foreign Office resisted these attempts at reform. One 
observer feared that open competition would allow ‘Jews, coloured men and infidels’ 
to enter the foreign service (an example of just the type of bigotry it was hoped the 
reforms would eliminate).
71
 Some more open-minded officials, nevertheless, realised 
that such changes could improve the Foreign Office by injecting it with new blood.
72
 
By 1919, then, some of the commission’s recommendations were brought in, 
including abolishing the need for the foreign secretary’s nomination for candidates, 
amalgamating the Diplomatic Service with the Foreign Office, and raising the wages 
of those officials working abroad. Yet, despite the significant pressure on the Foreign 
Office from the public, Parliament and from within the government itself, little did 
actually change within the department after 1919.
73
 By 1930, the majority of 
successful candidates for the Foreign Office still had a public school background and 
graduated from Oxford or Cambridge. Personality, rather than intellectual 
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achievement, was still viewed as the key to a successful career in the foreign service 
and the selection board continued to look for the same kind of man – and it always 
was a man – as it had prior to the First World War. Other changes which the reforms 
had brought in were rolled back during the 1920s as the public interest in the Foreign 
Office died down.
74
  
 
The significance of this failed attempt at reform is that it meant that the Foreign 
Office remained relatively the same department in the post-war period that it had 
been prior to 1914. In fact, a large proportion of those who served in the Foreign 
Office and Diplomatic Service before the First World War continued to do so after 
the conflict.
75
 Many of the key players that will feature in this thesis had long-
standing experience of foreign service: Sir Lancelot Oliphant, Sir Percy Loraine and 
Sir Percy Cox to name a few. Balfour, Curzon and Hardinge were three of the most 
influential figures within the British government in the first half of the twentieth 
century. All three had cut their teeth on foreign affairs years before the outbreak of 
the First World War. Not only did these men share an educational and class 
background, but the preparation and training for their work in the Foreign Office 
resulted in an almost homogeneous view of the nature of Britain’s foreign affairs. 
The seasoned diplomat and author, Harold Nicolson, termed this mode of thought 
‘the Foreign Office mind’, while another contemporary referred to the department as 
‘the brotherhood’.76 Importantly, those men who made up ‘the brotherhood’ in the 
early years of the twentieth century adhered to a certain way of thinking about 
Britain’s foreign relations which has earned them the label the ‘Edwardians’.77 As 
opposed to the ‘Victorians’, who eschewed alliances with other powers, the 
Edwardians championed the concept of a ‘balance of power’.78 Eyre Crowe’s 1907 
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memorandum on Britain’s relations with France and Germany has come to be seen as 
the classic exposition of this doctrine.
79
 The fact that the paper was still being read in 
the 1920s by Foreign Office officials is a prime example of how pre-1914 concepts 
of foreign affairs were carried into the post-1918 period.
80
 That Crowe himself 
remained a prominent figure within the department after the First World War 
personified this continuity in the Edwardians’ way of thinking. 
In his work on the administration of Britain’s foreign relations, D.G. Bishop 
devotes a full chapter to the concept of continuity. He argues that since the end of the 
nineteenth century there has been an implicit understanding within the government 
‘that foreign policy should be above and outside party conflict’. While successive 
governments might emphasise different points of foreign policy, the key goals 
remained essentially the same.
81
 It is this continuity which allows British foreign 
policy makers to take decisions based on the long-term issues rather than the short-
term repercussions. What is more, the wealth of knowledge and experience which 
Foreign Office officials and diplomats carried with them was useful when it came to 
tackling the big issues of foreign policy. However, the risk of such uniformity in 
personnel is that it left the Foreign Office vulnerable to ‘group think’, preventing 
innovation and dynamism of thought. The inherent discomfort many in the Foreign 
Office appeared to have in regard to amending their policies and processes could also 
prove a hindrance when it came to trying to adapt to the rapidly changing nature of 
the international scene. Being aware of these internal issues of the Foreign Office 
goes some way to explaining how foreign policy was formulated within the 
department. 
Understanding the Foreign Office mind is further advocated by James Joll 
and Zara Steiner. Joll’s concept of ‘unspoken assumptions’ plays a crucial part in his 
study of the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War: 
When political leaders are faced with the necessity of taking decisions the 
outcome for which they cannot foresee, in crises which they do not wholly 
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understand, they fall back on their own instinctive reactions, traditions and 
modes of behaviour. Each of them has certain beliefs, rules or objectives which 
are taken for granted.
82
 
As Steiner explains further: ‘Historical example is used to buttress predetermined 
conclusions. Experience is assimilated into an existing framework of inherited ideas’ 
– a process termed ‘mental maps’.83 To put it another way, Curzon, Hardinge, Crowe 
and others would invariably use their knowledge, experience and opinions gained 
prior to the First World War to help formulate their ideas in the post-war years. The 
fact that each official within the Foreign Office was of the same cultural, ethnic and 
class background, and tended to view the world in the same way (the Foreign Office 
mind), meant that these mental maps were rarely challenged – at least not from 
within the department. The point is an important one. That men such as Hardinge 
would rather support Curzon, even though he was often wrong in his assertions, than 
heed the Indian government, must say something about how the Foreign Office mind 
functioned.  
There are some, however, who question the need to study the personnel of the 
Foreign Office. Paul Kennedy, for example, believes it is the ‘issues and impulses’ 
that ‘affected both the conception and the execution of Britain’s external policy’ and 
therefore deserve more attention than government structures – issues such as the 
impact of Bolshevism, the rise of the Labour party and public opinion on war. 
Kennedy’s argument suggests that the officials of the British government were 
vessels through which the ‘issues’ travelled – they were ‘the plumbing, not the water; 
the wires, and not the electrical impulses’.84 The question of how the history of 
foreign policy should be tackled is a contentious one. G.M. Young famously (and 
contemptuously) argued that ‘diplomatic history is little more than the record of what 
one clerk said to another clerk’.85 And yet, as Michael Hughes has pointed out, ‘a 
good deal of recent literature on international history and political science 
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has...shown that individuals can exert a great influence on the way in which complex 
political processes develop’.86 D.C. Watt is one such writer who has looked at the 
impact of personality on the formulation of British foreign policy.
87
 Zara Steiner, in 
her seminal work on the pre-war Foreign Office, has focused on both the men who 
staffed the department and various influences on foreign policy making, such as the 
press.
88
 As to whether good history can be written by studying the personality of 
government figures, T.G. Otte provides a succinct defence: 
It is true, of course, that political decisions were shaped and formed by the 
political system in which they were produced. But these decisions were the 
responsibilities of a decision-making elite, of politicians and civil servants. 
International history cannot be understood unless an attempt is made to 
understand their decisions and actions. And these in turn cannot be 
comprehended unless the historian elucidates the often unarticulated 
assumptions, hidden axioms and the perceptions by which the decision-makers 
were guided. It is these assumptions, the thought-world of the decision-makers 
which hold the key to a more thorough understanding of history.
89
  
If one wants to understand the creation of British foreign policy, one needs to know 
what the ‘issues and impulses’ of the day were, and how they related to official 
thinking. 
While recognising the existence of the Foreign Office mind is important in 
ensuring proper analysis of how British foreign policy was formulated, this is not to 
say that all the officials of that department held a single view on all issues. They 
were, after all, individuals capable of forming their own opinions and debating 
important matters. The Foreign Office mind simply meant that these individuals 
shared certain values and that such debates, when they occurred, usually centred on 
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nuances of policy, rather than the larger issues of British foreign affairs.
90
 Likewise, 
it is also important to note that while little distinction has been made thus far, 
between the Foreign Office and the foreign secretary, this does not mean that the two 
were one and the same. In fact, in the following chapters, Curzon’s is the name 
which appears more than any other, including that of Hardinge or Crowe. The reason 
for this, as Chapter One will explain further, is simply that Curzon was preeminent 
when it came to British relations with South Asia in the post-war period.  Other 
scholars, such as Otte and Steiner, have demonstrated the important role which the 
Foreign Office personnel played in the creation of foreign policy prior to 1914. 
However, even Steiner acknowledges that ‘civil servants can only aid or complicate 
the foreign secretary’s task’. In the end, the ultimate decisions rested with the foreign 
secretary.
91
 The various clerks and under-secretaries of the Foreign Office could 
offer intelligent and valuable advice to the head of their department, but they could 
not make him accept it.
92
 And, as will come to be seen, Curzon was one who only 
paid heed to what he wanted to hear, often rejecting anything which did not fit with 
his predetermined plan of action. If Curzon dominates this thesis, it is a reflection of 
how he dominated Britain’s relations with South Asia between 1918 and 1924. 
 
 
Prestige 
Having discussed the processes of Foreign Office thinking, it is important to look at 
what exactly officials were thinking about when looking at Britain’s foreign 
relations. And the answer to that is simple – empire.93 The British Empire in the 
years after the First World War has been of interest to many scholars, largely because 
of the debate on the issue of decline which has dominated the historiography. In fact, 
as John Darwin puts it, ‘to an outsider historians must sometimes seem perversely 
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obsessed with decline’.94 The explanation for this is that ‘historians have sometimes 
tended to regard the outbreak of the First World War as the decisive turning-point in 
Britain’s imperial experience, separating the era of strength and success from the era 
of decline and dissolution’.95 It has often been argued that the First World War set in 
motion the destruction of the empire by depleting Britain’s financial resources to the 
point where it went from being the world’s creditor to being a nation deeply in debt. 
This economic stress forced Britain to rapidly reduce its military expenditure and 
placed restrictions on the ability of government officials to use financial leverage in 
their diplomatic negotiations. Such a loss of economic power is often taken to 
indicate a corresponding decline both in Britain’s imperial status and in the very will 
of the political elite to hold on to the empire.
96
 According to some, in the face of 
depleted coffers and extensive nationalist uprisings throughout the empire, and 
without the military resources to assert its authority, London lost all enthusiasm for 
the imperial mission.
97
 The enactment in 1919 of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms 
in India, for example, have been seen as an indication by some that Britain knew its 
imperial days were numbered.
98
 John Gallagher, for instance, believes that in the 
post-war period ‘India was beginning to lose pride of place in British calculations; 
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that the trend already faintly signalled by the Anglo-Russian Agreement in 1907 was 
growing by the 1920s’.99 After the First World War, the empire had become ‘an 
unmitigated burden’.100  
However, the arguments advocating imperial decline after 1918 suffer from 
certain flaws, not least of which is the emphasis on economics. Peter J. Cain and 
Antony G. Hopkins, for example, have challenged this traditional concept of 
Britain’s economic decline, arguing that, while Britain’s manufacturing output might 
indeed have fallen after 1918, industrial capability is not the only measure of a 
country’s economic strength. In the opinion of Cain and Hopkins, financial services 
(such as banking and insurance) were a crucial part of Britain’s economy after the 
First World War, a fact which others have tended to overlook. Indeed, it was this 
form of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ with which the political elite in London had the 
greatest affiliation, rather than the declining industrial centres of the north. Many in 
Whitehall were also largely insulated from the day-to-day consequences of financial 
constraint that the general population may have faced. All of which meant that 
domestic economic problems did not necessarily affect government figures as much 
as some have argued.
101
  
This is not to say that the British government was entirely unaware of the 
country’s financial problems – budget cuts certainly affected many departments after 
the war. Rather, it is to question the assertion that these economic issues precipitated 
a crisis of confidence among the ruling elite of Britain. For one thing, the British 
Empire was not defined entirely by economics. As Cain and Hopkins emphasise, 
‘Power, considered as a measure of the ability to influence others, is relative as well 
as absolute, and potential as well as real’. Too often economic performance and 
political strength are assumed to be connected, with little explanation as to how.
102
 
John Ferris concurs: ‘Historians of British power have paid too much attention to 
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economic history and too little to imperial history.’103 One caveat, however, is the 
issue of military expenditure, although even here the picture is complex. Keith 
Jeffrey has produced a number of well-researched works that have shown the 
conflicts within the government regarding reduction in military spending.
104
 The 
point is that the correlation between the international standing of a country and the 
numerical strength of its military is difficult to define and not always obvious. For 
example, in Persia the withdrawal of British troops in the years after the First World 
War was seen by some as a sign of Britain’s weakness. Yet, there had always been a 
level of resentment among the Persian population at the stationing of foreign troops 
in their country – thus, removal of these soldiers could be said to have improved 
Britain’s standing in the eyes of some. When it came to India’s military capabilities 
after 1918, while it was important that Delhi could command a strong enough force 
to defeat Afghanistan in the 1919 conflict, the size of the army was not crucial to the 
Indian government’s ability to deal effectively with Gandhi. Indeed, after the First 
World War overt shows of military strength within India often harmed Britain’s 
position more than it helped, as the Amritsar Massacre demonstrated.
105
 When it 
comes to the notion of ‘power’ (or ‘the ability to influence others’ if Cain and 
Hopkins definition is used) economic capability is thus but one part of its 
composition. In Ferris’s opinion, ‘power’ can be defined by several things, including 
not only physical resources but the projected image of a state.
106
 Indeed, Ferris 
emphasises that, in fact, it is how a country is perceived by others that lies at the real 
root of its strength. Britain may have been economically and militarily weakened by 
the First World War, but as long as other nations believed it to be strong, it was.  
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That prestige was a crucial asset to the empire was acknowledged by 
practically all those involved in Britain’s foreign affairs: as Harold Nicolson put it: 
‘What credit is to a large firm of bankers, prestige is to the administration of 
Empire.’107 The intangible forces of authority and reputation were believed by 
British contemporaries to be particularly important to its position within Asia and the 
Middle and Far East. Lord Minto, Viceroy of India from 1905 to 1910, articulated 
what many within the government thought when he noted that ‘We must remember 
the huge influence of British prestige... it has solid value in the East’.108 Despite what 
some writers have said, nobody in the British government – either in London or 
Delhi or elsewhere – displayed any disillusionment with the empire. In the post-war 
years, rather than seeing a beleaguered second-rate world power, ‘Important 
contemporaries...believed precisely the opposite: that the war had demonstrated, 
perhaps reinvigorated, the greatness of Great Britain’ and its empire.109 Even some 
foreign observers believed that the empire was still a force to be reckoned with, as 
one German noted in 1920: 
[Britain] has strengthened her power and her trade, has gained valuable new 
regions... and her world empire has increased in land-size by around 27 percent 
and in population by almost the same. This has resulted in a global power and 
position as never before; England is the only winner from this war, England 
together with North America: one can see an Anglo-Saxon world mastery 
rising on the horizon...
110
 
As for India, if there had ever been doubt prior to the First World War, that conflict 
had proved beyond measure the value of the Raj to the empire. India’s armies had 
been instrumental in the prosecution of the war and the country had earned a 
reputation as ‘the battering ram of British power’.111 Indeed, Montagu made his 
position quite clear in 1922 in a telegram to the viceroy: ‘Reports are constantly 
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being received in England that we look upon our mission in India as drawing to a 
close, and that we are preparing for a retreat. Should such an idea exist, it is a 
complete fallacy.’112 This determination to hold on to the empire was apparent not 
only in Britain’s policies in India but also in its attempts to retain hegemony in Asia 
and the Middle East at large: ‘Far from sensing the coming dissolution of their world 
power, the policy-makers set themselves the task of digging its foundations yet more 
deeply...’113 As one historian has elegantly put it, ‘if the lion had ceased to roar, it 
was not yet ready to lie down with the lambs’.114 
Instead, the problem for the British government lay not in whether it should 
hold on to the empire, but how. And this was ultimately rooted in the concept of 
power. For, although officials knew the empire needed to be perceived as strong, 
how prestige was to be defined and measured – and therefore how it was to be 
maintained – was another matter. And it is here where opinion divided. Broadly 
speaking, for Curzon and others in the Home government, Britain’s imperial position 
in places like Persia, Afghanistan and India after 1918 was best maintained by an 
unyielding and unwavering show of authority – diplomatic, economic and military 
pressure was all to be used to make foreign rulers compliant to Britain’s wishes, 
while any groups or individuals who questioned Britain’s authority were to be dealt 
with swiftly lest the empire appear weak. For the Indian government, however, such 
an approach to foreign relations in southern Asia was exactly the way to diminish 
Britain’s influence there. Instead, it advocated making concessions to some of the 
nationalist and pan-Islamist movements, to demonstrate the empire did not stand in 
the way of progressive liberal reform in this region of the world. The following 
chapters will show who was right. 
 
Russia 
Together with knowing who was responsible for creating British foreign policy in the 
post-war period, and in understanding what influenced their thinking, another 
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question to be answered is what role Russia played in these thought processes. Here 
it is necessary to piece together the puzzle, for there are two main issues with the 
existing literature. The first is that not enough writers have looked properly at how 
the policies of Britain towards both Russia and southern Asia interacted; at how the 
British government’s imperial interests in South Asia affected the way it viewed 
Soviet Russia and vice versa.
115
 For example, Housang Sabahi has studied British 
policy towards Persia from 1918 to 1925. However, despite discussing the part 
Soviet Russia played in this country in these years, Sabahi fails to show how opinion 
about the Bolshevik regime might have affected the creation of Britain’s Persia 
policy.
116
 Richard Ullman’s seminal three-volume work, Anglo-Soviet Relations 
1917–1921, is dedicated to analysing the internal discussions of the British 
government in regards to Bolshevik Russia.
117
 In his third volume, Ullman even 
devotes a full chapter to Britain’s and Russia’s interaction in Persia. And yet, 
important debates between London and Delhi on how best to address the growth of 
Bolshevik influence in southern Asia are missing.
118
 This means that the imperial 
aspect of Britain’s decision-making towards Russia is not afforded its proper 
relevance. The second problem is that even of those who have studied the dynamic 
between Britain, South Asia and Soviet Russia, even fewer have explored how the 
legacy of the Great Game may have impacted upon the post-1918 mental maps of 
British officials. Some writers have hinted at this – Stephen White, for example, 
acknowledges that there was ‘a good deal which was traditional’ about Anglo-Soviet 
relations in South Asia after the First World War. However, he does not choose to 
explain what exactly this ‘tradition’ meant for formulation of British foreign policy, 
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either in relation to Russia or southern Asia.
119
 John Fisher notes how ‘some of the 
discussions of the IDCEU [Interdepartmental Committee on Eastern Unrest] retained 
the exotic and eccentric flavour of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the previous century’, 
but, again, does not elaborate.
120
 Not enough writers have asked how the thinking of 
British officials in this period might have had more to do with their experience of 
imperial competition in southern Asia prior to 1914 than of post-revolution Russia 
itself. 
Frederick Stanwood is one of the few who has made a good attempt at 
addressing these issues, by looking at Britain’s reaction to Bolshevism in relation to 
Persia.
121
 Stanwood discusses nationalist and pan-Islamic movements in Persia and 
even suggests that Britain’s policies there were motivated not only by its views on 
Bolshevism but by longer term imperial factors.
122
 Unfortunately, however, 
Stanwood’s work does not go beyond 1918, hence important events such as the 
creation of the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 and the Bolshevik landings at 
Enzeli in 1921 are not covered. This limited time frame also means that there can be 
no exploration of how British policy towards both Persia and Bolshevik Russia might 
have developed after the conclusion of the First World War and as international 
relations began to settle into peace time. Lastly, because Stanwood focuses almost 
exclusively on Persia the debates between London and Delhi on Britain’s foreign 
policy are not put into proper context.
123
 As noted above, by studying British 
relations with Afghanistan, it quickly becomes apparent that the tendency for India to 
be ignored was not isolated to just Persia; which in turn leads to further questions 
about why these disagreements between the Home and Indian governments existed. 
Similar issues regarding scope also affect John Fisher’s work. While Fisher is 
another of the few to acknowledge how a tradition of rivalry with Russia affected the 
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thinking of some British officials, unfortunately he chooses to focus mainly on the 
Middle East and the Caucasus
124
 (rather than southern Asia) and stops his discussion 
at 1919.
125
 Peter Hopkirk’s excellent work on Anglo-Soviet rivalry in South Asia 
after the 1917 revolution is a further exception to the rule. As Hopkirk puts it, after 
1917 ‘far from being over, the Great Game was about to being again with a 
vengeance’.126 Perhaps it is because Hopkirk has also studied the Great Game that he 
has been more attune to the continuities between the two periods of history.
127
 
Nonetheless, the nature of Hopkirk’s work is that he tends to focus on the tales of 
individuals and largely ‘the men on the ground’ – the adventurers and spies 
conducting intrigue on their country’s behalf. The upper echelons of British 
government and their formulation of policy is therefore neglected. This limits the use 
of Hopkirk’s work and its reliability. 
 
Why is it, then, that more writers have not followed the likes of Stanwood, Fisher 
and Hopkirk? Why is the historiography of pre-1917 and post-1917 Anglo-Russian 
relations so largely disconnected? One answer seems to be the issue of ideology. The 
Bolshevik revolution ushered into Russia a political regime which was anathema to 
the majority of British officials. Thus, a large section of the literature on Anglo-
Russian relations after 1917 focuses on the idea that Britain’s policies towards its 
erstwhile imperial competitor were now conditioned by abhorrence of the Bolshevik 
ideology, rather than by the geopolitical concerns of the pre-revolution period. Time 
and again Britain’s participation in the allied intervention in the Russian civil war is 
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defined as an ‘anti-Bolshevik crusade’, often without supporting evidence.128 For 
example, Chattar Singh Samra starts his work on a positive, acknowledging the need 
to understand pre-1917 Anglo-Russian relations in order to fully comprehend affairs 
after the revolution. However, Samra then ignores his own good advice and argues 
that the central feature of Britain’s attitude towards Russia after 1917 was a hatred of 
Communism.
129
 The problem with this ideology argument is that, for one thing, it 
has been constructed as an explanation for Britain’s participation in the intervention 
– and more specifically the intervention in the north of Russia. It does not work to 
explain the whole of British policy towards Russia after 1917, for as soon as one 
shifts focus to the south of that country, one sees that the Malleson mission to 
Meshed and the Dunsterforce initiative in Baku, for example, were not conceived as 
part of an ‘anti-Bolshevik crusade’.130 Instead, Malleson and Dunsterville were First 
World War manifestations of a decades long British obsession with the security of 
India’s borders. Which leads to another point: was Perfidious Albion really so 
concerned with what was occurring some 1600 miles away from its mainland that it 
would send money and troops into Russia and Central Asia simply to counter an 
ideology it did not like?  
This is not to say that there was no feeling of anti-Bolshevism within the 
British government, or that this did not influence the thinking of officials in 
Whitehall. The anarchy and violence which the October revolution ushered in, the 
decline of Russia into civil war, the betrayal of the Allied cause, the execution of 
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Tsar Nicholas II and his family, all created a feeling of horror among most British 
officials. Memorandum and reports were constantly being produced by various 
government bodies detailing the apparent decrepitude of the Bolshevik regime.
131
 
The problem, however, is when anti-Bolshevism is discussed to the exclusion of all 
other explanations. By assuming too quickly that ideology was the sole motivator 
behind Britain’s actions towards Russia after 1917, other facets of the topic – such as 
imperial concerns and the legacy of the past – are sidelined, leaving only a partial 
picture of affairs. As Madeira explains, Britain’s policy towards Russia, ‘while 
designed to vanquish Bolshevism if possible, mainly intended to contain the ‘Reds’ 
by preventing them from encroaching on British possessions, in a new variant of the 
old ‘Great Game’’.132 The main reason for this flaw in the current canon of literature 
is that for those whose remit is the post-revolution period, the focus has been almost 
entirely on the idea of change rather than continuity. The Allied intervention,
 133
 the 
impact of Bolshevism on British Labour,
134
 the Trade Agreement negotiations
135
 – 
all of these topics have monopolised scholarly interest and come to define Anglo-
Russian relations in this period. Because a significant proportion of the literature has 
focused on issues which had no parallel in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, 
this has left the impression that the October revolution constituted almost a complete 
break with the past. Anglo-Soviet relations are viewed as fundamentally different to 
Anglo-Russian relations, and because the transformation was due to Bolshevism, the 
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relationship between Britain and Russia after 1917 is in turn defined by ideology. 
The trouble with this line of thought is that it presupposes that both countries were 
affected in the same measure by the events of October 1917. Yet, while the 
Bolshevik revolution may have been of monumental consequence to Russia, the 
same could not necessarily be said for Britain. This is particularly true in the early 
years of the revolution, when not only was there limited information on the 
Bolshevik regime, but there was also little expectation that Lenin and his comrades 
would survive as a viable government anyway.
136
 For most observers among the 
British political elite, October 1917 was just one further upheaval in Russia’s already 
turbulent domestic history.
137
  
Any information the British government did have on the Bolshevik regime 
mainly focused on their domestic policies. The British representative, Robert Bruce-
Lockhart, and British military personnel involved in the intervention could provide 
information on affairs such as the Red Terror and the civil war, yet could comment 
little on Bolshevik foreign policy.
138
 Even some of the trips to Russia made by 
British representatives later on in the 1920s still focused their attention on domestic 
affairs.
139
 The proclamations made by Lenin and his men upon seizing power and 
during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations were about the only official statements on 
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Soviet foreign policy which British officials could study.
140
 From these limited 
resources, Whitehall certainly realised the anti-imperialist nature of the Bolshevik 
government. The events of Brest-Litovsk also taught them not to trust the new 
regime in Moscow. However, little was properly understood of the practicalities of 
Soviet foreign policy or, as Stanwood points out, about specific Bolshevik intentions 
towards Asia.
141
 As this thesis will argue, with such little knowledge on which to 
judge Bolshevik foreign policy (particularly in the early years after 1917), many 
British officials would simply fall back on what they knew – the Great Game. In her 
work on the pre-war period, Jennifer Siegel argues that the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
Convention did not signal the end of the Great Game because, essentially, the men 
on the ground in places like Persia continued to think in Great Game terms and 
therefore still intrigued against their imperial rivals.
142
 This, in essence, is the 
argument of this thesis – that as long as the Great Game mentality existed in the 
minds of key British officials then the Great Game continued on.
143
 As Siegel notes 
further, with a ‘distinct dearth of adequate intelligence on the Russian Civil War, 
policy-makers within the Foreign Office and other government departments were 
free to draw their own conclusions which were loosely based upon the realities of the 
situation, at best’.144 To some, while Russian domestic politics were continually 
turbulent, the one constant had always been that country’s ambition in Asia. Thus, in 
the early years after the October revolution, there were many in London who simply 
used the same framework they had always used – their mental maps – and 
formulated policy based on Russia’s potential to threaten the stability of southern 
Asia.  
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Which takes us back to the Indian government – why did Delhi not think about 
Bolshevik Russia in the same terms as London did? Why were they, in effect, using 
different mental maps – ones which had less to do with traditional Great Game 
thinking? Given the parameters of this work (which focuses on the formulation of 
opinion in London), it will be difficult to comprehensively answer this. However, the 
question has always been in mind during the research for this work, and certainly 
some theories could be postulated. For example, one answer might lie in the 
intelligence which the Home and Indian governments were receiving. This will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five, but it would seem that while the reports being 
produced in India gave Delhi confidence in its abilities to handle any Bolshevik 
agitation, in London the work of the various intelligence agencies only increased its 
fear of Russian-sponsored anti-British intrigue.
145
 Nevertheless, as noted above, it 
would take some time for both the Home and Indian governments to be able to 
systematically gather information on the Bolshevik regime and its activities. In the 
meantime, in the early years following the conclusion of the First World War, it was 
most likely the rise of nationalism and pan-Islamism within India which caused 
Delhi to develop different mental maps; to re-allocate the traditional enemy from 
Russia to these other home-grown forces of instability. John Fisher has noted the 
idea of physical proximity and how this affected the thinking of the India Office.
146
 
This theory suggests that because Indian officials were exposed on a daily basis to 
the nationalist and pan-Islamic discontent of the South Asian masses, they were more 
likely to see this as the main threat to Britain’s imperial interests. In contrast, because 
those in London were removed from these relatively new forces of unrest, they did 
not heed them as much as the Indian government – a simple answer perhaps, but a 
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seemingly logical one. The debates between Delhi and London will be a central 
feature of the following chapters. What is important to emphasise here is that not 
enough scholars have taken the time to try to comprehensively explain these issues 
surrounding the thought processes of those involved in British foreign affairs after 
the First World War. As can be seen, trying to understand what influenced British 
government officials and what motivated their advocacy of certain foreign policies is 
like piecing together a puzzle. The ‘Foreign Office mind’ and ‘mental maps’; the 
importance of studying individuals rather than only ‘issues and impulses’; the notion 
of prestige and the complexity of how a nation’s power is measured; how Russia, 
Bolshevism and the Great Game influenced thinking – each is a piece of the picture.  
 
Argument, Sources and Structure 
As this discussion has shown, while there is no lack of literature on the British 
Empire, imperial policy in Asia and the Middle East, Anglo-Russian relations and 
even the British Foreign Office in the early twentieth century, there is still work to be 
done on this subject, particularly on understanding how all these different strands of 
research fit together. What this thesis will do is utilise the existing body of literature 
and build upon what has already been done by the likes of Stanwood, Fisher, White 
and Hopkirk. It will pull together some of the thoughts of other writers, and try to 
address issues which have only really been hinted at elsewhere. By looking briefly at 
the legacy of the Great Game, and then focusing in detail on the years 1918 to 1923, 
this thesis will demonstrate the continuity of thought which existed between the pre-
war and post-war period. Utilising primary documents from the National Archives of 
the Foreign Office, the War Office and the Cabinet, together with India Office papers 
held at the British Library, discussion will focus on the debates which raged between 
London and Delhi on all aspects of British policy towards southern Asia and Russia 
after the end of the First World War. The annotations of Curzon on various 
memorandum, telegrams and reports – often scathing, sometimes witty, always 
entertaining – are a particular insight into the mind of the foreign secretary. The 
numerous letters and telegrams sent between the secretary of state for India, Edwin 
Montagu, and two successive viceroys, Lord Chelmsford and Lord Reading, also 
provide particular illumination to this topic. Personal collections of key figures such 
as the Chief of General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, and the British ambassador to 
Tehran, Sir Percy Loraine, also help to provide background.  
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To be more specific, given what has been said so far about the flaws in the 
current state of literature on this subject and about the research questions which 
remain to be answered, the following chapters will lay out an argument which aims 
to comprehensively address this gap. In essence, it will be shown that there were 
those within the British government – and particularly within the Foreign Office – 
who displayed an attitude towards Soviet Russia and southern Asia that emanated 
from the decades prior to the First World War. This continuity of thought was rooted 
in the Great Game, and it is this ‘Great Game mentality’ that informed the decision-
making process of certain government officials in the post-war period. The concept 
of a Great Game mind-set will be explained in further detail in Chapter One, but 
fundamentally it consisted of believing Russia – irrespective of who ruled it – to be a 
permanent rival for influence within southern Asia, and a threat to Britain’s position 
in India. Indeed, this Great Game thinking tended to over-emphasise the danger of 
Russia to Britain’s imperial interests and, after 1917, often judged Bolshevik foreign 
policy by that pursued by the tsarist government, thereby failing to formulate policies 
which would counter the potential for Bolshevism to take hold in South Asia. As 
pointed out above, southern Asia was where Britain and Russia had traditionally 
played out their rivalry and Anglo-Soviet relations were still largely defined by 
interaction in this region of the world. For Britain, the Bolshevik revolution had not 
constituted a great watershed, and for those of a Great Game mentality, policy 
towards South Asia and policy towards Russia were largely intertwined.  
The legacy of the Great Game also meant that countries such as Persia and 
Afghanistan were seen only as pieces in the contest with Soviet Russia. The value of 
these two countries lay almost exclusively in their relation to Anglo-Russian rivalry 
and the security of India’s borders, while their internal politics were generally 
ignored by Great Game thinkers. This focus on Russia as a threat and this view of 
Persia and Afghanistan as mere pawns resulted in a failure of some in the British 
government to recognise the rising strength of the pan-Islamic and nationalist 
movements taking hold of Asia in the post-war period. Those who did realise the 
seriousness of these movements would be largely ignored by the Great Game 
thinkers. Thus, while the Indian government would try to turn the attention of the 
Home government from Bolshevik Russia to nationalist Asia, London did not want 
to listen. Between 1918 and 1923, events would occur that would demonstrate the 
fallacy of this Great Game mentality, and force those who adhered to it to adjust their 
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policies accordingly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that this fear of Russia 
was never really discarded by many British officials and that the modification of 
British policy that took place from 1921 was, in fact, simply a pragmatic change of 
tactics rather than a change of heart.  
 
It is also often just as helpful to know what will not be included in a work as what it 
will include. This thesis does not purport to be a balanced exploration of Anglo-
Russian rivalry in Asia in this period, but focuses instead on British policy only. 
Where discussion of Soviet foreign policy towards Asia does occur it is based on 
work already done by other researchers and is used with the aim of contrasting what 
British government officials perceived Bolshevik aims in Asia to be, not in 
understanding what such aims actually were. For the purposes of this work, ‘South 
Asia’ will largely refer to Persia, Afghanistan and India, with only brief mention of 
events in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Turkey, the Transcaucasus, Transcaspia and 
Turkestan as they pertain to Britain’s general international situation. In the same 
vein, this thesis does not discuss British imperial policy at large and affairs in 
Ireland, for example, are not mentioned. Aside from the issue of brevity, the reason 
for this decision of focus lies in the issues discussed above – namely the influence of 
the Great Game on the thinking of some British officials regarding Russia, Persia, 
Afghanistan and India. Persia and Afghanistan are singled out here as they were the 
two countries in which the Great Game most heavily featured in the nineteenth 
century, and in which Anglo-Russian conflict continued to occur in the post-war 
period. There are undoubtedly those who would argue that British imperial policy 
should be discussed as a whole, and that affairs in Egypt or even Ireland, for 
example, were all connected to decisions being made over Persia. John Gallagher, for 
one, advocates ‘studying problems, not regions’.147 However, while it is true that 
many of the same considerations informed policy towards other areas of the world as 
towards South Asia, a problem inherent in casting one’s net too wide is that one is 
forced into generalisations, as Gallagher’s own work unfortunately demonstrates. His 
attempt at explaining government reaction to the crises that beset the entirety of the 
British Empire means that many of his statements are too sweeping. The subtleties of 
debate within the British government are missing – for example, the disagreements 
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between the Home and Indian governments are not fully explored.
148
 Furthermore, 
Gallagher can only reference in passing the troubles caused by the pan-Islamic 
movement, or the influence of Bolshevism. 
Indeed, while concern about imperial prestige and power contributed to 
Britain’s Irish policy, and the security of India helped justify a presence in Egypt, at 
the end of everything, Britain did not have to worry overly about a possible incursion 
of the Red Army into Cairo (much less Dublin or Belfast).
149
 While civil unrest in 
places such as Ireland, Egypt and Mesopotamia undoubtedly caused Britain 
problems, again it did not have to counter the influence of Bolshevik agents in these 
countries the same way it had to with India. Persia and Afghanistan lay directly 
between British India and Russia, a highly vulnerable buffer zone in British eyes. In 
effect, all the issues that Britain faced in its imperial policy at large were 
compounded in Persia, Afghanistan and India by the threat of Russia looming on the 
border. Furthermore, this work will argue that British officials themselves viewed 
this region of the world differently to other areas of imperial interest. For the Indian 
government, Persia and Afghanistan represented a barrier which was in essence the 
last line of India’s defence; for Great Game thinkers, these two countries were prizes 
up for grabs in the relentless competition for hegemony in Asia. And if further reason 
is needed for the choice of Persia, Afghanistan and India for the focus of this work, 
events in these countries in the early twentieth century make them not only 
interesting but important nations to study. The Persian revolution of 1905 to 1911, 
the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, the Caliphate agitation and the non-
cooperation policy of Gandhi and his followers throughout the 1920s, are just some 
examples of movements and events which signified the rise of nationalism and pan-
Islamism in this region of the world and which directly impacted Britain’s imperial 
interests.  
Since it is a contention herein that the Bolshevik revolution was not as 
seismic an event for Britain as for Russia, the focus of research will begin not at 
1917, but at what was the most important marker of this period for British foreign 
policy – the conclusion of the First World War in November 1918. Chapter Two will 
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thus begin here and end in 1919, exploring how the Great Game mentality of some 
within the British government influenced policy towards Persia and Afghanistan in 
these early post-war months. It will contrast this thinking – which was centred 
largely at the Foreign Office – with the opinions of the Indian government and its 
preoccupation with pan-Islamism and nationalism. Chapter Three will look at the 
year 1920 and how events in Persia and Afghanistan came to challenge the optimism 
and ambition which had characterised the immediate aftermath of the First World 
War. It will compare the apparent ascendancy of Bolshevism in Central and South 
Asia to the relative downfall of British prestige in this region and explore the 
progress of Muslim extremism. If Chapter Two demonstrates the continuity of 
thought from the Great Game period into the post-war period, and Chapter Three 
shows how such individuals were forced to face the changed nature of international 
relations, then Chapter Four will explore how the foreign policy-making elite came 
to reconcile this disparity between continuity and change in 1921. Chapter Five in 
many respects will be the culmination of the journey from 1918. It will chart how the 
optimism and ambition that had characterised British policies pursued in Persia and 
Afghanistan in 1918 and 1919, were to be replaced with a more realistic and practical 
state of affairs by 1923. By 1924, a change of government in Britain would see the 
removal of many key figures from power, and so the story will end there. However, 
in the meantime, Chapter One will set the scene for the whole of the thesis, by 
looking at the Great Game and the legacy it left on British foreign policy towards 
South Asia in the post-war period.  
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Chapter One: Curzon, Russia and the Great Game 
 
In the mid-nineteenth century, a young British officer serving in Afghanistan came to 
believe that it was his ‘mission to frustrate Russian schemes of conquest in Central 
Asia and convince its independent Muslim rulers to band together and seek British 
protection’. What Arthur Conolly wanted most, he wrote to a friend in 1841, was to 
play a leading role in this ‘great game’ in Central Asia. Rudyard Kipling’s Kim might 
have helped the term to enter British lexicon, but it was a real life Great Game player 
who had first coined the phrase.
150
 Indeed, within a year of writing to his friend, the 
unfortunate Conolly would have met an end seemingly taken from the pages of 
fiction. Having travelled to Bokhara on a mission to rescue a fellow British officer, 
Colonel Charles Stoddart, from the hold of the capricious emir, Conolly found 
himself also taken captive. After spending a tortuous few months in a bug infested 
pit, Conolly and Stoddart were finally executed in 1842 – a death perhaps befitting 
the ultimate Great Gamer.
151
  
If only Conolly could have known the place he would come to occupy in the 
history books. For the expression he used would become so ubiquitous in the 
twentieth century that it would end up being used by politicians, journalists and 
writers to refer to almost any conflict in Asia or the Middle East that involved 
outside powers. Indeed, for some authors (such as Peter Hopkirk), the collapse of the 
USSR and the subsequent opening up of Central Asia has precipitated a second wave 
of international interest in the region that has come to be known as the ‘new Great 
Game’ – a phrase even used to describe the current war in Afghanistan.152 And what 
was once a game played only between Britain and Russia, has now found a third 
player in the form of the USA.
153
 Yet, the ‘Great Game’ is not merely a general 
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catchphrase to be applied to any and every issue arising in Asia. Instead, it is an 
important concept in history, and understanding how the Great Game should be 
defined is essential to grasping the reasoning behind this thesis. That is not to say 
that the definition need be rigid. In fact, this chapter will argue that the concept of the 
Great Game is much more fluid than historians have hitherto realised. While debate 
on this subject has nearly always centred on dates and events as defining the Game, it 
will be asserted that these were manifestations of a certain state of mind, and that it is 
this state of mind that should be focused on if one wishes to truly understand the 
Great Game – an argument which will hopefully become clearer as this chapter 
progresses.
154
 
 
Before looking at the Great Game as a mental process, however, it would be useful to 
understand something of the traditional definitions of the subject. Although, 
typically, the Great Game refers to the rivalry between Britain and Russia for 
dominance in Asia between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since the 
term has grown organically there is little agreement on the specific parameters of the 
Game. For example, Hopkirk describes the ambitions of Peter the Great towards Asia 
in the early eighteenth century as the start of the Great Game, for Russia at least. Yet, 
for Britain, it was the potential alliance between Napoleon and Tsar Paul I in 1801, 
which was to really initiate the fear of Russian expansion – a crucial component of 
the Great Game.
155
 Meanwhile, Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac begin their study of 
the subject in the early 1800s with the adventures of William Moorcroft, the British 
veterinary surgeon and horse-trader turned explorer and Great Game advocate.
156
 
One of the most narrow definitions, however, is given by Edward Ingram, who 
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believes that the Great Game effectively began and ended with the First Anglo-
Afghan War (1839–42).157 Certainly, this conflict was one of the key events of the 
Great Game and had a large impact on the British psyche. It also epitomised the 
nature of British reaction to Russian activity in Asia, the entire affair being 
precipitated by Russia’s attempts to extend its influence within Afghanistan.  
Largely in response to Afghanistan’s perceived favouritism towards Russia, in 1839 
Britain decided to invade that country and replace the current emir, Dost 
Mohammed, with a much more compliant Afghan ruler. While this initial aim was 
met, and shah Shujah successfully placed on the Afghan throne, in 1841 an uprising 
by the Afghan people took place in response to the continued presence of British 
military personnel in Afghanistan. The British explorer, Alexander Burnes, who had 
become famous for his travels into Bokhara a few years earlier and who was now a 
political agent in Kabul, was among the first British victims of the Afghan mob. 
Within a matter of weeks, the situation had deteriorated so rapidly that the entire 
British contingent of nearly 17,000 men, women and children were forced rapidly to 
evacuate the capital. During their retreat towards India through the treacherous 
gorges and snowbound passes, almost the entire party died of either starvation, cold 
or at the hands of local tribesmen. The event was a military and diplomatic disaster 
for Britain, and one that would long remain in the conscience of the public, 
immortalised as it was in Lady Butler’s painting, The Remnants of the Army, which 
depicts Dr William Brydon, said to be the sole survivor of the Kabul cohort.
158
 It was 
this shocking turn of events in Afghanistan that, according to Ingram, caused the 
British to realise that the Great Game could, in fact, never be won by them. Instead, 
they would simply spend the rest of the nineteenth century trying not to lose.
159
  
However, Ingram’s argument suffers from certain flaws, not least of which 
pertains to the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–80), which arguably successfully 
achieved what Britain had failed to do the first time around. In July 1878, under 
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pressure from Russia, the then emir, Sher Ali, had reluctantly agreed to allow a 
Russian mission to reside in Kabul, a move which angered Britain even further when 
their own mission was denied entry into the country. The viceroy of India, Lord 
Lytton, ‘determined to teach the Emir a lesson he would not easily forget, and at the 
same time make it perfectly clear to St. Petersburg that Britain would tolerate no 
rivals in Afghanistan’.160 By May 1879, with large parts of his country under British 
occupation, the emir’s son and successor, Yakub Khan (Sher Ali having died a few 
months previously), signed the Treaty of Gandamak. By its terms, the new emir 
agreed not only to cede certain territories close to the Indian frontier to Britain, but, 
more importantly, relinquished control of Afghanistan’s foreign relations to British 
India.
161
 The parallels with the first Afghan conflict are striking – yet again it had 
been precipitated by British fear of Russian machinations in Afghanistan and a 
zealous British governor general in India. Unfortunately, Britain had apparently 
failed to learn the lessons of the 1840s, however, and yet again the British resident 
sent to Kabul, Major Cavagnari, would soon be massacred by an angry Afghan 
mob.
162
 From 1880 until 1920, no British mission would be kept on Afghan soil. 
Nevertheless, for the next forty years Britain would retain control of Afghanistan’s 
foreign relations. By the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Russia would also 
finally officially agree to respect British suzerainty over Afghanistan.
163
 One could 
argue, then, that contrary to Ingram’s assertion, by the late nineteenth century, 
Britain had won a decisive victory in the Great Game when it realised hegemony 
over Afghanistan at the expense of Russian influence there.  
 
The Anglo-Russian Convention  
This is just one example of how historians run into difficulties when trying to define 
the Great Game by focusing on events such as war. Using diplomatic agreements to 
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set the parameters of the Game is also problematic, as can be seen with the Anglo-
Russian Convention of 1907. The culmination of two years of negotiations, the 
convention was signed between Britain and Russia in August 1907, arguably 
bringing to an end at least the more overt competition between these two powers that 
had characterised the Great Game during the nineteenth century. As noted above, the 
agreement solidified Britain’s position in Afghanistan and also laid out certain terms 
of interaction in Persia, the other crucial stage of Great Game rivalry. It was the first 
time that Britain and Russia had managed to negotiate such a truce and, as such, the 
convention claims great importance in the history of Anglo-Russian relations. 
Indeed, the nature of the rivalry which had existed between these two nations prior to 
1907 makes the creation of the convention all the more significant. As the Russian 
foreign minister, Serge Sazonov, observed, Britain and Russia’s history up until then 
had been characterised by an ‘endless series of political misunderstandings…mutual 
suspicions and secret and open hostility’.164 Only a few years prior to the convention, 
in 1904, these two countries had nearly come to blows over the Dogger Bank 
incident, while Britain’s alliance with Japan during the Russo-Japanese War had 
further exacerbated Anglo-Russian animosity.
165
 
Given what will be discussed later regarding the 1921 Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement, it is worth understanding what the 1907 convention represented for 
relations between Britain and Russia. The parallels between these two diplomatic 
accords is striking, particularly because while both purported to herald a new era in 
Anglo-Russian relations, in fact neither document was effective in changing the 
fundamental dynamic between these two countries. Prior to 1907, tentative attempts 
had been made to improve the state of affairs between Britain and Russia, but to no 
avail.
166
 By the time of the agreement, however, many factors had come together to 
create a suitable ground for compromise, not least of which was a growing fear in 
both Britain and Russia regarding German ambition in the Middle East and Asia. For 
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Britain, Germany had come to be regarded as a potential naval competitor,
167
 while 
the proposed Baghdad Railway – with its starting point in Berlin – was a potential 
threat to Britain’s position in the Persian Gulf.168 There was also a considerable fear 
in Britain by the early twentieth century that, should Russia end up allying itself with 
Germany, France might well be forced to follow suit and Britain could find itself 
diplomatically and militarily isolated in Europe. It was well known that Kaiser 
Wilhelm and Tsar Nicholas II corresponded regularly (they were, after all, uncle and 
nephew).
169
 In order not to become isolated and to preserve a balance of power in 
Europe (that Edwardian obsession), Britain therefore needed to improve relations 
with Russia. Since it was the scene of the Great Game, Asia, which had always 
brought Anglo-Russian relations to the boil, in 1907 it was in Asia that a rapport was 
now sought.  
For Russia too, the time was apt for seeking a resolution to the military and 
diplomatic tension of the nineteenth century. By 1905 not only had it suffered a 
humiliating defeat at the hands of the Japanese, it had been internally rocked by 
revolution and mass popular discontent. Domestically in turmoil, Russia needed to 
find stability in its foreign affairs in order to concentrate on its internal problems. 
Militarily weakened, there was also a fear that the other major powers would be able 
to take advantage of Russia.
170
 Much like Britain, Russia also hoped that the 
convention would help to protect it from growing German aggression. Suspicion had 
begun to develop among many in Russia that, while Germany professed friendship 
toward them, Berlin was actually more interested in domination than mutual 
alliance.
171
 Wilhelm had greatly encouraged Nicholas II in declaring war on Japan in 
1904, and Izvolskii believed that by turning Russia’s attention eastward, Germany 
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was trying to secure its own ascendancy over Europe.
172
 Hence, it was a common 
European enemy that ultimately helped to cool down Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. 
And, to some extent, the convention certainly encouraged better relations between 
the two signatories. Germany’s belligerency only increased after 1907, and its 
actions during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–1909,173 served to push Russia closer 
toward Britain.
174
 Indeed, the agreement paved the way for a meeting between 
Edward VII and Nicholas II at Reval in 1908,
175
 followed in 1909 with a visit to 
London by officials of the Duma (a courtesy reciprocated in 1912 by Bernard Pares 
and other prominent Englishmen).
176
 Thus, German ambition, which had been the 
main impetus behind the creation of the convention, also served to keep it alive.
177
 
By 1914, Britain and Russia would be at war with Germany and, as Sazonov noted, 
there was little doubt ‘that the agreement of 1907 removed many of the obstacles 
which might have prevented England from joining Russia in the struggle against 
Germany’.178  
 
Yet, there-in lay the problem with the convention: it was a ‘marriage of 
convenience’, as one historian has explained, designed to draw Britain and Russia 
closer together in the face of German ambition.
179
 It was not actually concluded in 
order to resolve the outstanding issues of the Great Game. Thus, while there are 
some who have seen the 1907 agreement as the end of the Game, others, such as 
Jennifer Siegel, have demonstrated that the conflict continued well after the signing 
                                                 
172
 C. L. Seeger, ed., Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky (London: Hesperides Press, 2006), pp. 43–45. 
 
173
 By lending its support to the Austrian-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany 
was attempting to demonstrate the strength of the Central Powers compared to the weakness of the 
Triple Entente: Neilson, Last Tsar, p. 306. 
 
174
 By 1909, Russia was pressing Britain for a conversion of the Convention into a formal alliance: H. 
Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson Bart, First Lord Carnock. A Study in the Old Diplomacy (London: 
Constable, 1930), pp. 313–314. 
 
175
 Ibid., pp. 269–275. 
 
176
 Neilson, Last Tsar, pp. 322–323. 
 
177
 R.P. Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Iowa: Torch Press, 1939), p. 349. 
 
178
 Sazonov, Fateful Years, p. 23. 
 
179
 Middleton, Britain and Russia, p. 92. 
 
50 
 
of that document.
180
 Indeed, that these two powers were able to move from a state of 
such tension in the early 1900s to formal allies in a world conflict by 1914 has 
tended to obscure the fact that the underlying hostility and suspicion between them 
never fully abated. This is particularly apparent when one looks at Anglo-Russian 
interaction in Persia during this period. By the terms of the convention, that country 
was divided into spheres of influence, with Russia in the north, Britain in the south, 
and a neutral zone in between – an official recognition of what was already the actual 
state of affairs in Persia by 1907.
181
 Yet, as Ira Klein has shown, the problem with 
the agreement is that it ‘failed to secure completely British or Russian interests in 
Persia, or to end rivalry between them’. 182  
The convention was unpopular in both Britain and Russia. Izvolskii was 
accused by some of being too timid in the negotiations and of renouncing Russia’s 
ambitions in Persia.
183
 Meanwhile the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 
came under heavy criticism from all different sectors of British society. Since the 
Russian sphere contained much of the commercial wealth of Persia, many believed 
that Britain had received the short end of the straw.
184
 The most vocal critic of the 
convention was Lord Curzon, who characterised it as ‘deplorable’: ‘It gives up all 
that we have been fighting for [for] years, and it gives it up with a wholesale abandon 
that is truly cynical in its recklessness...The efforts of a century sacrificed and 
nothing or next to nothing in return.’185 On 6 February 1908, Curzon even spoke for 
over an hour in the House of Lords against the convention, attacking it as ‘one-sided, 
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unequal and inequitable’.186 Unfortunately for him, Curzon would have to wait over 
ten years before he would get the chance to rectify Grey’s alleged mistake.  
For others in Britain, it was the fact that their government had collaborated 
with autocratic Russia that proved most odious. As Lord Minto (Viceroy of India, 
1905–1910), declared: ‘we have acted hand in glove with the most abominable 
autocracy of modern times’.187 This was also one of those rare moments in politics 
when both Conservatives and Liberals were drawn together in condemnation of 
government policy. For, while the former lamented the perceived sacrifice of British 
rights in Persia, the latter were equally critical of the apparent callous disregard for 
the interests of Persia itself which the convention entailed. So strong was the reaction 
against the convention that a ‘Grey Must Go’ campaign was even conducted in the 
newspapers Nation and Daily News between 1911 and 1912.
188
 In October 1908, a 
Persia Society was formed by one of the leading scholars of Persia of the time, E.G. 
Browne, which voiced vehement criticism of the convention.
189
 Browne had the 
particular advantage of possessing a great amount of information on Persia to which 
the Foreign Office did not have access – the personal contacts of Browne virtually 
amounted to an independent intelligence service within Persia.
190
 Having been a 
contemporary of Curzon’s at Eton, Browne found the ex-viceroy a useful ally in his 
fight against the 1907 convention.  Indeed, as Browne’s co-chair of the Persia 
Society, H.F.B. Lynch, noted in 1911, ‘a nod from Curzon will have more effect 
upon the Government than the frowns of our collective wisdom’.191 Yet, despite such 
confidence in Curzon’s apparent influence over the government, the convention 
remained. Soon, the First World War would prove a distraction and the Persia 
Society’s activities would cease. Grey would also manage to hang on to office, 
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always convinced that the 1907 agreement served as a restraining influence on 
Russian behaviour in Persia.
192
 The idea of controlling Russia via treaty would be 
used by others later when trying to justify the creation of the 1921 trade agreement.  
 
Such criticisms of the convention are indicative of many of the unresolved problems 
which lay between Britain and Russia in the early twentieth century. Attitudes and 
opinions do not alter as easily as treaties are written, and the 1907 agreement did not 
put to rest Anglo-Russian rivalry. British suspicion of Russian intentions in Asia 
certainly continued long after 1907. Minto epitomised official scepticism when he 
argued that Britain would ‘gain nothing [from the convention] except a mere 
phantom of friendship with a Power who will not cease secretly to advance her own 
interests, regardless of any pledges she may give’.193 The idea that Russia could not 
be trusted in its promises was a long-standing feature of Russophobia, which the 
agreement did little to change. As Lord Hardinge explained when he replaced Minto 
in 1910: ‘In India prejudices die hard, and nowhere so hard as amongst old soldiers 
who for two generations have been taught to regard Russia as a dangerous enemy.’194 
This distrust was amply demonstrated, for example, during the negotiations over the 
Trans-Persian Railway. In order to counter Germany’s Baghdad railway, and to 
secure its commercial relations, Russia proposed building a railway through Persia, 
ultimately connecting with the India network. For Britain, however, the project posed 
a myriad of problems. While it did not want to alienate Russia by an outright refusal 
to take part in the scheme, it was highly wary of India’s security, and building a 
railway that would allow the quick transportation of Russian troops through Britain’s 
‘buffer state’ was not a scheme it wanted to encourage. As one scholar has noted, 
‘leaving the connection with Indian railways open merely emphasised how little 
Anglo-Russian relations had changed in Asia’ even after the convention.195 The 
Russians too, found it difficult to move on from old patterns of behaviour and many 
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veteran Russian diplomats continued to cause problems in Persia after 1907.
196
 The 
Russian minister in Tehran, N.G. Hartwig, for example, ‘was one of those who 
considered at the time of the signature of the Convention, that his country was being 
deprived of the ripe fruit which was ready to fall into her lap’.197  
While the convention did not fundamentally alter Anglo-Russian relations, 
however, it did have important consequences for Britain’s relationship with South 
Asia. For one thing, as Vartan Gregorian explains, ‘Perhaps no single event gave as 
much impetus to the growth of Afghan nationalism as the Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907’.198 That the emir had not even been consulted about the agreement hurt 
Afghan pride. (Minto had warned as much, but when he suggested making the 
negotiations for the convention known to the emir, he had been overruled by 
London).
199
 Nationalists also feared the threat to Afghanistan’s independence – until 
now Anglo-Russian rivalry had prevented the country being absorbed entirely by 
either power. By laying to rest this competition, the road lay open to greater 
encroachment upon Afghan freedom.
200
 In Persia too, the effects of the convention 
would be very negative for Britain. Prior to 1907, British officials were generally 
held in high regard by the Persian people, particularly in the early years of the 
Persian revolution, when they sided with the reformers against the shah.
201
 During 
the Persian civil conflicts of 1905–1911, Russia and Britain were drawn to opposing 
sides: ‘The constitutionalists in Persia and the intelligentsia of the major towns 
looked to liberal England for inspiration, just as the shah and his followers looked 
towards despotic Russia for the support which they hoped would keep them in 
power.’202 For Russia, its relationship with the shah was crucial in helping to retain 
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its influence in the north of Persia.
203
 This, together with its own domestic political 
issues, meant that Russia took a natural aversion to the reformers, and made efforts 
to ensure the shah remained on his throne.
204
 That Russia was willing to use force in 
order to achieve its ends compounded the hostility that the Persian public felt 
towards its northern neighbour. The Cossack Division,
205
 for example, would often 
be deployed during the revolution in order to quell popular unrest, such as in June 
1908 when it occupied Tehran following violent protests by the public against the 
shah.
206
  
From Russia’s point of view, it appeared that Persia was gradually sinking 
into an unacceptable state of disarray – something unwanted so close to its own 
borders.
207
 As one Russian contemporary observed, ‘it always happens that the more 
civilized State is forced, in the interest of security of its frontier and its commercial 
relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and 
unsettled character makes most undesirable neighbours’ (a sentiment with which 
Britain itself would have found hard to argue).
208
 Yet, Russian heavy-handedness in 
trying to secure northern Persia from descending into anarchy ensured the enduring 
hostility of the Persian people. Britain, meanwhile, although claiming to be non-
interventionist, inclined towards a form of constitutional monarchy for Persia. 
Naturally sympathising with the cause of the reformers, the British also depended for 
their commercial prosperity in the south of Persia on the anti-shah tribes.
209
 In July 
1905, when some 12,000 political refugees sought bast (sanctuary) within the British 
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legation in Tehran, not only did the British consul general happily accommodate 
them, but he even recognised ‘many friends and acquaintances’ among the Persians, 
whom he invited for a cup of tea and a smoke in the drawing room.
210
 (Three years 
later, during their occupation of the Persian capital, the Cossack Division would 
surround the British legation to prevent a repeat of this).
211
  
By the 1907 convention, however, Britain’s esteemed position among the 
Persian people was quickly lost. Despite the best efforts of the British minister, Sir 
Cecil Spring-Rice, popular opinion believed that Britain had betrayed the Persian 
revolutionary cause by allying with Russia.
212
 Indeed, Persian protest at the 
convention was almost exclusively aimed at Britain, with Russia seldom mentioned. 
Indignation against Britain was ‘far stronger in fact than against Russia, who is not 
accused of disguising her policy or of ever having pretended to friendship for the 
Persian people, or a desire for Persian prosperity and independence’. In the words of 
one historian, after 1907 ‘Britain fell from grace; but Russia for many years had been 
accorded no grace’.213 That the Persian public had no idea of the existence of the 
1907 convention until its announcement was particulary insulting, and only helped 
fuel the rumours and misinformation that tarred the agreement further (yet another 
lesson that Curzon would fail to learn twelve years later).
214
 The idea that ‘England 
had definitely withdrawn her opposition to Russian aggression in return for a share of 
the spoil’ was hard to counter, particularly when events such as the Shuster Crisis 
only appeared to corroborate it.
215
 In 1911, the American financial adviser retained 
by the Persian government, W.M. Shuster, was forced out of office on Russia’s 
protest. Shuster had failed to appreciate ‘Russia’s privileged position in Persia’,216 
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and Grey had been unwilling to risk a breach in Anglo-Russian relations for the sake 
of Persian financial reform.
217
 The duplicitous nature of Britain, apparently revealed 
by the 1907 agreement, would have important repercussions in the years to come. 
The distrust engendered during this period would permeate Persian society, so that 
by 1919, when Curzon would try to initiate his own agreement with Tehran, he 
would receive a very frosty reception.  
 
The Great Game Mentality 
Thus, it can be seen that, despite appearances, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 
1907 did not mark the end of the Great Game. For, while the paper agreement might 
have restrained some of the more overt rivalry once displayed between the two 
countries, ultimately it could not significantly change the feelings and opinions of 
many Russians and Britons. In effect, it did not alter the official mind set. It has 
already been noted in the Introduction how important ‘mental maps’ are to 
understanding the creation of British foreign policy. Taking this idea further, it starts 
to become apparent that perhaps part of the reason there has always been such debate 
around the Great Game is that the parameters of the definition have been wrong. 
Hitherto writers have been too busy discussing what British and Russian officials 
were doing, not what they were thinking. Treaties and events were simply the 
manifestations of a certain mentality that was determined to view the other imperial 
power as a hostile rival. And, if the Great Game only really existed as a particular 
way of thinking (a ‘Great Game mentality’), then it could not end simply with the 
signing of an agreement.
218
 Only if the 1907 convention had represented a true 
change of heart between the ruling elite of each country, could it have been said to 
mark the end of the Great Game era. But as an artificial construct, created by 
expediency, it is unsurprising that the agreement only had a limited effect on Anglo-
Russian relations after 1907.  
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A further way of explaining the concept of a Great Game mentality is in 
reference to the Cold War. One cannot define this era of American-Soviet 
competition by simply studying the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. Instead, only 
by comprehending the intangible forces of fear, hostility, distrust and paranoia that 
characterised US and Soviet interaction after 1945 can the Cold War be fully 
defined. In fact, one could even argue that the Great Game was the precursor to the 
Cold War. For, if the argument is accepted that the Great Game existed essentially as 
a certain way of thinking, and that wars and treaties do not serve to define its 
boundaries, than it becomes clear how the Game could have reverberations 
throughout the twentieth century. As Hopkirk explains: ‘Some would argue that the 
Great Game has never really ceased, and that it was merely the forerunner of the 
Cold War of our own times, fuelled by the same fears, suspicions and 
misunderstanding’.219 The Cold War connection did not escape Meyer and Brysac 
either, who have noted how the notorious KGB mole, H.A.R. Philby was given his 
nickname ‘Kim’ by his father, in homage to the Kipling character. Indeed, Philby 
was born in India in 1921, his father a civil servant of the Raj whom the Soviets 
erroneously believed to be a British secret service agent. An anecdotal connection 
between the two eras perhaps, but an interesting one.
220
 If the analogy with the Cold 
War is extended, one can even see how the 1907 convention was arguably the 
equivalent of Détente – a short respite from the otherwise largely relentless 
endeavours of each power to gain hegemony in South Asia at the expense of the 
other. And yet, despite these mentions of the Cold War, very few authors have 
discussed the concept of the Great Game after the First World War. Aside from 
Hopkirk and a handful of others, by and large the majority of historians have centred 
their work on the pre-1914 period. As already pointed out, the Bolshevik revolution 
has tended to obscure Anglo-Russian relations after 1917, and the presumption has 
always been that with a change of government in Moscow came the end of the Great 
Game. Yet, it is already apparent that if British officials had been used to following a 
Great Game way of thinking for decades prior to 1917, the advent of the Bolshevik 
regime was not going to be enough to simply erase that mental process. 
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As one further explores the concept of the Great Game being a state of mind 
rather than a physical phenomenon, one starts to see just how well this definition fits 
the state of affairs that existed between Britain and Russia throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. It is not a coincidence that images of chess – a game which 
rests on strategy and subterfuge – have frequently been used in reference to the Great 
Game, and later the Cold War. The Anglo-Afghan wars aside, the Great Game was 
not defined by military conflict. In fact, over the course of two hundred years, Britain 
and Russia had only ever been on opposing sides of one major conflict, the Crimean 
War. As John Gleason points out, this constitutes ‘a record of peace unique in the 
bellicose annals of the European great powers’.221 As the works of Hopkirk, Meyer 
and Brysac have shown, the ‘game’ was the remit of individual adventurers; those 
men who had an appetite for intrigue and danger, and were willing to traverse the 
inhospitable terrain of Central and South Asia, often with little more than a few close 
bodyguards and native guides, all in the name of their respective homelands. All the 
while, their respective governments were trying to assess the intention of their rival 
from the information being delivered by a handful of individuals. The Great Game 
was never really about the reality of events taking place in Asia, but rather always 
rested on the perception each country held of the situation and their competitor. As 
Meyer and Brysac have succinctly put it, when it came to the Great Game, ‘The 
young [adventurers] were driven by both ambition and belief in the rightness of their 
cause; their elders [in government] were often possessed by half-examined ideas and 
a determination not to appear weak’.222 This, in effect, was the basis of the Great 
Game mentality – the fear of appearing weak to both the Asian nations and your 
imperial rival. Indeed, when it came to the Great Game, appearance and perception 
were always more relevant than reality. 
 
Ingram takes this point slightly further when he advocates that the Great Game was 
entirely a British construct:  ‘The Great Game was an aspect of British history rather 
than international relations: the phrase describes what the British were doing, not the 
actions of [the] Russians.’ In Ingram’s opinion, Conolly’s original quote 
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demonstrates that it was Britain who had the game to play.
223
 Such an argument 
implies that London possessed a certain view of the international situation that 
Moscow did not share and that, in effect, Whitehall created the concept of a Great 
Game when really none existed. This argument centres on the idea that the Great 
Game began and ended with Britain’s failed attempt to subdue Afghanistan in 1839, 
and was really just a certain aspect of Britain’s general imperial strategy. Yet, such a 
contention begs the question as to why such a limited period of British history has 
been defined by the term ‘Great Game’, when according to Ingram it was neither a 
game nor was it great. Ingram counters that the Great Game was akin to Britain 
playing solitaire – it was competing only with itself. However, this is a poor analogy. 
For whatever Russia’s role in the situation, it cannot be denied that Britain resolutely 
believed that it was involved in a battle for supremacy in Asia with a real and 
committed opponent; it was not resolved to play alone. So convinced was Britain of 
the hostile intentions of Russia towards its empire that the term ‘Russophobia’ was 
even coined to describe such a fear.  
The phenomenon of Russophobia has not received as much attention as it 
warrants, given its importance within the milieu of Anglo-Russian relations. Yet the 
term was one recognised by contemporaries and certainly had a role to play within 
both official and unofficial discourse on Russia. John Howes Gleason describes 
Russophobia as hostility by certain people in Britain towards Russia, sometimes 
manifesting itself as an almost obsessive hysteria. In particular, Gleason notes how 
Russophobes tended to view that country with a level of distrust that could not be 
countered by any Russian official.
224
 In effect, no matter what Russia said or did, a 
Russophobe always attributed the worst of intentions to that country. However, 
Gleason’s work only focuses on the period 1815 to 1841, and there remains scope for 
further study in this area. Keith Neilson devotes a chapter of his work, Britain and 
the Last Tsar, to exploring public opinion of Russia in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, particularly the role popular literature had to play.
225
 As Neilson 
notes, writers such as William Le Queux both epitomised Russophobia and also 
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served to exacerbate the phenomenon, by casting Russia as the principle enemy in 
adventure and spy fiction. Invariably in such novels, the Russian was ‘the picture of 
savagery’ – brutal, uncivilised and criminal. Russian invasion, of India, 
Constantinople, and even England itself, was a further common theme, as was the 
despotic nature of the tsarist government.
226
 While it is notoriously difficult to define 
‘public opinion’, and even harder to track the effect of such popular expression on 
official policy, Neilson writes how the views of the British population towards 
Russia ‘exerted a definite, if subtle and hard-to-quantify influence on the general 
relations between the two countries’.227 The work of Neilson and Gleason 
demonstrates how Russophobia was an important facet of British decision-making 
towards Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More research is 
needed on this worthy subject, however.
228
 In particular, what is still unknown is 
how much Russophobia influenced the way Britain perceived Soviet Russia. As will 
be shown, Curzon provides a prime example of a British official whose Russophobia 
affected his opinion of Bolshevik Russia, but more work needs to be done. 
 
Nonetheless, what is readily apparent from even the limited amount of literature is 
the continual reiteration, both within official and popular discourse, that Russia was a 
military threat to Britain and its empire. For all the apparent distaste of liberals 
regarding the tsarist regime, it was the ability of Russia to mobilise thousands of its 
men in opposition to Britain which ultimately fuelled Russophobia. In particular, the 
fear regarding the security and stability of India dominated British policy towards 
Russia and South Asia throughout this period. This obsession with India governed 
Britain’s preoccupation with naval supremacy, its perceived need to prevent Russia 
from gaining control of the Straits and the preservation of its own dominance of the 
Persian Gulf. India was at once Britain’s greatest asset and biggest weakness. It was 
what drove the likes of Conolly and others to implement British hegemony 
throughout southern Asia, it dictated the creation of Afghanistan, Persia and Tibet as 
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buffer states, and even later of seeking to extend British influence in Mesopotamia, 
Turkey and the Caucasus. While the many other nations of Asia might have been the 
stages for Great Game rivalry, India was always the prize. The problem for Britain, 
however, was that the very existence of the Raj depended almost entirely on the 
perceived strength of the British rulers. ‘India’ was a country made up of hundreds of 
individual states, some of which were directly possessed by Britain (‘British India’), 
others of which were governed by native Indian rulers under British suzerainty (the 
‘Princely States’). British rule in India had always relied on the collaboration of 
native rulers and on the general acquiescence of the Indian population.
229
 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, numerous observers 
would posit their views on Russia’s intentions towards India. In 1829, for example, 
Colonel George de Lacy Evans wrote On the Practicability of an Invasion of British 
India, in which he set out to demonstrate the feasibility of a Russian advance towards 
the sub-continent. De Lacy Evans opened his work with a supposed quote from the 
Russian envoy to Khiva: 
If we possessed Khiva, of which conquest would not be difficult... then would 
all the treasures of Asia enrich our country, and we should see realised the 
brilliant project of Peter the Great... In a word, Khiva is at this moment an 
advanced post, which ... would become the point of re-union for all the 
commerce of Asia, and would shake to the centre of India, the enormous 
commercial superiority of the dominators of the sea.
230
 
This was the very stuff from which Russophobia was made, and it is not hard to see 
why de Lacy Evans’ work ‘was to have a profound influence on policy-makers in 
London and Calcutta, and was to become the virtual bible of a generation of Great 
Game players’.231 Importantly, de Lacy Evans believed that Russia would not 
attempt actually to conquer India in its entirety, but would instead seek to destabilise 
British rule there. This was a view to be shared by a young Curzon, travelling 
through Central Asia almost sixty years later to survey the recently constructed 
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Transcaspian railway (Krasnovodsk–Ashkhabad–Merv–Bukhara). Recording his 
thoughts in Russia in Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Question (first published 
in 1889) Curzon believed that the full significance of the railway had been 
overlooked in London. He pointed out how the railway line had made this previously 
difficult terrain now relatively easy to traverse, enabling Russia to move its troops 
quicker than ever through Central Asia and up to India’s borders.232  
Yet even then, Curzon still believed that no Russian was foolish enough to 
attempt to invade India completely. Instead, it was probable Russia would try an 
attack on the Raj in order to distract Britain: ‘To keep England quiet in Europe by 
keeping her employed in Asia, that, briefly put, is the sum and substance of Russian 
policy.’233 As shown by M.A. Yapp, opinion on the relative likelihood of a Russian 
invasion of India appeared to ebb and flow at various points throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and of course varied from person to person.
234
 
For example, in 1884 Sir C.M. MacGregor calculated just how many Russian troops 
could be mustered against the Raj, an exercise designed to highlight the inadequate 
numbers of Britain’s troops in India should its northerly neighbour chose to attack.235 
Even by 1905, Russia’s intentions were still being discussed, with Lord Kitchener, 
commander-in-chief of the Indian army, claiming that the main danger facing India 
was ‘the menacing advance of Russia towards our frontiers’. For Kitchener, the 
likelihood of invasion was real enough to warrant extensive expansion of the Indian 
army.
236
  
This apparent obsession with the safety of India was not without justification. 
In 1801 for example, Tsar Paul I looked to take advantage of Britain’s troubles with 
France by proposing to Napoleon a joint endeavour against India.
237
 While Paul’s 
plans failed to come to fruition, the temptation to try to unbalance British rule in 
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India always remained.
238
 And despite later repeated assurances from St Petersburg 
that it had no hostile intentions towards India, the pace of Russia’s expansion into 
Asia in the nineteenth century was dramatic enough to be of concern to Britain. For 
four centuries the Russian empire had expanded at a rate of some fifty-five square 
miles a day, something of which British officials were only too aware. In 1836, Sir 
John McNeill, the newly appointed British minister to Persia, published a book 
detailing Russia’s territorial gains in Europe and Asia from the time of Peter the 
Great.
239
 Containing a folding map illustrating Russia’s expansion over the last 
century, McNeill’s book vividly warned of Russia’s apparent inexorable march 
through the continent.
240
 By the late 1800s, the Caucasus, the Trans-Caspian region 
and the khanates of Khokand, Bokhara and Khiva had all come under Russian 
hegemony.
241
 Peter Hopkirk has put this in perspective: ‘at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, more than 2,000 miles separated the British and Russian empires 
in Asia. By the end of it this had shrunk to a few hundred’.242 Furthermore, a 
programme of railway construction in Central Asia between 1880 and 1904 was 
carried out by the Russian government in order to fully consolidate its authority over 
these newly won territories.
243
  
To many contemporary observers, it must have seemed that the legend of 
Peter the Great’s will was true: that from his death bed, the great Tsar had 
commanded his successors to pursue what he believed to be Russia’s destiny – 
domination of the world through ascendancy over India and Constantinople.
244
 
Whatever the reality behind the legend, Curzon for one believed that ‘Russia was as 
much compelled to go forward as the earth is to go around the sun’.245 As for 
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Russia’s true intentions towards India, Curzon and De Lacy were not wrong when 
they believed their imperial rivals too smart to contemplate a full-scale invasion of 
that country. Nevertheless, the more astute Russian leaders realised that threatening 
the jewel in Britain’s imperial crown was always a convenient way of gaining 
leverage in negotiations. Thus, despite Ingram’s argument, Russia was just as much a 
player in the Great Game as Britain. It too looked to extend its influence into those 
countries on its frontiers in order to secure its territories; it too looked to its imperial 
rival with fear lest that rival gained influence at its expense in Asia; and it too sent 
numerous agents, spies and adventurers into the arena of the Great Game in order to 
counter British moves. As Siegel notes, ‘the competition with Britain for supremacy 
in Asia was felt just as keenly in St Petersburg as in London’.246 Indeed, it was the 
Russian foreign minister, Count Nesselrode, who coined the alternative term for the 
Great Game, the ‘Tournament of Shadows’.247 Whether Russia was as committed to, 
or as obsessed with, the Great Game as Britain is perhaps an issue up for debate. 
However, what is certain is that Britain was not simply playing with its own shadow, 
nor was Russia simply a passive participant in the process. That Russia was a very 
real nemesis to Britain in the period prior to the First World War is also important 
when it comes to understanding the mental maps which might have influenced 
decision-makers in the post-war years.  
 
Curzon 
One figure who epitomised the typical British Great Game player and Russophobe 
was George Nathaniel Curzon. The Introduction to this work has already shown the 
important positions Curzon came to occupy in the British government after 1916. 
What remains to be discussed, however, is the background of this figure who will 
feature so prominently in the following chapters. Not that there is room here to fully 
detail Curzon's biography – for one thing there is already a large amount that has 
been written on the man already – but a few signposts to his career and character are 
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worth making.
248
 Since he left no personal diary, the knowledge we have of Curzon 
is pieced together from the prodigious amount of other written material he left behind 
(letters, memoranda, books), together with the numerous opinions formed by his 
contemporaries. Even then, when it comes to Curzon’s personality, debate rages. In 
the opinion of some, such as Lord Beaverbrook, Curzon was ‘inconsistent, 
unreliable, untruthful and treacherous’.249 A.J.P. Taylor once described him as ‘one 
of nature’s rats’,250 while Lloyd George famously revelled in mocking his Cabinet 
colleague for his aristocratic background. Montagu’s feeling on Curzon were mixed:  
[He] amuses me, interests me, irritates me. Extraordinarily easy to deal with in 
the upshot, but, oh! what a process! Do you know that one of my daily duties is 
to write a letter to Curzon? Every day he wants some information about some 
Indian matter; every day he is critical about something or other; and he seems 
to find time to read the million and one papers which a War Cabinet Minister 
has to read, to write in his own handwriting any number of letters to his 
colleagues, and it will amuse you that on a day when I know that he had two 
meetings of the War Cabinet and a meeting of the Eastern Committee, every 
paper relevant to all three of which he had read, my wife said that she 
discovered him at Harrod’s Stores registering for tea! ... What a man!251 
This mixture of irritation and grudging admiration for Curzon was not uncommon. 
Curzon’s work ethic could not but be respected, yet his arrogance and unbending 
character meant that he did not win friends easily among his colleagues. Hence, 
while Montagu would frequently consult Curzon on matters concerning Afghanistan 
and India, this did not stop him bitterly remonstrating against the man in 1922 during 
the affair of his resignation. There were, in fact, few people with whom Curzon did 
not clash. His supreme self-confidence certainly did not help matters. As one fellow 
                                                 
248
 Curzon has intrigued many an author and there is no lack of work written on him. A very useful 
source in this regard is J.G. Parker, Lord Curzon 1859–1925: A Bibliography. Bibliographies of 
British Statesmen, No. 5 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991). 
 
249
 Beaverbrook, Decline, p. 46. 
 
250
 R.J. Moore, ‘Curzon and Indian Reform’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27 (1993), p. 722. 
 
251
 BL/MSS/Eur/E264/4 (MC), Letter from Montagu to Chelmsford, 15 June 1918. 
 
66 
 
student at Balliol put it, Curzon’s speaking style was ‘more inclined to overpower 
than to persuade’.252  
Yet, for all this apparent animosity to Curzon, there were some who saw 
another side of him. To his subordinates, Curzon could be attentive and convivial. 
One such individual who served under Curzon for three years, produced something 
like a rebuttal after his master’s death. Clement Jones describes Curzon as having 
shown him great kindness, and of being interested in his family life and attentive to 
his needs. More telling is Jones’ judgement that Curzon possessed something like 
two personalities: ‘For myself, I always felt that, like an actor, he [Curzon] put on the 
dress suitable for the part which he was going to play.’253 When Curzon felt the need 
to be, he could be pompous and arrogant; to those beneath him he could afford to 
extend kindness. Such an idea is echoed in the writings of Charles Hardinge – 
colleague in the Foreign Office and fellow former viceroy to India. As Hardinge 
explained in his memoir: 
I have always maintained that in him [Curzon] there were embodied two 
entirely different personalities which showed themselves according to 
surrounding circumstances. The one was a delightful, amusing, clever and most 
charming companion, while the other was a hard and relentless man, and the 
more one saw of this side of him the more one almost hated him.
254
  
In his biography of Curzon, Sir Harold Nicolson, appears particularly sympathetic to 
the man, painting a portrait of something like a troubled genius who lacked ‘people 
skills’ as it might be termed today – a man whose intellectual abilities were so above 
the average, that it was hard for him to relate to others not as gifted. Hence, Curzon 
is described as being: irritable, lonely, intelligent, competitive, humorous, genial, 
emotional, charming, childish, egotistic, and many other things beside. The Earl of 
Ronaldshay gave positively glowing praise to Curzon in his biography: ‘So much 
courage, so gallant a bearing in face of so great difficulties, such passionate devotion 
and such high ideals provide an example and an inspiration which will long survive 
                                                 
252
 Meyer and Brysac, Tournament, p. 285. 
 
253
 C. Jones, ‘Lord Curzon of Kedleston, 1859–1925: An Appreciation’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, 
No. 3 (1961), p. 337. 
 
254
 Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 244. 
 
67 
 
him’.255 Ultimately, it would seem that Curzon was one of life’s great dividing 
figures, eliciting great affection and admiration from some, and extreme hostility and 
derision from others. His tendency to change personality according to different 
people and circumstance made it particularly hard for both contemporaries and 
historians to fully get the measure of the man.  
 
One thing that is certainly agreed upon is that when it came to Asia and the Middle 
East, Curzon possessed a confidence that propelled him to centre stage of any debate 
centred on this region. For the one thing that Curzon aspired to be from an early age 
was an expert on Asia, and he would devote most of his life to such a pursuit. As 
many authors have noted, Curzon’s ambition in this arena was sparked while 
listening to a lecture by the imperialist writer James Fitzjames Stephen at Eton in 
1877: ‘Ever since that day the fascination and sacredness of India have grown upon 
me’, Curzon confessed.256 Between 1882 and 1895, he would make six extensive 
journeys through Persia, Russian Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, China and Japan, 
experiences which would do ‘much to colour his thinking about Britain’s place in the 
world’.257 Above all, Curzon would be a staunch believer in the civilising mission of 
the British Empire, and the sacred trust involved in ruling India.
258
 It was this 
obsession with India that led to Curzon’s life-long animosity towards Russia, and his 
genesis as a Russophobe.
259
 Interestingly enough, such a description is one that 
Curzon would never have accorded himself, declaring that he did not ‘class myself 
either with the Russophiles or the Russophobes’.260 Yet, in all respects of the word, 
Curzon personified Russophobia. For, as has been shown by C. Edmund Bosworth, 
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Curzon did not necessarily hate Russia as much as he feared it. Indeed, in some ways 
Curzon held a certain amount of respect for Russia. In his study of the Trans-Caspian 
railway he did not hesitate to applaud the technical achievements of the Russian 
engineers in having completed the task in such difficult desert terrain.
261
 There was 
also an amount of understanding as to why, given its geographical position, Russia 
did appear compelled to expand into Central Asia.
262
 Indeed, one could argue that it 
was just this acceptance of Russia’s needs and its capabilities that made Curzon 
ardently fearful of the threat that country posed to Britain; for it would seem that the 
Russian march through to the borders of India was somehow inevitable. Rather than 
blaming Russia for what it was in its nature to do, Curzon instead tended to criticise 
the various British governments for allowing its rival to act this way. If Britain was 
to be gullible and complacent, ‘it had therefore no right to complain of Russia’s 
advance’.263  
Furthermore, as noted above, Curzon was only too aware that a full-scale 
military invasion was not necessary for Russia to still create trouble for Britain in 
India. As Yapp has explained, British India was held by a comparatively small 
European force and: 
It was generally agreed that this force would have been quite insufficient to 
retain control of India but for the prestige of British power, that is the existence 
in India of a conviction that British power could not be shaken. ... British 
prestige would be shaken by the presence or even the influence of a hostile 
European power on the frontier. If Britain could not prevent Russia from taking 
up such a position her power, it would be argued, could not be so great as had 
been supposed. 
That the British in India were but ‘a little foam on an unfathomable and dark ocean’ 
was something Curzon understood entirely.
264
 Without the appearance that the 
empire was indestructibly powerful, stable, confident and wealthy, Britain’s position 
would be highly vulnerable. Just as Yapp has described, for Curzon, to allow Russia 
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to damage British prestige was akin to allowing the destruction of the empire. Hence, 
his Great Game call to arms: 
Whatever be Russia’s designs upon India, whether they be serious and inimical 
or imaginary and fantastic, I hold that the first duty of English statesmen is to 
render any hostile intentions futile, to see that our own position is secure and 
our frontier impregnable, and so to guard what is without a doubt the noblest 
trophy of British genius.
265
 
Throughout his public career, Curzon would be a vocal opponent of any British 
government policy that appeared to concede too much to Russia’s imperial 
ambitions. For, always, he had in mind not so much the reality of the concession to 
be made, but of the consequences to the perception of British power. So, for 
example, while in practical terms the 1907 convention actually gave little to Russia 
that it did not already possess, for Curzon the agreement in effect admitted that St 
Petersburg was just as entitled to influence within Persia as London was.
266
 
Together with the practical experience and formative opinion that his travels 
provided, the other important benefit Curzon derived from these years was the 
creation of a reputation as an expert on this region of the world. Indeed, Curzon 
always appeared anxious throughout his career to prove himself more than a mere 
politician. In 1896, when his work Pamirs and the Source of the Oxus won him a 
gold medal from the Royal Geographical Society, Curzon confessed the honour gave 
him greater pleasure ‘than it did to become a Minister of the Crown’.267 For the rest 
of his years Curzon would continually refer to this period of travel and the works 
produced as evidence of the superiority of his knowledge over those in the British 
government less experienced. In 1889, Curzon completed Persia and the Persian 
Question following a three month journey on horseback through that country. 
Ultimately, Curzon intended his study to fill a gap he perceived in the British 
understanding of Persia, and ‘to provide an enduring intellectual legacy’, reading 
‘virtually every work published on Persia in a European language’ as preparation for 
his trip.
268
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However, although Persia received critical acclaim upon its publication,
269
 to 
a modern eye there is an inherent conflict between Curzon’s desire to be considered 
an impartial Persian scholar, and the political bias he brings to his work. Both Russia 
in Central Asia and Persia are predicated on analysis of the strategic importance of 
this area of the world to Britain’s interests in India. In Russia and Central Asia, for 
example, Curzon revealed his early thoughts on Afghanistan, when he noted how it 
‘has long been the Achilles’ heel of Great Britain in the East. Impregnable elsewhere, 
she has shown herself uniformly vulnerable here’.270 In the opening pages of Persia 
Curzon gives his opinion on the ultimate worth of Afghanistan, Persia, Turkestan and 
Transcaspia: ‘To me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is 
being played out a game for the dominion of the world.’271 At heart, Curzon was a 
strategist, and not an academic. In his article on the subject, Christopher Ross 
highlights some of the flaws in Curzon’s claimed expertise. For one, the British 
politician did not speak any Persian, and had to use interpreters during his travels. 
Unlike the other renowned Persian scholar, E.G. Browne, who travelled for a year 
through the country engaging with people from all walks of life, Curzon remained 
largely isolated from the local people and their culture, his time being spent talking 
with merchants and officials.
272
 His lack of contact with the masses during his time 
in Persia perhaps goes some way towards explaining why Curzon would fail to 
recognise the nationalist feelings and popular hostility towards foreign powers that 
would become crucial to Anglo-Persian relations after the First World War. In 
contrast, in 1918 when Browne proposed a ‘five point plan’ for improving Anglo-
Persian relations, he was in much better position to gauge popular feeling in Persia at 
the time.
273
 Nevertheless, whether he was really an ‘expert’ on this region of the 
world or not, these early years of travel and writing would provide Curzon with the 
belief that he always knew best when it came to Britain’s Asian affairs, and would 
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become his standard justification for advocating policies in the face of opposition 
from his colleagues. 
 
Having formulated his ideas regarding Russia, India and their South Asian 
neighbours in his early years of travel and writing, Curzon would have to wait until 
he was thirty-nine to be able to put these thoughts into action. After gaining his 
laurels in government as under-secretary of state for India (1891–1892) and under-
secretary of state for Foreign Affairs (1895–1898), Curzon achieved one of the 
central aims of his career, and was appointed viceroy of India in 1898. The position 
could not have been more suited for a man who combined dedication to the British 
imperial mission with a pomposity that positively revelled in the ceremony of the 
viceroyalty. Often seen as the most regal of viceroys,
274
 Curzon’s tenure in India was 
marked by a scale of pageantry not seen before, including, for example, ‘the biggest 
show that India will ever have had’ in the form of Edward VII’s Coronation 
Durbar.
275
 These distractions were not merely created for Curzon’s indulgence, 
however, but were part of his strongly held belief that the ‘Oriental mind’ thrived on 
spectacle.
276
 In his earlier travels Curzon had quickly discovered that appearances 
counted for much when it came to Asian rulers – hence the well-known tale of his 
wearing medals and decorations he had purchased from a costume shop when he had 
an audience with the emir of Afghanistan.
277
 The reaction of the Times to Curzon’s 
appointment as viceroy is telling: ‘He goes as knowing something of India...but some 
might say that he knows too much and that he must have a great deal to unlearn.’278 
However, Curzon was not by nature a man open to having his opinions challenged. 
Indeed, his time spent as ruler of India appears only to have strengthened his 
convictions in regards to the importance of the Raj to Britain, and of the inherent 
threat to it posed by Russia. As David Dilks’ shows, Curzon’s tenure as viceroy was 
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characterised by adherence to a forward policy.
279
 Curzon’s inexhaustible capacity 
for work, combined with his belief that the best defence was offence when it came to 
Russia, meant that he never relented in pushing for an activist British policy in Asia.  
When it came to Persia, for example, the viceroy was highly vocal in his 
criticism of the Home government’s apparent apathy towards that country. Curzon 
found the attitude of Lord Salisbury and his adherence to the policy of ‘splendid 
isolation’ particularly frustrating.280 In his desire to see a stronger British hand in 
Persia, Curzon would also often clash with the British minister to Tehran, Sir Arthur 
Hardinge.
281
 While the viceroy was continually criticising Hardinge for apparently 
failing to deal firmly enough with the Persian government, the diplomat in turn 
believed Curzon to be impatient, with no appreciation of the art of diplomacy. The 
trouble was that, as viceroy, ‘Curzon was too accustomed to getting his own way 
quickly’ (a telling remark considering Curzon’s actions towards Persia after 1918).282 
As Hardinge pointed out, he, as a mere minister, could not bully the Persian 
government the way Curzon could bully Nepal or Afghanistan. Yet, both men agreed 
that the Home government lacked a coherent policy when it came to Persia, and 
blamed Salisbury for such vacillation.
283
 With the entrance of Lord Lansdowne into 
the Foreign Office in 1900, however, Curzon finally appeared to gain an ally in his 
endeavours. Spurred on by the viceroy, in December 1901 the new foreign secretary 
sent a lengthy despatch to the Persian government stipulating in no uncertain terms 
the limit to Britain’s tolerance regarding a Russian presence in that country.284 This 
was followed, in May 1903, by a pronouncement to the House of Lords that 
reiterated Britain’s determination to retain its exclusive position in the Persian Gulf. 
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Any establishment of a naval base or fortified post in that region by another power, 
declared Lansdowne, would be ‘a very grave menace to British interests, and...we 
should certainly resist it with all means at our disposal’.285 At last it appeared that 
Britain was prepared to send a clear message to Russia that there would be 
consequences should that country push its luck too far in southern Asia. Curzon was 
delighted.
286
  
Perhaps the most telling event of Curzon’s time as viceroy was his 
sponsorship of the Younghusband expedition to Tibet in 1903, for it epitomised his 
Russophobia, his determination to extend Britain’s influence in Asia, and his 
tendency to act as he deemed right despite the misgivings of others. For decades, 
Tibet had been closed to foreigners, but by 1900 there were growing rumours from 
various quarters that Russia was steadily increasing its connections with that 
country.
287
 Despite the hesitancy of London, Curzon was determined to act before 
Russia was able to gain a foothold in a country so close to India. He commissioned 
Colonel Francis Younghusband to advance into Tibet in order to force open the 
country to relations with Britain. Although sanctioned by Cabinet, the 
Younghusband mission step by step exceeded its original maxim, encouraged by an 
enthusiastic Curzon. The upshot of the event was that Younghusband forced his way 
into Lhasa and in September 1904 made the Tibetans sign a convention with Britain. 
Those back in London, however, believed Younghusband to have exceeded his initial 
commission in concluding this agreement. Despite the extraordinary physical 
achievement he had managed to carry out, rather than the expected hero’s welcome, 
the colonel was censured on his return, and given only the lowest rank of 
knighthood, KCIE.
288
 Unfortunately for Younghusband, it would appear that ‘he 
became the surrogate for the real target, Lord Curzon’.289  
The Tibetan mission was, ‘au fond, Curzon’s war’, and as Arthur Balfour, 
prime minister of the time, complained, ‘Curzon behaved as if India were an 
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independent country, and not always a friendly one at that’.290 Curzon’s authoritative 
rule as viceroy was well known. As Younghusband himself noted, ‘I fancy from 
what I saw and have heard that nobody says much against the Viceroy. He does not 
so much invite discussion as lay down the law and almost defiantly ask if anyone has 
any objection. If anyone has he is promptly squashed...’291 So often in his career 
would Curzon become highly frustrated when things did not appear to be going his 
own way: ‘I have a sort of consciousness that my arguments do not produce the 
smallest effect. If a Government means to sit down...no amount of kicking, even on 
the most sensitive spot, will induce it to rise...’292 Curzon often complained during 
his time in India that the Home government was simply not listening to him and his 
council in Calcutta. In 1905, he lamented how London often treated his government 
as if it were a negligible quantity, pointing out to Balfour that ‘the Viceroy of India is 
not an agent whom you send out merely to execute your orders or to act as the 
instrument of a policy conceived’.293 For his part, Balfour ‘once wrote that Curzon 
regarded the Secretary of State [for India] not as the Minister responsible to 
Parliament for the government of India but as the Viceroy’s diplomatic 
representative at the Court of St. James’.294 Come 1918, Curzon would find the roles 
reversed, when he was occupying the Foreign Office and the Indian government 
disagreed with policy emanating from Whitehall. One would have thought that his 
experience as viceroy would have provided Curzon with an empathy and an 
understanding for the frustrations of the Indian government in the post-war period, 
when it complained of being ignored by London. Ironically enough, however, when 
it came to it, Curzon was just as willing to ignore the voices of dissent in India as his 
predecessors had been.  
In August 1905, Curzon would end up resigning following a dispute with 
General Kitchener over the relatively minor matter of the power of the military 
member of the viceroy’s council. As viceroy, Curzon had fought incessantly with the 
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Home government to preserve his prerogative to act on matters which he believed to 
be in his sole remit and when London supported Kitchener in this affair it was too 
much for him to bear. Later, as chair of the Eastern Committee he would balk at any 
attempt to reform the committee that appeared to limit his powers over it. As foreign 
secretary, he would insist on having his own way over Britain’s international 
relations, jealously guarding his authority within the government. He would cajole 
and bully any who opposed him, and frequently threaten to resign if his wishes were 
not granted (although 1905 was, in fact, the only time he carried through the threat). 
For, wherever he was, whatever position within government he occupied, Curzon 
always believed that he knew best and should be listened to. His ambition, 
stubbornness and relentlessness nature, combined with his experience of Asian 
affairs meant that Curzon’s was nearly always the loudest voice in government when 
it came to Britain’s foreign policy in this region. His continual lauding his own 
expertise on Asia and the Middle East even became something of a standing joke 
among his colleagues in government. An encounter during a Cabinet discussion 
summarises all: as the discussion moved on to Persia, Curzon cleared his throat and 
began ‘You may not be aware...’ only for Balfour to quickly interrupt him: ‘It’s all 
right George, we all know you have written a monumental work on Persia.’295 
 
Bloody Retribution 
While it may seem that an overly extensive amount of attention is being paid to Lord 
Curzon in this thesis, hopefully it can already start to be seen just what an impact the 
man had on the direction of Britain’s foreign relations in the early years of the 
twentieth century. With the various positions of authority he occupied, his years of 
experience with India, Asia and Russia, and the sheer force of his personality, 
Curzon was a central figure within the British government in the post-war period. As 
viceroy, Curzon left his mark on India. As foreign secretary, he was determined to 
leave his mark on southern Asia. In fact, it has even been suggested by some 
historians that, following his ignominious departure from India in 1905, Curzon 
became even more resolute in the opinions formulated during this first stage of his 
career. Following his return to England, Curzon was decidedly out of favour in 
Whitehall, and it would be another ten years before he would finally get back into a 
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position of power within government. His outburst in 1907 against the Anglo-
Russian Convention demonstrates how he had lost none of his zeal when it came to 
Britain’s foreign affairs.296 Yet, between 1905 and 1917 he was to be largely 
frustrated in his ambitions, complaining to an acquaintance: ‘As one who was at the 
Foreign Office for three years, who served in India for seven, and who knows 
personally almost every country in Europe and Asia, I ought surely to be of greater 
use that I am now permitted to be.’297 Indeed, John Fisher paints the image of Curzon 
as a man with frustrated ambition almost straining at the leash to make his mark on 
the direction of Britain’s international policy after the First World War. As Fisher 
puts it: ‘Curzon’s subsequent political marginalisation in the course of 1916 served 
to ensure that when he attained a position of authority, there was a prolonged and 
bloody retribution as his ego battled with a system which had excluded him for so 
long.’298As another historian has noted, ‘The first sixty years of George Curzon’s life 
might logically be seen as a sustained preparation for the role of Foreign Secretary’. 
It was unlikely he was going to allow the opportunity to exert his authority slip once 
he had it within his grasp.
299
 All of which is crucial for understanding the actions 
taking by Curzon from 1918 to 1923. Driven by ambition and a redoubtable 
confidence in his personal knowledge and analytical abilities, Curzon would brook 
no opposition to his policies in Persia and elsewhere, even if the advice from others 
was actually sound.  
Furthermore, a good reason to pay such close attention to Curzon’s career and 
personality is that he is a clear example of the ultimate Great Game player. Indeed, 
he personifies many of the issues that are under discussion in this thesis, including 
the concept of a Great Game mentality. Unsurprisingly, the Great Game has 
intrigued many scholars, and there is certainly no lack of literature on the subject. So 
often the lines between reality and fiction seemed to be blurred during this time of 
adventure and high intrigue, and tales of derring-do and eccentric characters in exotic 
far-off lands have gripped both the contemporary public and the historian alike. Yet 
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perhaps it is because of this very abundance of exciting escapades that the traditional 
focus of this topic has always been on events rather than opinion or theory. The 
dearth of study on the idea of Russophobia is one example of this. Thus, the concept 
of a Great Game mentality has not hitherto featured explicitly in the discourse of this 
subject, despite the fact that it appears to be a very fitting definition on the state of 
affairs between Britain and Russian in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Trying to use military events and diplomatic exchanges to mark where the Great 
Game began and ended has the flaw of losing sight of the impetus behind these 
actions. As the Introduction to this work has shown, foreign policy was formulated 
by people whose opinions, assumptions and personality ultimately influenced their 
decision making. It is in this realm, therefore, that the key to defining the Great 
Game lies. Accepting the concept of a Great Game mentality also helps to 
understand better some of the decisions taken by Curzon and the British government 
in the years after the First World War. For this work argues that Curzon was 
governed in his policies by his Great Game mentality and that his actions, once in the 
Foreign Office, in turn determined the course of Britain’s foreign affairs in southern 
Asia in the post-war period.  
 
Curzon carried the thoughts and opinions which he had formulated in his early years 
of travel and his time as viceroy with him into the Foreign Office. Of course, many 
of these opinions were not exclusive to him. However, combined with the position of 
authority that Curzon held, it meant that this Great Game mentality was able to exert 
an influence over the direction of Britain’s foreign affairs, despite the many 
indicators that such a mode of thinking was outdated by 1918. The days of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention were gone. No longer could two imperial powers divide 
Persia between themselves with little regard to the consequences to Persia itself. That 
the 1907 agreement between Britain and Russia had been sealed in secret, with no 
consultation with the Persian government, insulted Persian pride. The backlash 
against Britain, when combined with the civil unrest of the revolutionary period, 
shows how nationalist sentiment was increasing in Persia even prior to the First 
World War. Unfortunately, Curzon failed to heed the warning signs. In 1907, despite 
protests, Britain was still able to exert its authority on Persia; by 1919, the Persian 
people would no longer allow this. 
78 
 
 The reason why the lessons of 1907 were not learnt is that for Curzon and 
others, countries such as Persia and Afghanistan were viewed almost exclusively in 
relation to the security of India.
300
 The ‘buffer state’ policy governed Britain’s 
actions towards the Asian states for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; 
after 1918 the government still pursued the same aims it had done for decades. The 
only difference was that while the ends remained the same, there was growing debate 
about the nature of the means. Before the First World War, the main consideration 
for Britain had been how best to counter the extension of Russian influence into 
Central and southern Asia. The internal situation of countries such as Persia was a 
secondary issue, if it was considered at all. Hence, the fact that the Persian people 
were unhappy with the convention, and that Britain’s standing among the masses fell 
after 1907 was not as important to the British government as was maintaining 
friendly relations with Russia. Simply put, the consequences of upsetting the Persians 
were not deemed as problematic to British imperial interests as the consequences of 
upsetting the Russians. After 1918, however, the growth in Asian nationalism and 
pan-Islamism would mean that if it wanted to protect India effectively, the British 
government would need to change its priorities. How to counter internal discontent in 
the likes of Persia and Afghanistan would have to become Whitehall’s focus. 
Unfortunately, while the Indian government would prove astute at recognising this, 
the Home government (Curzon being a key example) would utterly fail to note this 
change of play.  
Likewise, when it came to judgements about Russia, Curzon would fail to 
apprehend the real consequences of the change of regime in Petrograd in October 
1917. Just as southern Asia was viewed through the prism of the Great Game, 
Curzon’s understanding of, and opinion on, the Bolshevik regime was coloured by 
the Russophobia he had developed over a number of years. Curzon’s work on Russia, 
and the actions he took during his time as viceroy against what he viewed as Russian 
expansion into places such as Tibet, should be born in mind throughout this thesis. 
As pointed out in the Introduction, the concentration on the ‘anti-Bolshevism’ of the 
British government has tended to obscure the nature of Anglo-Russian relations in 
this period. When it comes down to it, Curzon was a Russophobe. He might have 
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deplored Lenin and his comrades for the many reasons that were unique to the 
Bolshevik creed; however, such anti-Bolshevism was always compounded by a 
fundamental anti-Russianism. Ultimately, Curzon’s Russophobia combined with a 
Great Game mentality that made it difficult for him to comprehend the true 
subversive nature of Bolshevism. This, in turn, would lead to a dichotomy whereby 
the foreign secretary feared Russian/Bolshevik influence in southern Asia, yet 
pursued policies which would only serve to enhance the likelihood of Bolshevism 
taking hold. Only by understanding the legacy of the Great Game on the thoughts of 
men such as Curzon can the actions of the British government after 1918 be 
explained. In the following chapter, the creation of the Anglo-Persian agreement of 
1919 will be discussed – let us see if this was not an archetypal Great Game move.  
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Chapter Two: The Iron Hand and the Velvet Glove, 1918–1919  
 
In November 1918, there appeared to be a lot that Britain could be thankful for. The 
British Empire emerged from the war against the Central Powers not only as a victor 
but also as a power presiding over a quarter of the world’s surface and ruling over a 
quarter of the world’s population.301 The British imperial army was of a strength not 
experienced since the Napoleonic Wars,
302
 and to many contemporaries the 
mobilisation of the empire’s resources during the conflict had, in the words of Lloyd 
George, revealed to the world ‘that the British Empire was not an abstraction but a 
living force to be reckoned with’.303 While the war had seen the demise of three great 
empires, Britain’s was still standing, and its prime minister was about to sit in Paris, 
as leader of one of the world’s greatest nations, to decide the fate of Europe, Asia 
and Africa.
304
 As Curzon put it to the House of Lords in November 1918, ‘The 
British flag has never flown over a more powerful or more united empire’.305 It is 
easy, therefore, to see why some contemporaries saw the aftermath of the First World 
War as a time of confidence and optimism for Britain. And yet, every silver-lining 
has its cloud. The war had tested the empire to its very limit, straining Britain’s 
economy and costing millions of lives. The disillusionment of the people against 
their governments had already created revolution in one major European state, and 
was about to take hold in others. Nationalist and pan-Islamic fervour were simmering 
in Asia. And, while the rapid increase in imperial territory might be an indication of 
Britain’s power in the post-war period, it also necessitated a requisite increase in 
military and administrative expense that the country could ill-afford after the strains 
of the war. Indeed, as one historian has posited, perhaps the disappearance of the 
German, Russian and Turkish empires simply gave the British Empire a deceptive 
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appearance of strength, by virtue of being the only one of its kind left.
306
 One thing 
that was for sure was that, for better or worse, the First World War had certainly 
changed things, as Sir Mark Sykes (expert in all things Middle Eastern), explained to 
Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office in January 1918:  
If America had not come into the war, if the Russian Revolution had not taken 
place, if the idea of no annexations had not taken root, if the world spirit of this 
time was the world spirit of 1887... [But now] we have to look at the problem 
through entirely new spectacles.
307
 
How many other officials in the British government recognised the differences of the 
post-war world, however, remains to be seen. In the meantime, the period from 1918 
to 1919 was one in which Britain, emerging from the battle fields, had to start 
adjusting its foreign policy from a war-time to a peace-time footing. It was, 
therefore, a time when some of the greatest debates took place within government, as 
officials thrashed out their ideas about the empire’s future.  
 
Two Voices 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this work, one particular problem with Britain’s 
relationship with southern Asia and the Middle East in this period is that there was 
serious interdepartmental friction and overlapping function when it came to the 
creation and administration of policy.
308
 And part of the issue lay with the role which 
India was to play in this region of the world. Throughout the history of the Raj, there 
had been debate about India’s contribution to the maintenance of the empire. In 
1920, the issue appeared to have been resolved when both the Indian and Home 
governments agreed that: 
Apart from such ‘special cases’ as might arise...India should bear primary 
financial responsibility for those geographical regions in which she had a 
‘direct and substantial interest’. Included among such regions were Egypt ‘so 
far as the security of the Suez Canal is affected’, Persia, the Persian Gulf and 
Afghanistan. 
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Since Delhi retained consulates in southern Persia and held ultimate control of 
Afghanistan’s foreign relations, such an arrangement appeared reasonable.309 And 
naturally, the First World War was just such a ‘special case’ that India contributed 
unreservedly to the British cause. Together with supplying a quarter of a million 
native troops to serve in Mesopotamia, Persia, the Caucasus and Transcaspia, in 1917 
India made an outright gift of £100 million towards the war effort – almost double 
India’s net revenue before the outbreak of the conflict.310   
The result of such an expansion of Indian involvement in southern Asia 
during the war was both a greater desire of the Indian government to have a political 
say befitting its military and financial responsibilities and a general confusion of 
jurisdiction between the Foreign, War and India Offices. In Persia, for example, 
General Malleson’s mission at Meshed and Sir Percy Sykes’ South Persia Rifles 
(SPR),
311
 were both Indian government contingents, yet Dunsterforce, in the north-
west of that country, was under the command of the War Office.
312
 The tradition of 
having both Foreign Office and Indian controlled consulates in Persia was also 
problematic. As Montagu pointed out in July 1918, such a set-up meant that Britain 
effectively had two voices within Persia.
313
 In Mesopotamia, Indian troops were 
instrumental in preventing the country from falling into Turkish hands. However, by 
1917 military operations were transferred to the War Office, even though India 
continued to supply the men and material for the rest of the war, and the civil 
administration of that country also remained under Indian control.
314
 For the 
government of India, by the summer of 1918 this confusion of authority was 
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becoming increasingly unacceptable, particularly when it was coupled with a lack of 
political say on India’s part. As Montagu pointed out, during a debate of the Eastern 
Committee on Persia, not allowing India to have political control in that country 
meant that ‘the Indian Government naturally said: “why should we give our men and 
our money to the prosecution of a policy of which we disapprove”’.315 The solution 
to both problems, as Montagu saw it, was to have ‘the whole war area from Palestine 
eastward managed from India by the Indian Government, both militarily and 
politically’.316  
Unfortunately for Montagu and the government of India, there was little 
support in London for the suggestion. The Foreign Office argued that the ‘feeling in 
Persia against India and Indian officials is traditional, and were the whole of the 
policy in Persia to be conducted from Simla that feeling would undoubtedly become 
aggravated’.317 The War Office thought that handing control to India would be 
viewed by the Persian population as nothing less than a step towards the annexation 
of their country.
318
 Curzon cut to the heart of the matter when he pointed out that 
while it might be irritating for India to not have greater control in Persia, ‘it would be 
not only disagreeable but dangerous to have a Minister at Teheran [sic] who might be 
pursuing a policy inspired or dictated from Delhi, that did not fit in with the foreign 
policy of Downing Street’.319 The supremacy of the Home government was 
ultimately indisputable. However, the consequences of refusing to allow India a 
greater say in Britain’s affairs in Persia and elsewhere would mean that, very quickly 
after the armistice, the Indian government would look to roll back its commitments – 
both militarily and financially – to their pre-war standing. Although necessitated by 
economic concerns, perhaps India might have been more willing to delay 
retrenchment had it felt its efforts in this region were appreciated more by 
Whitehall.
320
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While there was little support for granting the Indian government complete 
autonomy in southern Asia and the Middle East, the War Office and the Foreign 
Office certainly agreed that better coordination of policy was needed.
321
 Persia 
appeared the most acute example of overlapping jurisdiction, but by 1918 there was a 
general realisation within the British government that its policy towards this region 
should be treated as a whole – that Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Palestine, Arabia 
and the Caucasus, while representing varying levels of British involvement, were all 
inextricably linked by geography, religion and history, and that having one body to 
define, implement and co-ordinate policy across this area would considerably 
strengthen Britain’s presence there.322 This concept of unifying control was not 
necessarily a new one – the idea of a Near Eastern Viceroyalty or India-Middle East 
Empire had previously been floated by the likes of Kitchener and the British Oriental 
Secretary at Cairo, Ronald Storrs.
323
 As the war drew to a close, however, and 
Britain faced considerable expansion to its territorial responsibilities, the issue 
became more pressing. 
The problem was what form this Middle Eastern/Asian body should take and 
who should ultimately control it. In the opinion of Robert Cecil, what was needed 
was the creation of an independent department within the government with control 
over all political, administrative and military aspects of the region for Britain. 
However, for Hardinge and Sir Ronald Graham (assistant under-secretary), the 
creation of a separate department that would challenge the Foreign Office’s supposed 
monopoly over Britain’s foreign affairs was inconceivable. Instead, they argued for 
the creation of a Middle Eastern section within their department.
324
 As chair of the 
Eastern Committee, Curzon too was opposed to Cecil’s plans, as it threatened to 
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make his position within government defunct. The ex-viceroy was already annoyed 
at the frequency with which his committee was bypassed by other departments: ‘I 
observe that no questions are referred to us. We have not been summoned for some 
two months and the Foreign Office policy as regards these countries is formulated 
and published without reference to us at all.’325 Curzon’s alternative to the 
suggestions of Montagu and Cecil was to expand the Eastern Committee to include a 
staff, and that the chair (i.e. he) should be made a secretary of state for the Middle 
East.
326
 Thus, it would seem that while everybody agreed that a co-ordinating body 
was needed in order to take charge of Britain’s affairs in this region, everybody also 
believed that their department should be in control and nobody was willing to have 
their current authority diminished. Eventually, however, by August 1918, Cecil had 
finally managed to convince Balfour, to allow him to establish a Middle Eastern 
Department. To conciliate Hardinge, Cecil accepted that the department could not be 
completely removed from the Foreign Office,
327
 and he also gave up trying to 
dissolve the Eastern Committee altogether, although he did believe that the 
committee should be concerned only with matters of high policy, leaving the 
practical administrative issues to the new department.
328
  
For Curzon, this was the worst possible scenario. Not only had he been 
passed over to head the new Middle Eastern Department, but he was in danger of 
becoming chairman of a largely moribund committee. On 13 August, after a long 
speech recounting his many numerous qualifications, Curzon threatened to resign as 
chair if the committee decided to reduce its remit, as was being suggested.
329
 In the 
end, it was only when Curzon was made acting foreign secretary in January 1919 that 
Cecil was finally able to dissolve the Eastern Committee to be replaced by the ad hoc 
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Interdepartmental Conference on the Middle East (IDCE).
330
 In the meantime, on 28 
August 1918, Eyre Crowe, was appointed head of the new Middle Eastern 
Department of the Foreign Office, although it was agreed that he would share his 
authority with Hirtzel at the India Office. The Indian government would retain its 
political authority in Mesopotamia and Persia, while military issues were still to be 
referred to the War Office.
 
 The end result was that, rather than an all-encompassing 
body with full control over every aspect of British policy in the Middle East and Asia 
(as Cecil had originally envisaged), the new department was much the same as the 
old Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, which had been dismantled before the 
war.
331
 As Frederick Stanwood notes, the machinery for making policy in this region 
would continue to be ‘all muddled’, leading to a lack of coherence in this period.332 
Indeed, wrangling over who was to have authority over this area of Britain’s foreign 
policy was to continue until 1921, when another Middle Eastern Department would 
be created, this time under the remit of the Colonial Office.
333
 In the meantime, 
Britain would continue to have ‘two voices’ (and sometimes three or four) in Persia 
and elsewhere in southern Asia in the immediate post-war years.  
 
Good Red Herring 
This problem of coordination would not only continue to cause friction between the 
Foreign, War and India Offices, but would also allow Curzon to have a resounding 
say over Britain’s relations towards countries such as Persia in this period. For, as 
will be seen, with nobody to mount an effective challenge against his apparent 
authority on Asian affairs, Curzon would find himself able to convince others within 
the government that his way was ultimately the right way. As already shown, 
Curzon’s determination to change Britain’s relations with Persia had had a long 
gestation, and with his re-entry into the government – first with his position on the 
Eastern Committee and then as acting foreign secretary – he found himself in 1918–
1919 finally able to shape Britain’s foreign policy. As his biographer Nicolson put it, 
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the post-war period presented Curzon with the opportunity to enact his ‘complete, 
final, perfected plan’: to consolidate, once and for all, Britain’s presence in southern 
Asia and secure India from any future foreign threat.
334
 In the words of Curzon 
himself, in December 1918, now was the opportune time for the Persians to ‘realise 
that the iron hand lay beneath the velvet glove’. Curzon’s policy towards Persia in 
1918 and 1919 would exemplify his Great Game mentality, although he would find 
opposition to his endeavours at every turn in the form of the Indian government, 
which much preferred ‘to give the “velvet glove” a chance’.335  
Joining Curzon in his Persian quest in the post-war period was Sir Percy Cox, 
newly appointed chargé d’affaires in Tehran (the previous British minister, Sir C. 
Marling proving too inefficient for London’s liking).336 Cox certainly appeared more 
pro-active than Marling, and immediately upon his appointment, in November 1918, 
began to inundate the Foreign Office with his ideas for the direction of British policy 
in Persia. In the opinion of the new chargé d’affaires, the collapse of Russia’s 
presence in Asia presented the perfect opportunity for Britain to extend and solidify 
its position in Persia. Noting that the ‘suspension of Russia’s existence gives us a 
free field for our labours’, Cox was soon suggesting that Britain should try to gain a 
mandate for Persia from America.
337
 Such a move would give freer rein in Persia, as 
it would provide international legitimacy to Britain’s position of influence in that 
country. The focus on Russia as the prime target of Britain’s policy in Persia 
matched Curzon’s own beliefs. (That Cox and Curzon thought so alike is 
unsurprising given that the two had a history: Cox had been appointed by Curzon in 
1899 as Consul in Muscat and had travelled up the Persian Gulf with Curzon when 
he was viceroy).
338
 The government of India, however, was alarmed at Cox’s 
suggestion, Chelmsford arguing that the cost and military commitment that such a 
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move would necessitate would be a drain on Indian resources that could not be 
justified so far as India’s interests were concerned.339 Cox countered that the viceroy 
did not appreciate how much the situation in Persia had changed with the ‘alarming 
spread of Bolshevism and revolutionary ideas...As it is, the Shah is extremely 
apprehensive of [the] spread of Bolshevism.’340  
The India government was sceptical, nevertheless, that Bolshevism was the 
problem Cox believed it to be. Instead, it emphasised the danger of growing pan-
Islamism in the post-war years.
341
 Prior to 1918, pan-Islamism had already been 
‘simmering steadily beneath the surface’ of India. Since the late nineteenth century, 
more and more Muslims had come to the realisation that ‘the expansion of European 
power was increasingly subjecting Muslims to Christian rule’.342 Indian Muslims 
started to grow suspicious of Britain, and actions such as the 1911 revocation of the 
partioning of Bengal did not help matters.
343
 Nevertheless, they had remained loyal 
to the British crown, and the political reforms sought by the Muslim League had 
always been consistent with the maintenance of British control.
344
 That is, until after 
the First World War. Although many Muslims fought in the Indian army, there was a 
growing discomfort among them at the fact that they were in conflict with the 
Ottoman Empire, the last remaining bastion of Islamic power in the twentieth 
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century.
345
 Nationalist feeling also mingled with pan-Islamic sentiment, the one 
serving to encourage the other, as the likes of Rajat Ray and Jacob Landau have 
shown.
346
 In India, as Landau explains, in the early twentieth century… 
…a growing sentiment pervaded politically aware Muslims in India that 
ensuring Muslim power and sovereignty abroad was a guarantee for their own 
religious and national survival as a minority group; in other words, Pan-Islam 
[sic] assumed for them a nationalist significance.
347
 
Kemal Ataturk was particularly adept at utilising the Islamic factor to strengthen 
nationalism, realising that ‘the national Turkish awakening and mobilisation could 
only be achieved by the use of Islamic symbols’.348 Indeed, pan-Islamism ‘combined 
in itself a variety of ideological aspirations of disparate elements in the Muslim 
world’ and. as will be seen, would become a major thorn in the Indian government’s 
side.
349
 Only through deft handling of Indian, Persian and Afghan affairs during the 
war had Britain been able to avoid a mass Muslim uprising in support of Turkey. 
Muslim agitation had not abated with the armistice, however. Rather, it had gained in 
strength in the immediate post-war years, in part due to the Allied handling of the 
Turkish peace process.
350
  
In his work, John Fisher has tried to refute the idea of pan-Islamism being a 
key factor in the decision-making of the British government after the First World 
War. Fisher also dismisses the claim that British officials feared a pan-Islamic and 
nationalist combination in places like Afghanistan and India.
351
 However, not only 
does his work end at 1919 (before Muslim agitation would really reach its peak), but 
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Fisher fails to make a real distinction in this case between the thinking of those in 
London and those in Delhi. For, as will become quite clear in the following pages, 
while there were certainly some in the Home government who paid little heed to 
Muslim or nationalist discontent in Asia, the Indian government was absolutely 
absorbed by it in the years after 1918. Thus, on 3 December 1918, the India Office 
drew up a memorandum on ‘The Future of Russian Central Asia’ in which it noted 
‘that of [the] 10,000,000 inhabitants of various provinces [of the region], only 
500,000 are Russian, the rest are fanatical Muslims’.352 According to this report then, 
while Bolshevism might prove some irritation to Britain’s interests in the region, the 
real threat came in the form of Muslim extremism. In the post-war years debate 
would rage as to whether Britain should fear Bolshevism more than pan-Islamism 
and nationalism. Great Game thinking dictated that Russia, in whatever form, was 
the avowed enemy of Britain in South Asia. And yet, as the Indian government 
would consistently argue, when pan-Islamism combined with Asian nationalism it 
proved a force more potent than Soviet Russia.
353
 
When it came to it, the picture on the potential of Bolshevik Russia to be a 
threat to Britain in southern Asia was somewhat mixed. On the one hand, there were 
the reports by Cox and news from Malleson in Meshed that consistently noted the 
possibility of Bolshevism taking hold in Central Asia.
354
 A Tashkent Soviet had 
seized power in September 1917 and in April 1918 had established the first Soviet 
republic outside of Russia itself – a potentially worrying occurrence for Britain.355 
And yet, an uprising by Orenburg Cossacks had left the Tashkent regime completely 
cut off from Moscow (and they would remain so until September 1919). To the west 
an anti-Bolshevik regime in Ashkhabad, supported by Malleson, also separated the 
Tashkent Soviet from the Caspian route of communication, while in the north-east 
more hostile Cossacks meant that this revolutionary enclave was completed 
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surrounded.
356
 The presence of British and anti-Bolshevik forces in and around 
Persia also meant that the new Soviet envoy to Tehran, Karl Bravin, was isolated 
from his Bolshevik masters. Bravin had been the Russian consul in Khoi in Persian 
Azerbaijan and arrived in Tehran in January 1918.
357
 However, the new Bolshevik 
representative had no credentials from the Soviet regime and although the Persian 
government had initially been inclined to recognise him, it was soon persuaded to 
simply ignore Bravin.
358
 As he told his superiors, ‘in spite of all our expressions of 
friendship and our cordial demeanour [the Persian government] are obviously 
laughing at us’.359 Without the recognition of the Persian government, Bravin was 
unable to remove the sitting Russian legation, nor did he have access to any funds. 
Dejected and unable to do any work of substance, in June 1918 Bravin begged his 
superiors in Moscow ‘either to give me speedy assistance or to release me from such 
an unprofitable engagement’.360   
Just why the Bolshevik regime gave Bravin such little help in his endeavours 
is likely due to a number of reasons. For one thing, until the Red Army was able to 
make progress in the south of Russia, Persia was effectively cut off, preventing the 
sending of money or other Bolshevik agents into the country. Nevertheless, more 
effort could have been made to provide Bravin with credentials. There was, for 
example, a Persian representative in Moscow at this time, Assad Bahador, who could 
have pressed upon Tehran Bolshevik desire to have Bravin recognised. Instead, 
Assad noted specifically in his reports home that the Bolsheviks ‘have not asked for 
recognition for this person’.361 Such neglect of Bravin was therefore probably also 
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due to the lack of importance the Soviet regime placed on affairs in Persia at this 
time. Not only was the civil war occupying much attention but the Bolsheviks were 
still confused as to what role official diplomacy was to play in its foreign policy. 
Trotsky had, after all, upon assuming control of the Foreign Office  in 1917 declared 
that he would ‘issue some revolutionary proclamations to the peoples and close up 
the joint’.362 Such ambivilance towards the traditional channels of international 
relations was further compounded by the dilemma the Bolsheviks faced in deciding 
what groups of Persians they should be working with in the first place: should 
support be given to nationalist and pan-Islamic revolutionary forces, or should these, 
essentially bourgeois movements, be discouraged in favour of truely communist 
organisations?
363
 While Bravin may have been busy making connections with 
various Persian malcontents, not until 1920 would this issue be officially worked 
out.
364
 Not until 1921, either, would the Bolshevik regime invest greater resources 
into their diplomatic endeavours; in the meantime, Bravin was left to his own 
devices.
365
  
Together with Bravin’s impotence, there was also reason to doubt that 
Communism would find fertile ground in southern Asia. In December 1918, the 
Persian minister, Samad Khan, stated his belief that Bolshevism would never take 
root in Persia, as the people were not of that militant attitude. Nevertheless the 
Persian government was suspicious of Bolshevism and, as Cox himself had admitted, 
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the shah was said to be very anti-Bolshevik.
366
 In any case, even if Bolshevism was 
the threat to Persia which Cox argued it was, Lancelot Oliphant of the Foreign Office 
noted that ‘it is open to doubt whether the present sense of feeling here [Britain] or 
elsewhere would sanction our saving Persia from Bolshevism by military 
measures’.367 Indeed, in a meeting of the Eastern Committee on 19 December 1918 
there seemed little enthusiasm for Britain extending its involvement in Persia. 
Curzon opened the discussion with an explanation of the state of affairs there: 
We are face to face, in the first place, with a country, the Government of which 
is weak and incompetent, the ruling classes corrupt and extortionate, the 
monarch worthless and the lower classes in a deplorable condition 
intellectually, physically and materially. Persia would be bankrupt if it were 
not for our money, and she would at this moment be in a state of revolution if it 
were not for our troops.
368
 
If Curzon was trying to gain some sympathy for the Persian cause, his plan 
backfired. Instead, it led Montagu to question the very basis of Britain’s involvement 
there, wondering aloud if the country had ever actually been left to its own devices, 
free of foreign support. Curzon’s response – that such a move would be impossible, 
since there was no one within Persia capable of running that country properly 
without foreign aid – led Cecil to ask simply what would be the consequences should 
Persia be allowed to sink into chaos. Cecil then declared himself in favour of giving 
up entirely on Persia, including stopping all subsidies and supplies of arms. Sir 
Hamilton Grant (foreign secretary of the Indian government), argued that a certain 
level of anarchy in Persia would not be disastrous for India. As long as no other 
foreign power was able to gain a dominant position there, the Indian government 
cared little for the internal issues of Persia. For his part, Montagu believed that there 
was something to be said for letting Persia fall so far that it would come to realise, of 
its own accord, its need for Britain’s assistance. Clearly, Curzon’s attempt to 
galvanise his colleagues into action over Persia was not working. Curzon’s scare-
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mongering was also countered by the presence at the meeting of Marling, the 
recalled minister for Tehran. Marling flatly denied that Bolshevism was the threat to 
Persia that Cox and Curzon so adamantly claimed it to be. Cecil also expressed his 
doubt that Persia was under threat from a Bolshevik invasion, arguing that Lenin’s 
regime was as yet unable to organise an operation on such a large scale as would be 
necessary to successfully attack Persia. As Curzon’s irritation appeared at breaking 
point, Cecil aptly summed up Britain’s policy in Persia as being ‘neither fish, flesh, 
fowl, nor good red herring’.369 
The meeting of 19 December had shown a preference among the majority of 
committee members to remain distanced from Persian affairs. Curzon, nonetheless, 
had not been deterred from pursuing a more forward policy and two days after the 
meeting he received support for his endeavours from Sir Louis Mallet, ex-
ambassador to Constantinople and current head of the Middle East section of the 
Political Intelligence Department (PID) at the Foreign Office.
370
 In a memorandum 
written on 21 December, Mallet argued that to abandon Persia, as Montagu, Cecil 
and Grant had suggested, would have grave consequences for British interests in 
Mesopotamia, Afghanistan and India. It would also leave Persia entirely open to 
Russian advances, be it Bolshevik or White Russian. Mallet’s proposal was for 
Britain, in effect, to go on the offensive and extend its influence into the northern 
regions. He argued that were Britain not to press forward into ‘so fertile a field, just 
at the moment when our principle rival has disappeared from the scene... a good 
opportunity would be missed’. Mallet emphasised, in particular, the urgency of 
exploiting Russia’s current weakness before it was able to re-organise and re-assert 
its authority in Persia. Echoing Cox, Mallet advised gaining a mandate for Persia, in 
order to allow Britain to ‘fortify ourselves against any possible future difficulties 
with Russia’.371  
It just so happened that Mallet’s thinking was perfectly in-line with that of 
Curzon and of Cox and his memorandum gave added impetus to their cause. At the 
heart of their argument lay the idea that Britain needed to extend and consolidate its 
position in Persia as quickly as possible, before the traditional enemy, Russia (be it 
                                                 
369
 TNA/CAB27/24, Minutes of Eastern Committee Meeting, 19 Dec. 1918. 
 
370
 Goldstein, ‘Political Intelligence Department’, p. 420. 
 
371
 TNA/FO371/3263/211466, Memorandum by L. Mallet, 21 Dec. 1918. 
 
95 
 
Bolshevik or otherwise), could regain its influence there. In his discussion on 
Britain’s policy towards Persia in the aftermath of the First World War, John Darwin 
has tried to argue that not until 1920–1921 did government officials become 
concerned with the possibility of Russian rivalry in that country: 
Since early in 1918, their plans had been framed on the assumption that Russia 
would cease to play, for an indefinite period, any active part in the affairs of 
the Ottoman Empire and Persia...Acceptance of this assumption was implicit in 
Curzon’s newfound enthusiasm for a much enhanced British role in Persia...At 
no stage in these discussions was the possibility of a Russian imperial revival 
seriously considered, and the survival of powerful elements of pro-
Russian...sentiment...went unnoticed.
372
  
However, the main flaw in his argument is that Darwin uses the work of two other 
historians rather than primary material as support for this claim.
373
 As can be seen 
already from the quoted documents, the reality was actually in stark contrast to 
Darwin’s statement. Not only was the possibility of a revived imperial Russia 
seriously discussed in 1918, but it was actually used by the likes of Cox and Mallet 
to emphasise the need for haste in this direction. Furthermore, as discussed below, 
the presence of vestigial elements of imperial Russia in Persia after the 1917 
revolution could hardly go unnoticed, given that Britain was financially supporting 
most of them. Even the post-war concept of seeking a mandate to legitimise Britain’s 
position in Persia still reflected a preoccupation with Russia and the supposition that 
it would at some point in the future try to challenge Britain’s hegemony in southern 
Asia.  
All of this not only reflected Great Game thinking, but was in contrast to the 
opinion of the Indian government. On 20 December 1918, Hamilton Grant had also 
written a memorandum further emphasising the points made in the committee 
meeting the previous day: that the most desirable course, from the Indian 
government’s point of view, was to assist Persia only on a limited scale. Rather than 
trying to extend its political influence in Persia, the British government should be 
attempting to ingratiate itself better with the Persian people, who since the 1907 
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convention had viewed Britain as an imperial exploiter.
374
 The violation of Persia’s 
neutrality during the First World War by both British and Russian troops had angered 
the Persians even further so that by 1918, Britain’s standing in the country was at an 
all time low.
375
 As Chelmsford noted, ‘until we have regained [the] confidence of 
[the] Persian people, no Persian Cabinet, however friendly, can work effectively in 
our interests’.376 This idea of trying to return to a pre-1907 relationship with Persia 
had support from others: it had been advocated by Marling in 1917, while in January 
1918 the Persian expert, E.G. Browne, had put forth his idea of an Anglo-Persian 
treaty based on five points, including abolishing zones of influence and allowing the 
Persian government to recruit advisers of whichever nationality they liked. Browne 
also advocated filling the Legation in Tehran with those ‘who are known to be 
friendly and sympathetic to the Persian people’.377 Curzon, however, refused to 
acknowledge the changes which had over-come Persia in the last decade and had 
little time for this ‘softly-softly’ approach. By 30 December 1918, in another meeting 
of the Eastern Committee, he appeared to have entirely lost patience with the 
situation. The acting foreign secretary condemned the idea espoused in the previous 
committee meeting of leaving Persia to its own devices as ‘immoral, feeble and 
disastrous’, adding that ‘if anybody imagines that this would really quit us of Persian 
responsibility he really must be blind’. Continuing his acerbic attack, Curzon mocked 
the Indian government for believing: 
...that we should go on with our present policy, but do it in a more ingratiating 
way; use rather nicer phrases and try to humour the Persian National 
Government more than the Government of India thinks that we have so far 
done, and that our better manners should take the form of repeating the 
statements we have already made in a pleasanter way...  
                                                 
374
 TNA/FO371/3858/150, Memorandum by Sir Hamilton Grant, 20 Dec. 1918. 
 
375
 Unwilling to allow Persia to become a passage for German and Turkish troops into Central Asia 
and India, British and Russian forces occupied large parts of the country during the conflict. For more 
see: N.S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia 1917–1923: Anglo-Russian Power Politics in Iran 
(New York: R.F. Moore Co., 1952), pp. 2–9 and F.J. Moberly, Operations in Persia 1914–1919 
(London: HMSO, 1987). 
 
376
 BL/IOR/L/PS/10/735/1000/18, Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 2 Nov. 
1918. 
 
377
 Stanwood, ‘Britain in Persia’, p. 149; Ross, ‘The Persian Question’, p. 270. 
 
97 
 
Curzon then dismissed this argument by disparaging Indian expertise: ‘it is to be 
noted that all the authorities who speak with actual knowledge of Persia itself are 
against it’.378 What Curzon advocated, in contrast, was a set of reforms and economic 
concessions which were to be pressed upon the Persian government. Should it refuse 
to accept such an arrangement, Persia would find itself cut off from any future 
British loans and would face an immediate call on all its current debts.
379
 The British 
government, he argued, ‘have never had the pluck to say to them [the Persians], ‘You 
are in our hands absolutely to do as we please’. In his opinion, now was the time to 
tell the Persian government just that.
380
  
 
The reality, however, was that Persia was not entirely in British hands. Despite 
Bolshevik proclamations renouncing all Russia’s foreign interests and an official 
recall of all Russian staff from foreign soil, in 1918 there remained in Persia an 
imperial Russian presence in the form of the Russian Legation in Tehran and the 
Cossack Division. Officially, this Russian presence in Persia remained allied to 
Britain, and London had been financially supporting both organisations since 
1917.
381
 As Cox observed, however, there was a great difficulty in having in Persia 
so many Russian officials ‘of [the] old regime who cannot exist without our support, 
but who not unnaturally resent our predominance...’382 Both the leader of the Russian 
Legation, Vladimir Minorskii, and the commander of the Cossack Division, Colonel 
Staroselskii, regarded themselves as the last bulwark of Russia’s presence in Persia. 
Both also felt responsible for maintaining a semblance of Russian influence in 
Tehran for as long as was necessary for a new Russian government to form and 
reclaim its privileges there.
383
 For this Russian element, forced to watch Britain’s 
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international standing reach its pinnacle with the conclusion of the First World War, 
while their country collapsed into anarchy and civil war, it was hard not to view their 
old Great Game rivals ‘with a jealous eye’.384 In November 1918, for example, Cox 
informed the Foreign Office that Minorskii had been causing a nuisance to the 
British during his tour of northern Persia.
385
 British military personnel, in turn, 
viewed the Russians with barely disguised contempt.
386
 By December, CIGS was 
forced to instruct Malleson to warn his officers in Persia to refrain from openly 
showing hostility towards the Russian Legation.
387
 
For, despite Russia’s weakness in 1918, Britain could not afford to aggravate 
Minorskii and Staroselskii. For one thing, having been appointed by the Russian 
Provisional Government, Minorskii was able to disassociate himself from the days of 
imperial Russian rule in Persia, and represent himself as a progressive liberal, 
making his standing among the Persian public relatively high.
388
 Another problem 
lay in the fact that ‘the mere consideration that they depend on us for their up-keep 
counts for nothing when Russian interests or those of the Division lie in a direction 
contrary to those of His Majesty’s Government’.389 This meant that, should they feel 
the urge to do so, the Russian leaders in Persia could quite simply turn on their 
benefactors and, while Britain could probably easily put down such a rebellion, it had 
no wish to incite such a situation. For one thing, the Cossack Division remained a 
useful resource in the face of any civil unrest or to be employed against any possible 
Bolshevik incursion into Persia. The division’s influence over the shah was also 
formidable. As Curzon noted, ‘the Russian commander of the brigade, Starosselski 
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[sic] was, owing to the size of his force and his easy access to the Shah, dictator of 
the situation, and, until the circumstances were more favourable to ourselves, it 
would be impolitic to arouse his enmity’.390 Nine months earlier, in April 1918, when 
trying to convince the British government to continue financially supporting the 
Russian Legation, Marling had warned that without the money, the legation and 
consulates would be forced to close, and that ‘if [the Russian] Minister himself left I 
am convinced Persian Government would eventually recognise such people as 
Bravine [sic]’.391  
In December 1918, Marling continued to argue that, were Russian influence 
to be eliminated completely from northern Persia, it would create a vacuum and if 
Britain was unable to fill this vacuum itself, it would ‘prove very tempting to some 
other Power’. While Germany or Turkey perhaps no longer represented a threat, 
there still remained the possibility of Bolshevism filling that void.
392
 Cox also 
justified his continued political support for the established Russian diplomats by 
pointing out that should such support be withdrawn, these Russians would soon be 
ousted by Bolshevik emissaries.
393
 While Cox would have liked to have seen the 
tsarist element in Persia replaced by a British presence, he certainly did not want it 
exchanged for Bolshevik officials. In Mallet’s eyes, however, the solution was 
simply for Britain to make sure it filled the vacuum itself, arguing that ‘there is little 
to be gained by maintaining Russian interest in N. Persia against Persian wishes’.394 
For Montagu, keeping Russian diplomatic figures afloat was advisable, but he 
questioned the wisdom of aiding Russia to hold on to its economic interests in 
Persia.
395
 Others in the India Office simply believed that ‘this appears to be a quite 
impossible line of policy’.396 Oliphant agreed that ‘there seems no need to bolster up 
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Russian political interests’.397 Yet, in January 1918 Oliphant had admitted that in 
Persia, ‘anything is better than Bolshevism’,398 and so for now, maintaining the 
Russian Legation and the Cossack Division appeared to carry less risk than the 
potential consequences of breaking with them.  
 
It would seem, then, that the policy that Curzon and his allies were pursuing in Persia 
in 1918–1919 consisted of supporting one group of Russians against the possible 
threat of another group, while all the while working to at least undermine, if not 
remove, Russian influence altogether in that country, to be replaced by a British 
presence forced upon the Persian government through economic coercion. This was a 
policy that the Indian government vocally opposed. By April 1919, Chelmsford was 
arguing that the ‘existence of anti-British feeling among Moslems in Egypt and 
India... coupled with unsettled condition of Afghanistan, renders the present a highly 
dangerous moment for initiation of so hazardous an experiment’.399 In February 
1919, the emir of Afghanistan, Habibullah, had been assassinated, sparking a 
succession crisis,
400
 while in India itself Chelmsford was facing rising popular unrest 
following the enactment of the Rowlatt Bill and the infamous Amritsar Massacre on 
13 April.
401
 While they were struggling to keep a check on events within India itself, 
the viceroy and his government were cautious of giving Muslims in South Asia any 
further excuse for agitation.  
Yet, such protests seemed to be having little impact on Curzon, and 
Chelmsford complained continually to Montagu that the government of India was 
being treated ‘as if we were a quantité negligeable’.402 In December 1918, Montagu 
himself had threatened to completely withdraw India’s share of Persian expenditure 
if the Foreign Office did not stop sending instructions to Tehran without prior 
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approval from the India Office.
403
 In response, Crowe argued that ‘the attitude of the 
India Office is unreasonable. The fact is that the India Office do everything to 
substitute their authority for that of this dept., not only in Mesopotamia and kindred 
questions but also in regard to Persia, where, I gather, Mr Montagu is bent upon 
leading us into a policy of scuttle and complete abandonment of our position.’404 
This struggle over control of Persian policy was compounded by the Foreign Office’s 
apparent disregard of the Indian government’s opinion and its claim to expertise in 
Asian affairs. Despite the viceroy’s assertion that the Indian government held ‘a 
greater knowledge of the facts than they [the Home government] could possess’,405 
the Foreign Office believed ‘that knowledge and experience gained in Persia is to be 
found far more easily in London than it is in Simla or Delhi’.406 This attitude 
Chelmsford attributed to the report of the Mesopotamia Commission ‘which had 
blackened our faces in the eyes of the world and discredited us as a Government’.407 
  Curzon, for his part, was growing increasingly impatient with Chelmsford’s 
opposition. In an interdepartmental conference in May 1919 the acting foreign 
secretary blasted the government of India for refusing to underwrite a large loan to 
Persia needed to push through his planned reform package. The issue of finance was, 
indeed, the one ace up the viceroy’s sleeve, for without India’s resources the Home 
government would struggle to maintain its interests in Persia, let alone extend them 
(as Curzon was trying to do). Threatening to withhold such finance, as Montagu had 
done in December, was the one way of getting the Home government to listen to 
India. It had certainly caught the attention of Curzon, who fumed at the Indian 
government’s attitude, arguing that the whole plan he was trying to enact in Persia 
was being carried out for the benefit of India in the first place, by creating a stable 
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buffer state.
408
 Curzon apparently failed to understand why the Indian government 
objected to being forced to pay for a policy that it opposed, while all the while being 
scolded that it was for India’s own good. The problem for Chelmsford came when 
Montagu was finally persuaded to support Curzon’s plan. In the structure of 
authority, the viceroy was subservient to the secretary of state for India and, thus, 
while Chelmsford could continue to rail against the Home government’s plans in 
Persia, Montagu ultimately had the final say.
409
 Once the secretary of state had been 
brought around to the opinion that it was worth running the risks that Curzon’s 
Persian policy held for the potential beneficial results, Chelmsford had to 
acquiesce.
410
  
 
Once Montagu had capitulated and Cecil had been brought around, there was little 
opposition left to Curzon’s proposed plans. (It is worth noting that the reason for 
Cecil’s change of heart was not that he became fearful of a Bolshevik threat to Persia 
but, rather, that he had grown apprehensive over the position of power in which 
Staroselskii and the Cossack Division would be left should Britain withdraw from 
Persia.)
411
 By August 1919, the Anglo-Persian agreement was finally concluded. 
Curzon considered this an important personal achievement, although lamented the 
fact that others did not recognise this. As he wrote to his wife: 
The papers give a very good reception to my Persian Treaty, which I have been 
negotiating for the past year, and which is a great triumph, as I have done it all 
alone. But not a single paper so much as mentions my name or has the dimmest 
perception that, had I not been at the Foreign Office, it would never have been 
at all.
412
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The agreement allowed for the supply of British advisers for Persia’s administrative 
departments, for the encouragement of Anglo-Persian enterprise for the extension of 
Persia’s railways and roads and for a military commission to assess Persia’s military 
situation (with a view to creating a uniform force, officered by the British and which 
would ultimately absorb the South Persian Rifles and the Cossack Division). 
Together with a substantial loan of two million pounds sterling, to be levied on 
certain concessions, the agreement also stipulated the creation of a joint commission 
to investigate revision of the Persian customs tariff.
413
 When the finalised text of the 
Persian agreement was circulated through the War Cabinet for approval, Curzon 
justified the agreement by arguing that ‘if Persia were to be left alone, there is every 
reason to fear that she would soon be overrun by Bolshevik influences from the 
north’.414 The idea of an imminent threat of a Bolshevik takeover of Persia was also 
reflected in many British newspapers that reported on the agreement. The Times 
believed that the Bolshevik regime was at that very moment ‘preparing a war of 
conquest in Persian territory’,415 while The Daily Telegraph argued that there was 
every reason to believe that if Britain refused to help Persia, ‘that in a very short time 
the whole country would be overrun by Bolshevik agents’.416 The Manchester 
Guardian ominously noted that, for Persia, ‘there are always the Bolsheviks looming 
on the horizon, and it is impossible to say...what engines of war of the most “modern 
type” may not be needed in order to counteract the inflow, if not of Bolshevik arms, 
yet of the more deadly Bolshevik doctrine’.417 How far Curzon was really fearful of a 
Bolshevik incursion into Persia, and how far it was a convenient way to justify his 
expansionist ambitions – as Stanwood believes – is questionable.418 
Whatever Curzon’s motivations really were, for all this anti-Bolshevik 
rhetoric, it was to be the White Russian element that was to be the most immediate 
threat to Britain’s interests in Persia in late 1919. The Bolsheviks of course 
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immediately denounced the agreement as ‘a scrap of paper whose legal validity it 
will never recognise’ and proffered ‘their fraternal hand’ to the ‘oppressed masses of 
Persia’ – but gave no real help to the Persians.419 Those Russians who ran the 
legation and Cossack Division, however, were able to cause much more trouble for 
the British and the previous trepidation the British government had felt over 
alienating the Russian presence in Persia was proved justified by its reaction to news 
of the agreement. For the officials of the former tsarist regime, the agreement not 
only represented the strengthening of Britain’s presence in Persia, but an extension of 
that influence into ostensibly ‘Russian’ territory. For the Cossack Division, the 
concept of a uniform force, with British rather than Russian officers in command, 
obviously constituted a great threat to its position in Persia. On 29 August 1919, Cox 
was asked outright by the Russian minister whether the agreement marked a change 
in Britain’s policy towards Russian interests in north Persia. While Cox replied in the 
negative, this did little to reassure Russian officials.
420
 On 1 September, it was 
reported by Cox that Minorskii, together with Staroselskii, had been in close 
communication with M. Bonin of the French Legation since the announcement of the 
agreement (both France and America had denounced the terms of the accord and the 
secrecy in which it had been negotiated).
421
 As Cox explained to the Foreign Office, 
the ‘attitude of Russian Legation is that [the] agreement [is] obviously most injurious 
to Russia, and that [the] Russian Legation, being in too weak a position to offer any 
effective opposition to it, look to [the] French to do their best to support Russia in 
connection “dans les interets des deux pays”’.422  
More worrying than the Russian Legation’s overtures to the French, however, 
was the possibility that Russian officials in Persia, particularly the officers of the 
Cossack Division, might actively try to impede the treaty and its reform terms. Since 
March 1919, the British together with the Cossack Division, had been sporadically 
fighting an uprising in north-east Persia by the Jangali group led by Mirza Kuchuk 
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Khan.
423
 By October, Lord Derby in Paris was relaying warnings from the Persian 
minister for foreign affairs that the Russian constituents of this campaign were 
stirring up intrigue against the Persian government, particularly in the northern 
provinces: ‘They even go so far as to wish to create relations between Persian 
elements of disorder and Bolsheviks.’424 The Persian prime minister himself was 
fearful of the Russian reaction to the agreement and asked Cox to implore the British 
government ‘to recognise that it is in our joint interests that steps should be taken 
without delay to make position safe both as regards Bolshevist menace in northern 
provinces and in regard to Cossack Division, whose loyalty can now no longer be 
relied upon’.425 British officials were quickly finding that their policy of supporting 
the Russian presence in Persia was coming back to haunt them.  
The Cossack Division, although it was the only force capable of repressing 
any disturbances in northern Persia, had now become worse than redundant, 
constituting a threat in itself. Talk from Staroselskii of removing his force to Persian 
Azerbaijan and Gilan in order to put down the Jangali uprising, was met with 
suspicion by the British government. By taking his division from the capital, the 
Cossack commander would not only prevent his men from being absorbed into the 
proposed new uniform force, but he could potentially re-enforce his troops with men 
from the Caucasus and even liaise with General A.I. Denikin, the White commander 
in south Russia, to intrigue against Britain in Persia.
426
 As Cox himself noted, it 
‘seems quixotic that we should be giving so much help to Denikin, and should have 
maintained [the] division itself for so long, and now allow them to remain a serious 
menace to successful progress of our policy’.427 For whatever reason, Curzon had 
apparently failed to appreciate the risk that lay in providing financial support to an 
armed Russian contingent in Persia while simultaneously trying to undermine the 
basis of that force. He had failed to predict just how far the agreement would 
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antagonise the Russian Whites and had arguably made Britain’s position in Persia 
less secure by it. In effect, the Great Game thinking that had informed his actions in 
this period re-awakened many of the Great Game tensions that had lain dormant for 
the past five years.  
 
The Wasp’s Nest 
While the Indian government struggled to have its authority taken seriously in 
London in relation to Persia, when it came to Afghanistan things should have been 
more clear cut. Not only was Afghanistan inextricably linked to India via proximity, 
religion and its connections with the tribes on India’s North-West Frontier, since 
1880, with the conclusion of the Second Afghan War, the Government of India had 
had control of Afghanistan’s external relations.428 Nevertheless, this did not prevent 
the Home government from interfering when it could. In June 1918, for example, in a 
meeting of the Eastern Committee, Chief of Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir 
Henry Wilson, questioned the Indian government’s judgement over Afghanistan. 
Wilson advocated persuading emir Habibullah to join the conflict, arguing that, with 
the collapse of Russia, Afghanistan had become extremely vulnerable to penetration 
by the Central Powers.
429
 He accused the Indian government of being ‘diffident 
about formulating any definite course of action’ in regard to Afghanistan, and pushed 
for the War Cabinet to take control of policy towards that country.
430
 Curzon too was 
keen to make Afghanistan a formal ally, believing that together with Persia it could 
form ‘a Moslem nexus of states’ which would stop a German and Turkish advance 
into Asia. Yet again, Curzon also tried to exert his authority over India, pointing out 
during the meeting that ‘the Viceroy of India and his Government were in these 
matters advisers to the Home Government, and that in the last resort it rested with the 
latter to decide’. Balfour, however, quickly poured cold water on Curzon’s 
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implications that London should proceed without listening to Delhi.
431
 For 
Chelmsford believed that open revolution would ensue there should the emir ally 
himself with Britain against Turkey. Habibullah was already facing intense pressure 
from his subjects to provide support to Muslim Turkey, and was only just managing 
to maintain his country’s neutrality by arguing that Afghanistan would be ruined by 
entering the war.
432
 Trying to get Afghanistan to support the British cause was 
therefore simply unfeasible. As Abdul Ali Arghandawi notes ‘The whole country 
[Afghanistan] was against the British and favoured Turkey’.433 Luckily, on this point 
Chelmsford had Montagu’s support, who argued in the next Eastern Committee 
meeting that, ‘as the Indian Government had hitherto been successful throughout the 
war in their dealings with the Amir, he thought the Committee should trust their 
judgement in the present case’.434 Unfortunately for Delhi, however, London would 
persist in similar criticism throughout the years after 1918. 
As already noted, one particularly important reason the Indian government 
was so reluctant to become overly involved in Persia was the problems it was facing 
in Afghanistan. The murder of the emir Habibullah had proved a great blow to 
Britain, not least because of the unrest it created in Afghanistan. Habibullah’s 
willingness to stay loyal to Britain despite strong pressure from his people to support 
Turkey, was invaluable to Britain, although it may have actually cost the emir his 
life.
435
 Whatever the cause of it, Habibullah’s death set off a chain of events that 
would culminate in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. While Habibullah’s brother, 
Nasrullah Khan, immediately pronounced himself the new emir, this was contested 
by Amanullah, Habibullah’s third son. By 4 March, Nasrullah had given up his claim 
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and Amanullah had been proclaimed emir.
436
 Unfortunately for Britain, Amanullah 
was well known for his nationalistic, anti-British tendencies, and from the outset of 
his reign the new emir seemed determined to be antagonistic towards his imperial 
neighbour.
437
 Traditionally Britain’s relationship with the ruler of Afghanistan was 
one of ‘gentle bondage’ – the emir was expected to be ‘a remote but complaisant 
liege to the British suzerain’ and in exchange he received a generous subsidy.438 
While many of Amanullah’s predecessors had grumbled about this arrangement, he 
was the first emir to reject it entirely.
439
 Pronouncements declaring the independence 
of Afghanistan externally as well as internally were followed with the appointment 
of a Commissary of Foreign Affairs, under Muhammad Tarzi.
440
 As well as being 
Amanullah’s father-in-law, Tarzi was the founder and owner of Afghanistan’s only 
newspaper of the time, the Siraj-al-Akhbar (‘Spotlight on the News’), a paper that 
specialised in vitriolic attacks against Britain and which had spent the entire First 
World War espousing the Turkish cause.
441
 Such actions boded ill for the Indian 
government, which by April 1919 was facing its own problems with extensive 
internal unrest. The announcement of the Rowlatt Bill, followed by the tragedy of the 
Amritsar Massacre, were used by the new emir to denounce Britain’s rule in India.442 
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Finally, following minor skirmishes along the borders, Afghan troops violated Indian 
territory on 5 May 1919. Indian forces were mobilised to counter the attack, and by 
11 May Amanullah had announced a jihad against Britain. The conflict was short-
lived, as Afghan troops and civilians became quickly demoralised by the Indian 
government’s campaign of aerial bombardment, and by 28 May Amanullah had 
despatched a request for a ceasefire.
443
 
 
With such events in Afghanistan and India dominating his attention, it is unsurprising 
that Chelmsford was reluctant to become more deeply involved in Persian affairs. 
Signs of a link between the Bolshevik regime and the problems in Afghanistan were 
also highly worrying. Throughout May, Malleson had been reporting on the increase 
in pro-Bolshevik, pro-Islamic and anti-British propaganda being distributed in 
Meshed, Turkestan and Afghanistan.
444
 On 30 May, Malleson had told CIGS that the 
Bolshevik government had officially recognised emir Amanullah and the 
independence of Afghanistan,
445
 while, for his part, one of the first acts of the new 
emir was to congratulate the Soviet regime on their successes in Russia.
446
 On 6 
May, the Director of the Eastern Section of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs in Soviet Russia had described Afghanistan in the paper Izvestiia as being ‘of 
first class importance for the propaganda cause in Asia...Afghanistan is historically 
and geographically a passing stage from India to Central Asia...it exercises an 
enormous influence over the 70 million mussulman population of India’.447  
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This description of Afghanistan as ‘a passing stage’ would not have escaped 
the notice of the Indian government. The Bolshevik regime’s relationship with exiled 
Indian dissidents, some of whom had at one stage or another resided in Kabul, only 
compounded India’s fears. The Muslim agitator Maulana Barakatullah, for example, 
had been part of the German–Turkish mission to Afghanistan in 1915, and in 1919 
arrived in Moscow claiming to have been specially sent by the new Afghan emir to 
establish relations with the Soviet government.
448
  The Indian revolutionary also tried 
to assert that ‘the ideas of communism have thoroughly penetrated into Afghanistan 
and even into neighbouring India’, although both these claims were simply wishful 
thinking on Barakatullah’s part.449 The year 1919 also saw the arrival in Moscow of 
Mahendra Pratap, the head of the ‘Indian Provisional Government’ – an organisation 
set up in Berlin during the First World War by exiled Indian revolutionaries. After 
discussions with Lenin, Pratap travelled to Kabul later in the year, where he was 
joined by Karl Bravin who, being unsuccessful in Persia, was now trying his luck in 
Afghanistan.
450
 The new emir was more than welcoming to these Bolshevik and 
Indian malcontents, allowing them unlimited freedom of movement and 
association.
451
 Thus, in 1919 it appeared that Afghanistan had the potential to be a 
hotbed of anti-British intrigue. 
Nonetheless, for all the apparent affinity between Afghanistan and Bolshevik 
Russia, there remained doubt among many in the Indian government that Bolshevism 
alone was the threat to Britain’s interests some claimed it to be. Just as with Persia, 
there was scepticism that Bolshevik ideology could take hold in Afghanistan, with its 
religious and monarchical political structure. H.R.C. Dobbs, chief commissioner of 
Baluchistan, noted that it was ‘inconceivable that present-day Bolshevism should 
make any impression on the social structure of Afghanistan’.452 Hamilton Grant, in 
his talks with the Afghan delegation during the peace negotiations following the 
Third Anglo-Afghan War, even expressed amusement at the concept that ‘a State 
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ruled by an autocratic King and supported by an aristocracy’ would ‘amalgamate and 
work in sympathy with a violent rabble who hold that Kings must be murdered, that 
Monarchies must be abolished, [and] that aristocracies must be swept away’.453 In his 
work, Zafar Imam argues that ‘in official quarters’, Amanullah’s attack on India was 
seen as the work of Bolshevik agitators.
454
 It is certainly true that there were some 
within Britain who saw the spectre of Bolshevism behind every form of popular 
agitation during this period. The Times, for instance, had argued that the civil unrest 
that had precluded the Amritsar Massacre was a result of a Bolshevik ‘conspiracy’.455 
However, Imam oversimplifies things by suggesting that the opinion of British 
officials was uniform on this matter. The Political Department of the India Office, in 
a report of 17 May 1919,  actually argued that ‘there is little evidence to support the 
theory of Bolshevik or enemy instigation’ in the outbreak of the Afghan war. Instead, 
the report contended, it was the weakness of the new emir’s position, combined with 
the news of unrest in India, that encouraged Amanullah to take the opportunity to 
strike and re-assert Afghanistan’s international authority.456 Hamilton Grant 
concurred, believing that one of the chief reasons for the outbreak of the conflict had 
been the mistaken belief in Afghanistan that the tribes along the Indian border, 
together with the Indian people, would rebel against the British government.
457
 The 
historian T.A. Heathcote has argued that by making war on the old enemy, 
Amanullah could ‘simultaneously appeal to religious and historical sentiment among 
the conservatives, and to nationalist and progressive views among the radicals’, 
uniting both behind his throne.
458
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Furthermore, there was evidence to suggest that the Afghan government were 
using relations with Moscow as a bargaining tool against Britain. As Hamilton Grant 
reported to the Indian government, the Afghan delegation at Rawalpindi ‘was 
obviously briefed to try and frighten us with the Bolshevik bogey’.459 Indeed, they 
openly threatened the Indian government when they asserted during the negotiations 
‘if you fight with us we can fight with you, and we will get help from the Bolshevists 
and fight against you. If the Bolshevists fight against you, we shall help them and 
welcome them. But if you are our friend, we can prevent them by force.’460 Aware of 
the vulnerability of his position, Amanullah was effectively playing the best card he 
had – inviting into his country Bolshevik and Indian revolutionaries in order to 
demonstrate his ability to cause trouble for the Indian government.
461
 Hamilton 
Grant’s reaction was, in effect, to call the Afghans’ bluff, by arguing that Britain had 
no fear of Bolshevism taking hold in India, since the Indians themselves would not 
let that happen, and that the government could quite easily close all the northern 
passes between the two countries if need be.
462
  
Nevertheless, while Hamilton Grant could not afford to appear anything less 
than entirely self-assured in front of the Afghan delegation, this did not mean that the 
Indian government totally dismissed the potential danger of Bolshevism. First, as 
Dobbs explained, the Bolshevik regime ‘might ally itself with Afghanistan and help 
it with men and arms against India. Or it might conceivably conquer Afghanistan as 
an obstacle on the road to plunder India.’463 This threat was, however, not entirely 
different to that which had been posed by the tsarist regime and had, indeed, been the 
very basis of the Great Game. The Indian government well understood how to 
counter this by making friendship with Britain appear the better option than co-
operation with Soviet Russia. The second layer of Soviet foreign policy, however, 
was one that few contemporaries at this time appeared to appreciate: the spread of 
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ideology and encouragement of popular unrest as a means of undermining rival 
governments.
464
 While there was much talk in London of the threat of invasion by 
Bolshevik forces in places like Persia, it was the Indian government that appeared to 
understand that Bolshevism spread quickest and most effectively where there was 
mass discontent. Thus, in the Indian government’s opinion, the more Britain 
undermined the sovereignty of the rulers of Persia and Afghanistan by imperialistic 
coercion, the more it inflamed nationalist and pan-Islamist feeling, then the more 
likely it was that Bolshevik agitators would find a ready following in these countries. 
If, on the other hand, Britain treated the people of southern Asia with tact, and 
proved an attractive ally to the shah and emir, it had little to fear from Bolshevism. 
Fundamental to the Indian government’s policy towards Afghanistan then, was an 
understanding – perhaps not explicitly verbalised but certainly apparent from its 
handling of the Afghan peace process – of how the Bolshevik regime functioned in 
its international dealings.  
 
For Delhi, then, it was imperative that the peace negotiations with Afghanistan were 
handled correctly, with enough firmness to disavow the Afghan delegation of any 
notion of the Raj’s weakness but without risking pushing them into Bolshevik arms. 
The Home government, however, did not share this view and from the outset 
Chelmsford and Hamilton Grant faced criticism from London. In June 1919, 
Montagu complained of having not been consulted before the viceroy had arranged 
the armistice, particularly as he felt that the emir’s letter preceding the ceasefire had 
not displayed enough deference. Not only had Amanullah not apologised for his 
actions in causing the conflict, but he had even had the audacity to compare Britain’s 
air-raids of Afghanistan to the German bombing of London during the First World 
War – a reference almost designed to earn the animosity of the British government 
and people. Montagu was worried that the viceroy had shown himself too keen for 
peace and that the emir had not been properly castigated for his impudence towards 
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the British Empire.
465
 Chelmsford, nevertheless, stood by his decision to accept an 
armistice. He insisted that the letter from Amanullah needed to be understood in light 
of ‘Afghan psychology’. He explained: 
We can, of course, vanquish Afghanistan, but only at a cost of prolongation of 
war with its attendant dangers – probable breakdown of stable Government in 
Afghanistan, thereby opening Afghan doors to Bolshevism, probably 
necessitating occupation of parts of the country by our troops...Bolshevik 
propaganda skilfully manipulated from Tashkend [sic] is preaching that we are 
bent upon an aggressive war on one of the few remaining Moslem powers. Had 
we resumed hostilities after the Amir had fulfilled our demand [for a 
ceasefire]...we feel that this would have been [the] interpretation placed on our 
action by the Moslem world...
466
 
The alternative to accepting the armistice, in the opinion of the Indian government, 
would have meant continued military action and the weakening of Afghanistan. This 
would subsequently result either in exposing that country to Bolshevism or of having 
to make it a British protectorate, a prospect nobody relished. As the secretary of the 
Military Department of the India Office, Lieutenant-General Sir H.V. Cox, aptly put 
it, ‘I cannot imagine a less profitable country to “protect” than Afghanistan – a 
veritable wasps’ nest.’467 
This was, of course, assuming that India would continue to be victorious 
should the conflict resume. The Third Anglo-Afghan War had, in fact, highlighted 
the weaknesses in the Indian army following the First World War. Not only were its 
numbers depleted, but those soldiers who remained were often undisciplined and 
inexperienced in frontier fighting. The Indian troops faced a hard enemy in the tough 
and skilled tribesmen who had joined the war with Afghan encouragement,
468
 and 
there was a genuine fear that should the conflict resume, India might not be able to 
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defeat Afghanistan, at least not as quickly and resoundly as should be expected from 
the larger power.
469
 It was also clear that a speedy resolution to the current crisis was 
in the interest of India’s domestic concerns. The scars of the Amritsar Massacre were 
yet to heal, and Gandhi’s nationalist agitation was gaining momentum. While the 
Indian population had failed to rise up with the outbreak of the Afghan War, this was 
not to say that it might not do so should the conflict continue. In 1919, the viceroy’s 
entire attention was therefore needed at home. While Montagu was admonishing the 
Indian government to remember that ‘we, and not he [the emir], are the victors’,470 
Chelmsford appeared more realistic about India’s current weaknesses. His aim in the 
peace negotiations was to deal firmly and resolutely with the emir in order to bring 
about a peaceful resolution as quickly as possible and in such a way as to maintain a 
strong yet friendly Afghanistan and prevent it from becoming a hostile centre of pan-
Islamic and Bolshevik propaganda.
471
  
 
Indeed, the Anglo-Afghan peace negotiations and the treaty that would eventually be 
proposed were designed to achieve a quick resolution to the conflict by creating a 
temporary basis for a firm peace: in Chelmsford’s words, ‘first peace, then 
friendship’.472 The biggest issue, nevertheless, would prove the hardest for the Indian 
government to try to postpone, for it soon became clear that the Afghan delegation 
would refuse to come to any agreement that allowed for Britain’s continued control 
over their country’s external relations. Chelmsford tried to convince Montagu of the 
impracticability of insisting on retaining the right to conduct Afghan foreign affairs: 
During the past year there has been a profound change in political outlook in 
[the] middle East, including Afghanistan. General unrest awakened national 
aspirations, President Wilson’s pronouncement, Bolshevik catchwords and 
other influences have been at work. This change of outlook is evidenced in 
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Amanulla’s first utterances as Amir, basis of which was the sovereign 
independence of Afghanistan, and the complete freedom of his external 
relations.
473
 
It is this recognition of the changing times that set Indian government opinion apart 
from much of the foreign policy making elite in London. Afghan intellectuals such as 
Tarzi had done much over the last few years to spread concepts of freedom, 
modernisation and independence among the Afghans.
474
 Habibullah himself had tried 
to re-gain control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs at the end of the First World War, 
to no avail.
475
 Indeed, the desire for self-determination was one of the very reasons 
Amanullah had gone to war with India in the first place. For, as Vartan Gregorian 
explains, ‘In 1919, no ruler could have succeeded in establishing a strong hold over 
the Afghan nation without pledging himself to the cause of total Afghan 
independence’.476 From Delhi’s point of view, the British Empire simply could not 
deal with its Asian neighbours as it had done before 1918. If the Indian delegation 
forced a provision regarding Afghanistan’s foreign relations on Kabul, all that would 
happen was that the emir would break the terms anyway, leaving Britain in an 
awkward position, whereby it would be forced either to ignore this treaty violation or 
to resume hostilities in order to save face.
477
 
Realising it could no longer use force to retain its predominance over 
Afghanistan, the Indian government instead hoped to be able to gain Afghan 
confidence and friendship to keep that country allied to Britain. As Hamilton Grant 
tried to explain to Sir George Roos-Keppel, chief commissioner of the North-West 
Frontier Province: 
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It is obviously imperative for us so far as possible to exclude this force 
[Bolshevism] from Afghanistan. We cannot do so by military measures...The 
only alternative appears to be to secure the genuine friendship and trust of 
Afghanistan, and to convince the Afghans of the danger of the inroad of 
Bolshevism.
478
 
Roos-Keppel, who had led troops into battle during the Anglo-Afghan War, doubted 
that there had ever been ‘any really friendly feeling among the Afghans towards the 
British Government and I do not think there will ever be. As regards mutual trust the 
past has shown that we can never trust Afghans.’479 According to Chelmsford, 
however, Roos-Keppel ‘is confessedly an Afghanphobe. He hates the Afghans and, I 
think I may say with confidence, he would like to see Afghanistan thoroughly 
conquered.’480 The Indian government maintained that Britain had little choice but to 
give up control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. Much as it had advocated with 
regard to Persia, the Indian government believed that a stronger alliance could 
ultimately be made with Afghanistan through mutual confidence and co-operation 
than through interference in that nation’s affairs: the choice of the ‘velvet glove’ 
rather than the ‘iron hand’. 
 
By 8 August 1919, Hamilton Grant was able to report the signing of a treaty with 
Afghanistan.
481
 The terms of the peace included an end to the subsidy the Indian 
government had paid to the previous emir, the removal of the privilege of allowing 
Afghanistan to import arms and munitions through India and the provision that the 
Indian government would be prepared to receive another Afghan mission in six 
months to discuss greater measures of friendship, should Amanullah prove his 
sincerity towards the British government. In a letter that Hamilton Grant handed to 
the Afghan delegation alongside the official treaty, the Indian government further 
stipulated how the new emir could prove this sincerity, naming certain Bolsheviks 
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and Indian revolutionaries who were to be expelled from Afghanistan. Most 
importantly, however, the letter also noted that the treaty had made no mention of the 
issue of Afghanistan’s foreign relations. Since all previous agreements between the 
two governments were accepted as void by the creation of this treaty, this by default 
left the Afghan government independent in both its internal and external affairs.
482
 
Thus in this roundabout way, the Indian government relinquished its official hold 
over Afghanistan.  
The reaction in London, however, was not good. Certainly, this was not what 
Curzon had in mind when he was thinking of his ‘Moslem nexus of states’. Montagu 
sent the viceroy a rebuke for presenting the Afghan delegation with the treaty and 
letter before having gained approval from the Home government. And, for the 
secretary of state, the more information he received on the peace with Afghanistan, 
‘the more [,] I am sorry to say [,] I dislike it’. In Montagu’s opinion, it seemed 
Hamilton Grant had given away a considerable amount for little in return.
483
 Indeed, 
it was hard to see what punishment the Afghans faced for having waged war against 
the British Empire. There was also some evidence that the Afghan government was 
flaunting the new treaty as a triumph. As Roos-Keppel’s secretary noted, ‘a General 
Sarsarus has been saying that Afghanistan got the main things it wanted, 
independence and certain tracts of land and that others – importation of arms, 
subsidy and better treatment of Indians – had been postponed until excitement in 
India had subsided’.484 Thus, while the Indian government believed that by the treaty 
it had taught Afghanistan its place, ‘the position of a petty state in relation to her 
powerful neighbour’,485 Montagu had to point out that: 
The fact remains that a great deal of disquiet was felt here by myself and my 
colleagues, and has been shared, as I must assure you, by that part of the public 
which takes an informed interest in Afghanistan, as to whether the Afghans, 
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under what may have been a show of bluff, have ever truly realised that they 
were not the victors.
486
 
Ultimately, however, in a role reversal (which was perhaps apt considering the 
situation in Persia), there was little Montagu (or Curzon) could do once Chelmsford 
had decided on his course but to impotently complain that his opinion was not valued 
by the Indian government.
487
 
 
Blown Sky High 
By August of 1919, the British government had concluded two new treaties with two 
of the most important nations bordering its imperial field of interest, each one 
reflecting the views of the main negotiators on Britain’s future in southern Asia. The 
Anglo-Persian agreement represented the ‘iron hand’ of Curzon and his allies, while 
the Anglo-Afghan treaty was a demonstration of the Indian government’s preference 
for the ‘velvet glove’. When it came to Persia, Curzon’s thinking was conditioned by 
his Great Game experience which placed Russia front and centre in his 
considerations. Yet, whether it was the new Bolshevik regime in Moscow or the old 
tsarist presence in Tehran that Curzon’s policy was designed to combat is difficult to 
tell. Indeed, Curzon’s policy towards both White and Red Russia was complex and 
often contradictory. From what was known and understood of Bolshevism, it was 
clear to London that the new regime in Moscow was a potential threat to the British 
Empire.
488
 It was just such a danger that was used by both Curzon and Cox as a 
reason for forwarding Britain’s presence in Persia. Furthermore, the possibility of the 
Bolshevik regime penetrating Persia, either politically or militarily, was one of the 
main reasons given for the continued maintenance of the Russian Legation and the 
Cossack Division.  
However, as much as Curzon and Cox may have feared a Bolshevik incursion 
into Persia in the immediate future, it was the possibility of a resurgence of an 
imperial Russia that was, in their opinion, the greatest long-term threat to Britain’s 
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interests in southern Asia. Reflected in Curzon’s haste to push forward his Persian 
policy in 1918–1919 was the belief that Britain should take the opportunity to gain 
the upper hand while its old imperial rival was weakened. The assumption that 
Russia would eventually re-constitute itself in something of its old form and try to 
pursue that which it had temporarily lost with the Bolshevik revolution seemed 
supported by the attitude of the Russian Legation and the Cossack Division in Persia. 
Indeed, the Great Game appeared personified in these relics of the old order and in 
the day-to-day feuds between the likes of Minorskii and Malleson. Yet, this inability 
to detach his thinking from the old pattern of Anglo-Russian rivalry meant that 
Curzon followed a line in Persia in this period that really did seem ‘quixotic’, in the 
words of Cox: the propping-up of the imperial Russian presence in Persia, while 
simultaneously working to undermine its position within that country. Indeed, it is 
hard to understand how Curzon and Cox failed to predict the hostility that the 
Russian Legation and Cossack Division would have against the Anglo-Persian 
agreement when it was finally made public. 
And although others within the British government who were sceptical of 
Curzon’s proposals for Persia in 1918–1919, the acting foreign secretary was able, 
through force of will, to push through his plans. As one historian has explained, 
when it came to Persia, ‘Curzon was able to exploit his ministerial seniority and his 
special expertise in Eastern affairs to overcome or evade criticism or opposition’.489 
Throughout this time, however, the Indian government remained a vocal critic of 
Curzon’s Persian policy. For, when it came to the issue of Bolshevism, Delhi was 
adamant that the new regime in Russia only constituted a real threat to British 
interests if the South Asian people and their governments were mishandled so much 
as to push them towards Moscow.
490
 In contrast to Curzon and Cox, Chelmsford and 
Hamilton Grant were apt to downplay the threat of Bolshevism to Afghanistan. 
Indeed, the Indian government appeared to recognise that while there may have been 
a new government in Russia, Afghanistan was using old tactics in trying to play its 
neighbours off against each other: using fear of Bolshevism to try to gain concession 
from the Indian government. In these respects, when it came to handling the three-
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way dynamic between India, Afghanistan and Bolshevik Russia, the Indian 
government was more astute than its colleagues in London gave credit for. 
Delhi also appeared attuned to the changes that had occurred in southern Asia 
since the First World War, so that imperial dominance was no longer simply an 
accepted fact and that the threat of force was increasingly coming to lose its potency 
in the face of potential mass Asian nationalist and pan-Islamist unrest. It understood, 
for example, that ‘a genuine nationalistic spirit was alive in Iran, despite its seeming 
confusion, and…felt that this force should be recognised and conciliated’.491 As Leon 
Poullada puts it, ‘Lord Chelmsford realised that there was an entirely new game to be 
played in Asia and that British policy would have to change’.492 Indeed, when 
Montagu argued that the viceroy was going against 40 years of tradition in his 
handling of the Afghan peace process Chelmsford responded: ‘“It has been the 
cardinal policy of His Majesty’s Government for the past forty years....” and the 
whole world has blown sky high in the last four!’493 The Indian government also 
realised that while Britain may have just ‘issued triumphantly from a struggle with 
the greatest military power the world has ever seen’, economically and militarily it 
had been weakened by the experience.
494
 A large part of its southern Asian policy in 
1918–1919 was, therefore, conditioned not only by its views on the potency of 
nationalism and pan-Islamism but by the basic premise of incurring the least amount 
of strain on India’s resources, particularly when the country itself was undergoing so 
much domestic unrest. After all, alliances based on trust and friendship ultimately 
cost much less than those based on financial and military inducements. In this 
respect, then, the agreements of 1919 reflect the optimism of Curzon against the 
realism of Chelmsford. Curzon’s imperialistic rhetoric, when it came to ‘doing as 
Britain pleased’ with Persia, is an indication of the confidence he appeared to have in 
Britain’s capabilities in the post-war period. It also reflected, perhaps, a concept of 
the British Empire as a force that needed to continually expand and strengthen lest it 
flounder. For its part, the Indian government was more conservative in its 
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expectations of the empire after 1918. It was more willing to accept a limited British 
presence in southern Asia and called for a reduction in Britain’s military and 
financial involvement in that part of the world. In the opinion of the Indian 
government, it was far worse for the empire to have to face flagrant violation of 
unenforceable treaties, or even military defeat, then to admit its limitations and tailor 
its policy accordingly. 
For Curzon, the post-war period provided the opportunity to extend and 
consolidate Britain’s imperial influence in southern Asia once and for all (creating 
his ‘Moslem nexus of states’), using all the financial and military coercion the 
empire could garner to forcibly achieve this position of hegemony. For Chelmsford, 
this was a time to resuscitate Britain’s reputation among the South Asian population, 
to seek to find an accord with the forces of nationalism and pan-Islamism and to 
maintain Britain’s imperial position through a more subtle form of influence, by 
appearing as the friend and benefactor of the Muslim world. Eventually, the course 
of events in the next few years would come to vindicate the Indian government’s 
point of view. In the years 1918 to 1919, however, Delhi was doomed to play 
Cassandra, unable to make itself heard in London, despite the astuteness and 
foresight of its opinions.  
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Chapter Three: A Nice State of Affairs, 1920 
 
In a speech given to the Central Asiatic Society towards the end of 1920, Curzon – 
now fully foreign secretary
495
 – declared that Britain ‘must face the fact that the 
expansion of the British Empire in Central Asia is at an end, and rightly at an end’. 
The problem, however – as the Times newspaper saw it – was that while this fact was 
accepted readily by the British public, ‘we are by no means sure that the Government 
are doing so, or even that Lord Curzon himself appreciates the full significance of his 
own words’.496 The observation was telling, for, as this chapter will show, despite 
this pronouncement Curzon had spent most of 1920 categorically refusing to 
abandon his ambitions in South Asia or accepting the limitations that now existed on 
Britain’s foreign relations. For, if the years 1918–1919 had been a time of optimism 
for the British government – emerging as it did a victor of the First World War – the 
events of 1920 would soon bring an end to that feeling. The failure of the Anglo-
Persian agreement, the invasion of the Persian port of Enzeli by the Red Army, 
nationalist discontent in India, a restless Afghanistan and the possibility of a mass 
pan-Islamist movement across Asia all threatened to destabilise Britain’s position in 
that part of the world in the post-war period. Quick to realise the potential of this 
popular discontent, the Soviet regime threatened to add to the explosive mix with the 
dissemination of anti-British, anti-imperialist propaganda throughout the region. For 
1920 was the year in which the forces of nationalism, pan-Islamism and Bolshevism 
would really come to the fore of politics in South Asia. That such events coincided 
with (or marked) the military and political ascendancy of the Bolshevik regime 
within both Russia and Asia, compounded Britain’s problems. Nonetheless, old 
habits die hard, and despite the arguments of the Indian government and the War 
Office, there were those in government who could not evolve beyond their Great 
Game thinking, or the optimism of 1918, to accept the realities of 1920. By their 
stubbornness, the likes of Curzon and Lloyd George arguably made what was a bad 
year for the British Empire even worse.  
                                                 
495
 Curzon gained sole control of the Foreign Office when Balfour retired as Foreign Secretary in 
October 1919. 
 
496
 TNA/FO371/4909/C8788, Times article on Lord Curzon’s speech to the Central Asiatic Society, 14 
Oct. 1920. 
 
124 
 
 
Mutiny and Revolution  
Compounding the difficult international scene, Britain was facing its own domestic 
problems in 1920. Although the country had experienced an economic boom in the 
months immediately after the armistice, this was short-lived. By 1920, rising 
inflation and unemployment was causing widespread public discontent within 
Britain, and the year would experience a surge in labour unrest and industrial 
action.
497
 Particularly worrying, however, was the apparent influence of Bolshevism 
on Britain’s domestic strife at this time. The creation of the ‘Hands off Russia’ 
movement, for example, organised protests against the government’s involvement in 
the Soviet–Polish conflict of 1920.498 In January 1919, during violent clashes 
between police and workers in Glasgow, a red flag was raised on the flag pole of the 
city chambers. That troops, tanks and machine guns were called in to occupy the city 
and end ‘The Battle of George Square’ is indicative of just how much the British 
government feared a Bolshevik-style uprising in the country.
499
 To make matters 
worse, in 1918 and 1919 the police force themselves had gone on strike, and could 
no longer be entirely relied on to keep the peace in the face of other workers 
protests.
500
 As for the army, in January 1919 troops stationed in Dover and 
Folkestone had rebelled at the slow demobilisation process.
501
 By 1920 there was a 
likelihood that should a general strike occur – as the Triple Alliance was threatening 
in the autumn – the authorities might find the police and a large group of ex-soldiers 
joining the workers.
502
 As a report of the Home Office put it, ‘in the event of rioting, 
for the first time in history the rioters will be better trained than the troops’.503 So 
seriously did the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir Henry Wilson, view 
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the situation that, in January 1920, he set his men to prepare plans for ‘mutiny and 
revolution’ in Britain.504 Such fear regarding Britain’s domestic situation goes some 
way perhaps in explaining the Home government’s consistent preoccupation with the 
threat of Bolshevism.  
With Britain in domestic turmoil, drastic measures were needed in order to 
bring the economic problem under control and thus reduce popular agitation.
505
 
Given the financial constraints facing the government, an extensive military machine 
was an obvious target for cost-cutting. By April 1920 the army constituted about 
173,000 more men than seven years earlier, and cost approximately twice as much.
506
 
Unsurprisingly, the secretary of state for war, Winston Churchill, faced intense 
pressure to reduce the financial burden of the army on the Treasury. However, the 
cost of the army in 1920 was clearly a reflection of its size, which in turn was a 
consequence of the large number of arenas where British forces were stationed. After 
1918, British troops were to be found in countries across the northern hemisphere, 
including, among others, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Ireland and not 
forgetting the interventionist forces in Russia.
507
 Thus, there was a fundamental 
disparity between the need to rapidly reduce the army and the level of responsibility 
that the British Army held in the post-war period.  
Something was going to have to give and for Churchill, it was going to have 
to be the extent of Britain’s military presence in Asia. In February 1920, for example, 
the secretary of state attacked the excessive price of maintaining troops in places 
such as Mesopotamia.
508
 To Wilson, however, Mesopotamia was one of five 
countries that were essential to the security of the British Empire as a whole.
509
 The 
director of military operations, General Radcliffe, also agreed that a reduction of 
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British forces in Mesopotamia would lead to anarchy, which could have negative 
consequences for India.
510
 Nevertheless, Churchill would not let the matter of 
Mesopotamia rest. In May, he submitted another memorandum to Cabinet in which 
he tried ‘to draw the attention of my colleagues to the waste of money entailed by 
our present military and administrative policy in Mesopotamia’, and asked them to 
make the decision for ‘a prompt and drastic curtailment of expenditure’.511 In his 
cost-cutting endeavours the secretary of state for war even explored using the RAF in 
Mesopotamia.
512
 In the opinion of Wilson, Churchill ‘regardless of safety and hoping 
that any disasters may come after he has left office, is trying to gain credit and make 
a name by saving money’.513  
 
Whatever the strategic benefit of Mesopotamia to Britain, where both Churchill and 
Wilson agreed was that the security of India did not lie in Persia. The main debate on 
Persia, prior to May 1920, concerned whether the country was at risk from a 
Bolshevik attack and to what extent Britain was prepared to help the Persian 
government should such an event occur. One of the justifications for the Anglo-
Persian agreement used by Curzon had been the need to protect the country from a 
Bolshevik incursion, which could have repercussions on Britain’s position in South 
Asia at large. By 1920, the consolidation of the Soviet government within Russia and 
its actions in Central Asia made this threat more credible. In the Russian civil war the 
White Russian commander, General Denikin had been defeated outside of Moscow 
in October 1919 and subsequently driven south to Novorossiisk before escaping in a 
boat to Constantinople.
514
 By March 1920, the Red Army had consolidated its hold 
on the North Caucasus and pushed on into Daghestan and Azerbaijan, capturing 
Baku on 27–28 April and setting up the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In 
Central Asia, a protracted battle between the Red Army on one side, and General 
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Kolchak and the Orenburg Cossacks on the other, had finally ended in September 
1919 when forces of the Tashkent Soviet joined with the Red Army to defeat 
Kolchak. By early 1920, the Turkestan Army Group had destroyed all remnants of 
the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks, while the Transcaspian Government of Ashkhabad 
was gradually forced back towards the Caspian, with Krasnovodsk finally being 
captured in February 1920.
515
 A few months later Russian forces would help 
overthrow the khan of Khiva, with Bukhara soon following suit.
516
  
Unsurprisingly, this rapid southern progression of the Red Army alarmed some 
British observers. While for 1918 and most of 1919 Persia (and Afghanistan) had 
been somewhat cushioned from Bolshevism by the presence of anti-Bolshevik 
factions throughout southern Russia and Central Asian, by 1920 the borders of these 
countries were now looking decidedly vulnerable. In a Cabinet meeting of January 
1920 it was admitted that: 
The Bolsheviks had now a very powerful army, consisting of all their best 
troops...Every day they were making great strides towards the East, in the 
direction of Bokhara and Afghanistan. They were carrying out a regular, 
scientific and comprehensive scheme of propaganda in Central Asia against the 
British. We ourselves had no military forces wherewith to oppose them; in fact, 
at the moment, our troops were at their lowest ebb...
517
 
Whether the current success of the Red Army meant that the Soviet government 
would attempt an attack on Persia, however, was unclear. In the opinion of the Indian 
government, the real danger lay in Bolshevik emissaries and propaganda infiltrating 
Persia, rather than military action.
518
 (In January 1920 the first ‘Red Train’ left 
Moscow for Turkestan, laden with propaganda materials).
519
 The question remained, 
however, as to whether Persia was actually worth saving from a Bolshevik military 
attack if it came to it. For the Indian government, the answer was much the same in 
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1920 as it had always been: that Persia simply was not worth the cost, particularly if 
it meant using Indian resources. Indeed, Montagu had already let Curzon know that 
India could no longer be responsible for the cost of retaining Malleson and his force 
at Meshed. In the opinion of the secretary of state for India, any danger which 
Bolshevism posed to Persia was ‘largely the fault of the Home Government in their 
anti-Mohemmedan policy’520 and defending Persia was ‘not an Indian matter’.521 The 
refusal of the Indian government to provide more men for Persia was particularly 
important given the small number of British troops stationed in that country at the 
time. As the CIGS made clear, Britain could not save Persia in the face of a 
Bolshevik attack even if wanted to. In which case, as the general staff explained, ‘If 
His Majesty’s Government has no intention of assisting Persia to defend her territory 
by the use of British troops, the logical course is for the North Persian Brigade to be 
withdrawn’.522  
Nevertheless, in the early months of 1920, if the soldiers and diplomats did not 
always entirely agree on the course to be pursued in Persia, there was at least an 
understanding that the situation was complex. As the General Staff explained further: 
On the other hand there can be no question but that the withdrawal of this force 
from North Persia at the present juncture would exercise a deplorable effect on 
the political situation generally. It would leave Teheran [sic] a prey to the 
Bolshevik sources should the Soviet Government decide actually to invade 
Persia, and in any case it would shake the stability of the Persian Government 
and expose them to all the anti-British propaganda that would most certainly be 
instituted...
523
 
Even the Indian government agreed that there was no simple answer, noting that 
withdrawal of its troops from Persia could affect Britain’s reputation both in that 
country and in other southern Asian states, such as Afghanistan. (However, it was 
also sure to point out that since India was little effected by events in Persia, it really 
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raised no objection to such withdrawal.)
524
 Ultimately, at a meeting of the Eastern 
Committee on 12 January 1920, it was decided that no reinforcements were to be 
sent to Persia and that none of the troops there were to be withdrawn either.
525
 
Churchill took exception, protesting to the Cabinet at the apparent absurdity of 
retaining within Persia a force that, while being an enormous drain on the military’s 
finances, was insufficient to prevent any serious attack on that country anyway.
526
 
Despite Churchill’s complaints, however, it was agreed in Cabinet on 18 February 
that the general officer commander in Mesopotamia would be directed to hold his 
forces at Enzeli and attempt to bluff the Bolsheviks out of making an incursion there. 
Should this fail, however, and an attack took place, there was no intention of holding 
on to Enzeli and the troops should retreat.
527
 For, as Curzon pointed out to Cox, it 
was not really ‘understood by us why a country with a population of 10 millions, 
even if it be Persia, should allow itself to be conquered by a few thousand armed 
robbers from without’. In any event, ‘it is most improbable that [the] Bolsheviks will 
make any attack in force against Persia, and [the] possibility may practically be 
discounted’.528 
 
I Told You So 
In the diary of Wilson there is an entry on 19 May 1920 that notes with some 
bitterness that ‘at 6:30pm came a wire from Teheran [sic] to say our garrison at 
Enzeli on the Caspian had been surrounded by Bolsheviks & made prisoners! A nice 
state of affairs which will have a bad effect in the East.’529 The improbable had 
occurred. The retreat of British troops in the face of the Red Army was a humiliation 
that struck at the very heart of Britain’s prestige in South Asia. Officially, the Soviet 
government denied sanctioning the attack on Enzeli, claiming that it was only 
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informed after the operation was complete
530
 – a claim the British government and 
press  found dubious, and rightly so.
531
 Trotsky had apparently planned the event the 
previous month, cabling Lenin and Chicherin to tell them of the operation.
532
 On 23 
May the Soviet government sent a congratulatory message to the sailors of the 
Caspian Fleet, thanking them for the ‘fatal blow’ that had now been dealt to the 
‘international counter-revolution’.533 Aside from causing the British government a 
major embarassment, the immediate effect of the landings was to open up 
communication between the Bolsheviks and the various revolutionary agitators in 
Persia and, in particular, to provide support to the Janglis. Indeed, collaboration 
between the Bolshevik regime, and the Janglis would see the takeover of the 
provincial capital of Gilan, Recht, and the ultimate creation of the Soviet Republic of 
Iran.
534
 This Republic, however, was to prove short lived. For although they may 
have been busy sending the Red Army into Persia, the Bolshevik government had 
still not resolved the contradictions in their policy towards Asian nationalists, pan-
Islamists and Communists. As Stephen Blank has explained: 
...there was no clear line between supporting Kuchik Khan against London and 
Teheran [sic], the Iranian Communists against all comers, or Teheran [sic] 
against the other forces. Each course had supporters and a bruising debate 
occured back home over Iran. While the choices were incompatible with each 
other nobody could see the regime through to a clear willingness to assume the 
burdens, costs and risks of a definite decision.
535
 
Blank and Cosroe Chaqueri have both produced good studies on the Soviet Iranian 
Republic so that this work will not try to compete. Suffice as to say that it was this 
confusion over who they should be supporting which hampered the Bolsheviks in 
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these early years when it came to extending their influence in Persia. Hence, while 
there were those in Moscow who warned against trying to impose communist 
practice on the Persian people too soon, others disagreed. Unruly local Ghilan 
Communists ignored Lenin and his comrades and set about encouraging class terror, 
creating peasant Soviets and unveiling Muslim women.
536
 Such radicalism, however, 
alienated Kuchik Khan and his Janglis and spelt the downfall of the Soviet Republic 
in Iran.
537
  
Meanwhile, back in London, Churchill was furious. Despite its earlier 
vacillations, by early May the General Staff had actually warned that the situation 
following the collapse of Denikin had deteriorated to the extent that Norperforce was 
now extremely vulnerable. As such, on 13 May it recommended moving the troops 
from Tabriz and Enzeli to Kazvin.
538
 However, at a meeting of the Eastern 
Committee a few days later, to which neither Churchill nor Wilson were invited or 
even had knowledge of, the decision was taken against evacuating Enzeli. ‘In 
consequence of this, our force has first been rounded up and then allowed to retire in 
circumstances of great humiliation to the British arms’, Churchill fumed at 
Curzon.
539
 Recrimination and counter-recrimination thus began. Wilson could not 
resist his own taunt at Curzon, asking the foreign secretary if he might in future 
‘trust, a little, in the advice of the responsible military advisers’.540 Curzon, however, 
was not prepared to take the blame for the situation and acidly replied to Wilson that 
it was the War Office that had consistently given the wrong information regarding 
Enzeli: 
Who was it who wrote the telegram of Feb. 13 telling the Enzeli force to hold 
on?...not the FO but the WO...Who was it who came repeatedly to E[astern 
Committee] Conferences and told us that the W.O. view was that the Bolshevik 
policy in Persia was not military but propaganda? Not I but General Radcliffe. 
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Therefore do not my dear Field Marshal accuse me of being indifferent to 
military advice. I have trusted it too implicitly!
541
 
In the days, weeks and months that followed Enzeli, debate over Persia would 
become intense. Despite the humiliation of what had occurred, there were still those 
within the British government, such as Curzon and Milner, who believed that 
complete withdrawal from Persia ‘would weaken our whole position in the East’.542 
The War Office, on the other hand, vehemently pressed for the evacuation not only 
of the force at Enzeli, but all the various troops stationed in north Persia and in 
Batum, to fall back to Mesopotamia over the next few weeks in order to avoid any 
further embarrassment.
543
 As Churchill pointed out in a letter to Curzon on 20 May, 
‘If we are not able to resist the Bolsheviks in these areas, it is much better by timely 
withdrawals to keep out of harm’s way and avoid disaster and shameful incidents 
such as that which has just occurred...I must absolutely decline to continue to share 
responsibility for a policy of mere bluff.’544 On 18 June both Wilson and Churchill 
continued to press their views, warning that should the Cabinet ignore their advice 
and ‘decide to continue the attempt to maintain simultaneously our existing 
commitments at Constantinople, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Persia, the possibility 
of disaster occurring in any or all of these theatres must be faced, and the likelihood 
of this will increase every day’.545 As Wilson noted in his diary, however, his 
recommendation to withdraw from Persia ‘brought Curzon and Milner to their feet, 
and it was quite clear they would resign if it was done’.546 In a letter to Curzon a few 
days after the Enzeli attack, Churchill vented some of his frustrations: ‘It is a great 
pity that we have not been able to develop any common policy between W.O. and 
F.O. I have to bear the abuse of F.O. policy and to find the money for it. Yet there is 
no effective cooperation or mutual support.’547  
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The humiliation of the events of May 1920 was compounded for Britain by the 
ultimate failure to convert the Anglo-Persian agreement into a meaningful 
relationship between the two nations. Indeed, the hostility of the Persian public to the 
agreement was a demonstration of the low standing that Britain now appeared to 
have in that country. The prevailing belief that by the agreement Persia had become a 
British protectorate was one that both Cox and his successor, Herman Norman, found 
hard to counter, particularly when it was coupled with the accusation that Persian 
government figures had received bribes from the British government in exchange for 
supporting the agreement.
548
 Homa Katouzian has shown the extent of public 
opposition to the agreement, which came from many sections of Persian society, 
including religious leaders, constitutionalists, nationalists, journalists, civil servants 
and even poets.
549
 As one contemporary observed: ‘The entire Near and Middle East 
is in the grip of Anglophobia, which unites the Muslims from India to Turkey, from 
Turkestan to the Persian Gulf’.550 In trying to force British patronage on the Persian 
people, Curzon had simply failed to grasp the idea that ‘The Orient of 1919 was 
completely changed from the Orient of 1890’.551 
The practical effect of this opposition came with the ratification of the 
agreement. Under the terms of the Persian constitution, any foreign treaty or 
agreement had to be ratified by the Persian parliament, the Medjliss. With such 
public and international condemnation of the agreement, the Persian government was 
understandably reluctant to put its terms into effect. To the annoyance of Curzon, 
delaying the summoning of the Medjliss became a convenient way for the Persian 
government to thereby delay acting on the agreement. Matters were made worse 
when the Persian prime minister, Vosugh ed-Dowleh, was forced to resign in June 
1920, the Enzeli attack being the final nail in the coffin of his unpopular tenure.
552
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Vosugh’s successor, Mushir ed-Dowleh, was not a supporter of the Anglo-Persian 
agreement, unfortunately for Britain, and was even more willing to delay its 
ratification. Such opposition, nonetheless, did not prevent the Persian ruling elite 
from seeking other concessions from the British government. As Curzon explained to 
Norman, the Persian prime minister refused to draw on the loan which was provided 
as part of the agreement, or to make use of the British officers of the military 
commission sent to Persia in December 1919, or to let Armitage Smith, the British 
financial adviser, begin his work. Yet the shah was currently pressing for the 
retention of British troops in Tehran, the Persian government was drawing on a 
monthly subsidy provided by Britain, and the Persian ambassador in London was 
pressing for a supply of arms and munitions.
553
 As Curzon complained, the ‘Persian 
Government cannot repudiate or ignore the obligations which the Agreement 
imposes and at the same time claim all the advantages which it confers’.554 
Unfortunately for him, however, there was little Curzon could do in the face of 
Persian delaying tactics. After May 1920, the Persian Government began to claim 
that the Bolshevik invasion had caused distraction from the task of electing the 
Medjliss.
555
 By November, Curzon appears to have lost his patience, complaining to 
Norman that ‘though it is now fifteen months since the agreement was signed, no 
serious attempt has been made by two successive Persian Governments to submit it 
to the approval of [the] Persian Parliament’. He simply could not allow this 
filibustering to continue and demanded the Medjliss to be called within the space of a 
month.
556
 By December, it had become clear that the Anglo-Persian agreement had 
died an ignominious death, when the new Persian prime minister, Sepahdar-e Azam, 
hinted to Norman that the agreement would probably be accepted if certain people 
were bribed.
557
 Ultimately, the Indian government proved to be correct with its 
warning in 1918 that Britain should seek the friendship of the Persian people before 
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trying to conclude an agreement with the Persian government. In a letter to Montagu 
in December 1920, Chelmsford could not resist gloating slightly:  
We have carefully abstained from saying ‘I told you so’, but anyone who takes 
the trouble to peruse our telegrams from the very beginning of the Persian 
negotiations will see that we have been strenuous opponents of the Curzon 
policy and that we wished to confine our interference in Persian matters within 
much smaller limits.
558
 
In ignoring the forces of nationalism within Persian society, Curzon and Cox had 
made a grave error. As William Olson notes, both men ‘were aware of political 
opposition to their efforts but they believed that most of this was trumped-up, 
inconsequential, and easily won over or subdued’.559 Curzon appeared to believe that 
the majority of the Persian public still saw Britain as they had done prior to 1907 – as 
a friend and protector.
560
 In this respect, Cyrus Ghani blames Cox somewhat for not 
enlightening Curzon on the true nature of Persian feeling after 1918. However, much 
as Curzon, Cox appears to have seen what he wanted to when it came to analysing 
Persian sentiment towards Britain.
561
 Both men had failed to appreciate that the days 
when governments could entirely ignore public opinion on foreign relations had long 
gone, even within the relatively politically backward nations of Asia.  
 
The ignominy of Britain’s position in Persia in 1920 was further demonstrated by its 
complete impotence when it came to the Cossack Division. A key part of the Anglo-
Persian agreement had been the idea of creating a Persian force that would assimilate 
the Cossack Division and the South Persian Rifles, thereby relieving the British 
government of the financial responsibilities for these troops. With the Persian 
government refusing to enact the agreement, however, this project was being held in 
limbo, leaving the Cossack Division still active in Persia. Indeed, given the shortage 
of troops in Persia in 1920, the Division was to prove invaluable following the 
Bolshevik landings at Enzeli. For Britain, the Division continued to be a mixed 
blessing. While it undoubtedly relieved some of the pressure off the British military 
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in Persia, the force continued to be a financial drain. Again, one of the benefits of the 
Anglo-Persian agreement, as argued by its advocates, was that it would bring an end 
to British patronage of Persia’s armed forces. Indeed, Montagu had made quite clear 
that his support for the agreement was based solely on the idea that it would relieve 
the Indian government of much of its financial responsibilities in Persia. From 
December 1919, the India Office therefore refused to share in payment of the 
subsidy.
562
  
British financial support of the Division was thus supposed to end in March 
1920, although with some wrangling Norman and the Foreign Office managed to 
extend it until June.
563
 Nevertheless, come July, Norman was asking for further 
payments to be made, since the Persian government was not ready to deal with the 
Russian officers of the Division.
564
 Thus, the same problem which faced the British 
government in 1918 was hampering its actions in Persia in 1920. If the Division was 
not paid, it would leave a large number of unemployed, disaffected Russian officers 
within Persia, with nothing better to do than cause trouble for Britain there. As long 
as the Persian government refused to draw on the loan provided by the Anglo-Persian 
agreement, it could not afford to support the Division on its own. Therefore, the 
burden remained with the British government, and Norman would spend much of his 
time in 1920 trying to find ways of providing for the Division until its final 
dissolution in 1921. Just as in 1918–1919, a further reason for continuing its support 
for the Cossack Division in 1920 was that the British government could not afford to 
risk making its leader, Staroselskii, an outright enemy. In June, Norman telegrammed 
Curzon that it was reported that ‘Colonel Starosselski [sic] was again in 
communication with Bolsheviks and was working actively to spread Bolshevik 
principles amongst officers and men of [the] Cossack Division’.565 Brian Pearce 
gives some evidence that, indeed, appears to support this claim by Norman.
566
 That 
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the British officials in London and Persia believed Starosselski to be collaborating 
with the Bolsheviks (or that he possessed the inclination to do so), is the important 
point to be made here.  
For, still, the British government could not quite make up its mind as to what 
it feared most – the new Soviet regime or the old tsarist Russia – and the landings at 
Enzeli simply added to the confusion. The Persian government had little choice but 
to send the Division to quell the rebellion of Kuchik Khan and his men. For Britain 
the problem was three-fold: should Staroselskii succeed in his endeavours, his 
prestige and standing in Persia would rise to such an extent that it would be even 
harder to have him removed as leader of the Division. Should he fail, however, the 
Bolsheviks would increase their campaign and it would fall to Britain to prevent 
Persia disintegrating into anarchy. And should the British government’s suspicions 
turn out to be true and Staroselskii actually defected to the Bolsheviks, it would be 
almost impossible to prevent the greater part of Persia from coming under Russian 
control.  
Indeed, the success of Staroselskii in July in putting down a rebellion in the 
province of Mazandaran was contrasted unfavourably with the decision of the British 
government a few days later to evacuate their troops from Menjil in the face of tribal 
unrest.
567
 By the end of August, the Division leader and his men had recaptured 
Recht and pressed on towards Enzeli, where they found themselves under heavy fire 
and were forced to retreat. Throughout September and October the Cossack Division 
would make several attempts to take Enzeli, but with no British support it was 
difficult to face the Bolshevik fleet.
568
 While in 1920 the Cossack Division, the Red 
Army and the Persian rebels were busy fighting, the British forces seemed merely to 
be retreating – an unfortunate metaphor for Britain’s position in Persia in general and 
a policy which made them more unpopular among the Persian people. According to 
Cosroe Chaqueri, some saw the retreat as a sign of Britain’s weakness; others 
guessed that it was a calculated move because Britain did not care much about 
Persia; and some believed that the British were deliberately trying to frighten them 
by allowing Bolsheviks into the country so that the Persians would then clamour to 
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Britain for help.
569
As a reward for his efforts against the Bolsheviks, however, 
Staroselskii soon found himself deposed as the Cossack Division leader. Taking 
advantage of a temporary absence of the colonel in October, General Ironside – who 
was now commanding Norperforce – took control of the Division.570 Simultaneously, 
Norman pressed upon the shah to dismiss the colonel; charging Staroselskii with 
incompetence and corruption, Norman threatened to withhold the royalties of the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company from the government should the shah refuse. The shah 
had little choice but to acquiesce.
571
 Although there was some criticism in London of 
the coup that Ironside and Norman had enacted, something had finally been done to 
end the absurd position which the British government had allowed itself to get into 
by its patronage of the Cossack Division.
572
 
Thus, by the end of 1920, the British government faced a catalogue of 
humiliations in Persia. The inability of Curzon to have his agreement ratified by the 
Persian Parliament was just one indicator of the loss of status and prestige which 
Britain now experienced in that country. The forced retreat of the British army from 
Enzeli in the face of a Red Army incursion was only made worse by the comparative 
successes of Staroselskii and his Cossack Division. It is, therefore, unsurprising that 
in 1920 the Persian government came to the conclusion that it could no longer rely 
on Britain for financial help and military protection. In December 1920 Edmund 
Overy in the Foreign Office accused the Persian government of touting those 
concessions which had been in Russia’s possession to America. Now that the Persian 
government had ‘practically exhausted the milch cow of the British Government’, it 
was evidently looking to America for financial aid; an act which displeased the 
British Foreign Office but one which it could do little about.
573
 It could also do little 
to prevent Persia from seeking an alliance with the Soviet government either. In July, 
                                                 
569
 Chaqueri, Birth of a Trauma, pp. 185–186. 
 
570
 Ironside had supervised the withdrawal of British troops from Archangel and then from Ismid. 
Importantly, he had combat experience against Soviet troops. Ghani, Reza Shah, p. 107. 
 
571
 TNA/FO371/4906/C10166, Telegram from Norman to the Foreign Office, 26 Oct. 1920. 
 
572
 Pearce, Staroselsky  Problem, pp. 68–70. In removing Staroselskii, Ironside and Norman (whether 
by design or by accident) opened the way for Reza Khan to take control of the Division and later on 
enact a coup against the Persian prime minister, Sepahdar-e Azam. For more detail see Ghani, Reza 
Shah, pp. 153–192. 
 
573
 TNA/FO371/4907/C12838, Minute by Edmund Overy, 4 Dec. 1920. 
 
139 
 
Norman reported that Mushir ed-Dowleh was talking of despatching a Persian 
mission to Moscow in order to discuss the recent events.
574
 From the Persian point of 
view, such a move was essential. The actions of May had marked the ascendancy of 
the Soviet government on the international stage, and the Persian government could 
no longer afford to pursue its hitherto policy of ignoring the Bolshevik regime. As 
Norman explained, the ‘weakness of Persia’s geographical and military position 
obliges them to make such an agreement [with the Bolsheviks], more especially since 
they have more than once [been] told that Great Britain cannot defend her against 
serious invasion’.575 For the British government, the attempt – which had 
characterised its foreign policy in 1918–1919 – to take advantage of Russia’s 
weakness to bring Persia under its sole influence appeared to have failed.  
 
Bolshevist Bogeys 
For the Indian government in 1920, the main issue when it came to Bolshevism was 
not so much the latter’s military capabilities but its subversive activities. In India, the 
threat of Bolshevik propaganda creating unrest among the population was 
particularly great when combined with nationalist and pan-Islamist agitation. One of 
the key challenges facing the Indian government in 1920, then, was the prevention of 
Bolshevik agents and propaganda from infiltrating India through Afghanistan. 
Immediately upon gaining independence of their foreign relations in 1919, the 
Afghanistan government had invited a Bolshevik mission to Kabul, headed by Karl 
Bravin, the former Soviet envoy to Persia.
576
 Indeed, the British agent in Kabul 
complained how Bravin and his cohort could be seen riding around the city in a 
particularly nice coach lent by the emir himself, while the British were assigned a 
much more inferior mode of transportation.
577
 Despite appearances, however, there 
was reason to believe that the relationship between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan 
was not as solid as either nation would like India to think. On 24 August 1919, 
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British intelligence intercepted a message from Bravin to Tashkent, informing his 
government that: 
Afghan policy towards Russia is now absolutely clear. Amir only desired our 
friendship for security of his northern frontier...He has invited us to his palace 
merely that we may become hostages. Of course Amir uses us as a bogey to 
frighten British by threats of alliance with us, and will show us at Kabul as 
evidence of his power.
578
  
For all his flirting with the Soviet government, it seemed that the emir did not 
entirely trust the new Russian regime. In the autumn of 1919, with the defeat of the 
hostile Cossack forces at Orenburg, the Soviet regime at Tashkent had finally been 
able to turn its attention to the Bokharan and Khivan states. By April 1920, Russian 
forces had facilitated the collapse of the Khanate of Khiva and the establishment of 
the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic in its place. By the end of the year Bokhara 
would have followed suit. On both occasions, the Bolsheviks claimed to be helping 
to ‘liberate’ the people of Bokhara and Khiva from despotic rulers.579 The removal of 
khan Abd Allah and emir Alim (and the Bolshevik justification for their actions) was 
unsurprisingly a concern to the emir of Afghanistan. Amanullah’s own position was 
somewhat unstable and his control within his country ‘loose and undefined’.580 To 
align himself too firmly with the Soviet government could place the emir in danger 
of one day being deposed just like his fellow Muslim rulers. Nevertheless, the emir 
was also aware of the advantages that were to be had ‘by raising Bolshevist...bogeys’ 
against Britain.
581
 For the Indian government’s part, while it could not allow 
Afghanistan to use Bolshevism as blackmail to force concessions, it was also aware 
that having its neighbour, at the very least, as a neutral buffer against Soviet Russia 
was invaluable.    
The Indian government’s objective during 1920, therefore, was to prevent 
Afghanistan from moving closer to Soviet Russia, by emphasising the dangerous 
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potential of friendship with the Bolshevik regime as compared to the benefits of good 
relations with Britain. While this had always been the policy of Chelmsford and his 
men, with the Bolshevik successes in Asia in 1920, it became even more imperative 
to keep Afghanistan on side.
582
 Hamilton Grant had noted himself, as early as 
November 1919, the opportunity that existed to drive a wedge between the Bolshevik 
regime and Afghanistan: 
There is every indication that the Amir’s ambitions are for the moment turned 
mainly towards enlarging his borders or influence in Central Asia. We hear that 
his representatives at Merv and Bokhara are posing as protectors of 
Mussalmans against the tyranny of Bolshevist communism; and if this policy is 
pursued, it seems bound to bring Afghanistan into collision with the 
Bolshevists and to throw them definitely into our arms. But the decision hangs 
in the balance.
583
  
The question, as Montagu put it, was whether the Indian government could ‘hold out 
inducements to him [the emir] that will suffice to turn [the] scale against [the] 
Bolsheviks and in our favour’.584 One way to find this out was with the Mussoorie 
Conference, which took place between British and Afghan delegates in the summer 
of 1920. As may be recalled, the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of August 1919 had been 
concluded as a peace treaty only, with an agreement of friendship to follow. Thus, in 
December 1919, Amanullah wrote to Chelmsford suggesting conclusion of such an 
accord.
585
 The problem was, however, that the Afghan government had failed to 
uphold the conditions which the Indian government had set for such a treaty of 
friendship, including the expulsion of Indian and Bolshevik seditionary characters 
from Afghan territory. Therefore Chelmsford suggested a meeting between the two 
sides ‘for the purpose of frankly examining any obstacles which may now exist to a 
                                                 
582
 BL/MSS/Eur/E264/12 (CC), Telegram from Chelmsford to Montagu, 5 Jan. 1920.  
 
583
 BL/MSS/Eur/E264/55(l) (CC), Letter from Hamilton Grant to Dobbs, 26 Nov. 1919. In October 
1919 Amanullah had sent six cannon and a number of military experts to Bokhara to aid Emir Alim 
against Russia. Becker, Russia’s Protectorates, p. 290.  
 
584
 BL/MSS/Eur/E264/12 (CC), Telegram from Montagu to Chelmsford, 7 Jan. 1920. 
 
585
 TNA/CAB23/23, Cabinet 66, 5 Dec. 1920.  
 
142 
 
good understanding and to preparing a firm foundation on which a treaty of 
friendship can afterwards be erected’.586  
Just as with the Rawalpindi negotiations, however, the Home government was 
suspicious of the emir’s calls for friendship with Britain, and wary of the Indian 
government appearing weak to the Afghans.
587
 Nevertheless, in the viceroy’s 
opinion, the Indian government needed to do something to ‘dispel this atmosphere of 
probably genuine suspicion’ that was developing in Afghanistan against Britain.588 
As H.R.C. Dobbs (Hamilton Grant’s successor as foreign secretary), emphasised, the 
longer Afghanistan and Britain remained estranged, the more that suspicion between 
the two nations would grow and the more success Bravin would have in 
misrepresenting British intentions to the emir and his government.
589
 Thus, on 14 
April 1920, a conference between British and Afghan delegates opened in 
Mussoorie, in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. As well as lengthy discussion 
on issues such as tribal unrest on India’s borders, the conference served to confirm 
the Indian government’s opinions on the state of Afghan–Bolshevik relations.590 On 
30 April, the Afghan representatives openly admitted to Dobbs, who was heading the 
British delegation, that they would much rather be Britain’s friend than Soviet 
Russia’s, since Britain: 
is an ancient, powerful and well-established State, which the Bolsheviks are 
not, and because she is wealthy. We can easily get rid of our connection with 
the Bolsheviks and restrain the Indian seditionists if it is made worth our while. 
But we want to know how much Britain will give.
591
 
As Montagu had predicted, Afghanistan was, in effect, trying to precipitate a bidding 
war between Soviet Russia and India. For his part, Dobbs tried to emphasise the 
danger to Afghanistan if it chose to trust in the Bolshevik regime. For, if the Afghan 
government allowed Bolshevik propagandists to travel freely through its territory 
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into India, it was inevitable that some of that propaganda would be spread through 
Afghanistan itself.
592
 By September, the Indian government’s handling of the 
situation appeared to be having some success; the Foreign and Political Department 
reported that the Afghan government was opening its eyes ‘to the dangers which they 
would invite by permitting Bolshevist agitators to enter Afghanistan ostensibly to 
promote agitation in India and by having too intimate relations with the Soviet 
Government’.593  
 
Together with trying to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a channel for Bolshevik 
propagandists, the Indian government was also sensible enough to be taking 
precautions within India itself. In October 1919, it proposed appointing a special 
officer attached to the Foreign and Political Department ‘whose duty would be the 
reception, collation, digestion and dissemination of information regarding activities 
of Bolshevists, indeed specially to study the whole problem’, as well as increasing 
intelligence staff in the provinces and enacting special legislation that would prohibit 
anyone from possessing the rouble note.
594
 This last measure, passed on 6 December 
1919, proved so effective (depriving, as it did, Bolshevik agitators of the means of 
directly financing propaganda within India) that the temporary ordinance was 
prolonged in June 1920.
595
 To a large extent, these measures were pre-emptive, as 
the secretary to the Indian government explained to the local administrations: 
‘Though actual proof of Bolshevik activity in India itself is small, the Government of 
India think that a serious situation may develop unless systematic protective 
measures are adopted.’ The government’s defensive policy was thus to include not 
only the officer attached to the Foreign and Political Department whose focus would 
be on Bolshevism outside of India, but also one on the staff of the Department of 
Criminal Intelligence (DCI) who was to seek out Bolshevik activity within the 
country. The DCI officer was to be in close contact with a colleague of similar 
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function in each province. For the local administrations, the role of their officer was 
to regularly liaise with officials in the province, explaining to them the various guises 
Bolshevik propaganda could take. He was to ‘make enquiries as to the presence of 
Bolshevik Agents, collect evidence of Bolshevik activity, endeavour to trace the 
source of pro-Bolshevik writings in the press, and especially watch for any attempts 
of Bolshevik agents to create new sources of credit’.596  
These measures, taken in late 1919, to create an efficient web of 
communication between the local and central Indian administrations on Bolshevik 
activities, demonstrate the foresight of the Indian government. For 1920 was to prove 
the year in which the Bolshevik regime would come to organise itself in Asia, both 
theoretically and practically. As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, from the 
outset Lenin and his comrades appeared to recognise the importance of Asian feeling 
to their success. Within the borders of Russia alone there resided approximately 
twenty-five million Muslims in 1917,
597
 while the possibility of co-opting Islamic 
discontent for its own revolutionary struggle was not lost on the Bolshevik regime. 
Together with its appeal to working Muslims, in January 1918 the Soviet government 
established a Commissariat for Muslim Affairs.
598
 From the early days of the 
revolution it also maintained contact with various Indian revolutionaries and 
agitators,
599
 and in June 1918 produced a blue book which spoke of the role Soviet 
Russia was to play in a future Indian revolution.
600
 Yet, other than this tentative first 
steps, the Bolshevik regime appeared a little lost in the early days as to how to deal 
with Asian affairs. The problem was that Marx himself had failed to focus on this 
area of the world, since it had been assumed that the Communist revolution, when it 
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came, would invariably occur in the advanced nations of Europe. Early Communist 
thought on this issue was thus limited to some discussion on the nature of Britain’s 
rule in India,
601
 and statements which were ‘sometimes contradictory, and 
often...distinctly ambivalent’.602 
In 1916, Lenin had himself tried to fill in some of the gaps with his work 
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. In it, the Bolshevik leader argued that 
the “super-profits” the capitalist countries gained from their colonial holdings – such 
as India – had thus far stifled proletarian unrest in the West. Lenin concluded that 
any nationalist movements in the colonies should therefore be supported by 
Communists, in order to break the capitalist hold and remove their resources.
603
 It 
was not until the 1920s, however, that this theory would be put in practice, as the 
steady gains of the Red Army in the Russian civil war gradually opened up Asia to 
Bolshevik influence. A key event in the evolution of Soviet policy towards this 
region of the world was the Second Congress of the Comintern. Founded in March 
1919, the Third Communist International (Comintern) was intended as a replacement 
for the Second International, which had been denounced by Lenin and his regime 
during the First World War. Despite arguments by the Soviet government that the 
Comintern was a global political organisation, over which it had no control, it has 
been shown that the International’s hierarchy was dominated by members of the 
Russian Bolshevik party.
604
 Indeed, one historian has argued that the Chairman of the 
Comintern (Grigory Zinoviev) was a much more ‘weighty political figure’ than the 
Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Georgii Chicherin).
605
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It was at the Second Congress of the Comintern, which convened in Moscow 
on 19 July 1920, that the relationship between Bolshevism and Asia was discussed in 
detail for the first time. As one historian has explained: ‘at the time of the founding 
of the Comintern, while there was certainly a distinct awareness of the colonial 
question, there was as yet no clear understanding of how the strategy of revolution in 
the colonies would be worked out’.606 Hence, the early disinterest in Bravin’s 
endeavours in Persia, and the confusion as to how best to deal with Kuchik Khan and 
the Janglis.
607
 It was at the Second Congress that Lenin developed his theory from 
Imperialism to answer this fundamental question and effectively lay the foundation 
for all future Communist practice in Central and southern Asia. Discussion on India 
particularly dominated the meeting in July, largely because of the debate which 
ensued between Lenin and M.N. Roy – a well-known Indian Communist – on the 
question of the progress of Communist revolution in that country. While Lenin 
argued that, as a backward nation, India needed to experience a bourgeois revolution 
before it was able to progress to a proletarian one, Roy believed that the Indian 
workers and peasants were advanced enough for a proletarian uprising – with aid 
from Soviet Russia – to succeed there.608 In essence, the debate centred on the larger 
issue of whether or not the Comintern should encourage Asian nationalism and pan-
Islamism – how far it should support movements such as that being orchestrated by 
Gandhi or Kuchik Khan, for example. While Roy believed Gandhi was a 
‘reactionary’, and should be denounced by the Comintern, Lenin believed that the 
Indian leader was a ‘revolutionary’ deserving of all encouragement Communist 
organisations could give.
609
 By supporting the likes of Ghandi, the Bolshevik leader 
argued, more headway would be made in removing British influence from South 
Asia which was a fundamental step in securing Soviet Russia and in furthering the 
general revolutionary cause. In effect, the nationalist and pan-Islamist were to be 
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used for their ability to cause general disruption in the region – Communist 
revolution could then follow.
610
 This was the tactic Lenin chose to advocate in 
Persia, India and Central Asia where tactical alliances where to be made between the 
Bolsheviks and Muslim modernist and nationalist groups such as the Jadids.
611
 
Ultimately, the Bolshevik leader’s opinions held sway over the Roy’s, and the 
congress agreed that support should be given to the nationalist movements across 
Asia. From this meeting arose the ‘Directives on the Nationality and the Colonial 
Question’, signed by Lenin and from here on out the guiding document for the 
Comintern on all its Asian affairs.
612
 Finally, it appeared that some order was to be 
brought to Bolshevik policies towards Central and South Asia. Efforts were to be 
made to pander to nationalist sentiment and Communists were to tread lightly with 
Muslim revolutionaries in order not to cause an Islamic back-lash against the 
Bolsheviks. However, while the theory had been worked-out, the practicalities of 
such policy was another matter, as shall come to be seen. 
The debate on Gandhi and the issue of Asian nationalism at the Comintern 
congress would have been particularly worrying to the Indian government in 1920. A 
report by the Home Department in February had noted that ‘there is no evidence in 
our possession to show that Bolshevik agents have reached India and started direct 
propaganda, but certain extremists...have been presenting Bolshevik theories in most 
favourable light’.613 As the year was to develop, the growth of nationalist agitation in 
India threatened to bring Bolshevism into the country despite all of the government’s 
endeavours. In May, old wounds were reopened when the Hunter Commission 
published its report into the events of April 1919 in India and the actions of General 
Dyer at Amritsar. While the Hunter report condemned Dyer for using excessive force 
and for not providing aid to the injured, there were some who lauded the general as 
‘the saviour of the Punjab’. A collection was set up for the general in which over 
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£26,000 was raised,
614
 and Montagu and Chelmsford were even criticised for their 
treatment of him. The council of the European Association of India, for example, 
announced that ‘[the] General body of Europeans in India strongly uphold Dyer and 
condemn [the] actions of [the] Government of India and Secretary of State’.615 
During a debate in the House of Commons on the Hunter Report, there was a strong 
reaction among some of the Conservative politicians to Montagu’s speech against 
Dyer.
616
 (Although one observer believed most of those involved were ‘less Pro-
Dyer than anti-Montagu’).617 The CIGS himself believed that in this time of troubles, 
the British government should be standing by the actions of its soldiers.
618
 Such 
defence of Dyer, however, was resented by many Indians. At the Indian National 
Congress of September 1920 it was decided to adopt Gandhi’s resolution for a 
programme of non-cooperation with the Indian government.
619
  
For Chelmsford, the best way of dealing with this action was to largely ignore 
it. He believed that the Indian public would realise the ‘folly’ of non-
cooperation.
620As one historian has put it, ‘Chelmsford’s slogan was “caution and 
watchfulness”’.621 In a letter to the viceroy, Montagu voiced his support: ‘I believe 
your treatment of Gandhi will be successful...I am quite certain that if you have to 
move against him, he will hunger-strike and die in prison, and then I don’t know 
where we should be.’622 Chelmsford, nevertheless, faced criticism by others in 
London, who ‘want to know why you don’t lock him [Gandhi] up at once because 
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they disapprove of him’.623 However, the viceroy and his colleagues were well aware 
that Bolshevism thrived on popular discontent, and they were not about to provide 
fodder for Bolshevik propaganda by creating martyrs of Gandhi and his followers.   
 
Potentially more dangerous than the Bolshevik interest in Gandhi and Indian 
nationalism, however, was Moscow’s involvement in the nationalist and pan-Islamic 
agitation in Central and southern Asia during 1920. When it came to Islam the 
Bolshevik regime had to tread carefully, as instructions from Moscow pointed out to 
its party members in February: ‘Religious prejudices are much stronger among the 
Mussulmans than among Russians or other European peasants and workmen...great 
caution must be exercised in the struggle against religious prejudice.’624 Lessons also 
appear to have been learnt about Asian nationalism from the early Bolshevik 
encounters in Central Asia. In March 1918, the first Bolshevik attempt at deposing 
the Bokharan emir had failed, largely because Alim had been able to gather 
widespread support from his subjects in the face of what was a blatant foreign 
invasion.
625
 When Russia tried again in 1920, it was careful to first orchestrate a 
‘spontaneous’ uprising by the Young Bukharans before sending in troops to aid 
them.
626
 This subtle manipulation of nationalist feeling to ultimately achieve 
revolutionary ends is indicative of how far the Bolsheviks had progressed from their 
early confusion and heavy-handedness in Asia.  
Fortunately for Lenin and his colleagues, 1920 was a year of particular 
Muslim unrest, largely as a result of the Caliphate affair. If the loss of Enzeli was the 
biggest military blunder of the British government in 1920, its handling of the 
Caliphate issue was arguably the greatest diplomatic mistake of the post-war 
period.
627
 The problem centred on the fact that the Sultan of Turkey was also the 
Caliph, the ostensible head of Islam. Thus, when Allied forces took control of 
Constantinople in October 1918 following the armistice of Mudros, there was 
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immediate fear throughout the Muslim world that the Caliph would have his power 
and status significantly curbed. The defeat of Turkey – the last truly independent 
Islamic power – was bad enough for Muslims to have to stomach, without seeing 
their spiritual leader degraded too. In India, as pan-Islamic feeling had grown, so too 
had sympathy with the Caliph in Istanbul. After the Indian Mutiny and the deposition 
of the last Moghul emperor, Indian Muslims needed a symbol of Muslim solidarity 
and the Caliph appeared to be it.
628
 As Landau explains, ‘they needed an alternative 
support centre to the British rulers of India…as well as allies in their rivalry with the 
huge Hindu majority’.629 Hence, in the aftermath of the First World War, the 
Caliphate issue had the potential to create mass discontent among Indian Muslims, a 
fact that was recognised by the India Office: on 5 January 1920, at a conference of 
ministers, Montagu argued that harsh treatment of Turkey would have a great and 
negative effect on India. It was pointed out that nearly all Indian (and 
Mesopotamian) experts agreed that if the Allies removed the Sultan/Caliph from 
Constantinople, there would be dangerous consequences. For Curzon, however, the 
only way to assure Britain’s security from Turkish ambitions in the future was to 
relieve the Sultan of his standing in the Islamic world.
630
 As for causing unrest in 
India, the foreign secretary branded such agitation as ‘fictitious’ or, at worst, ‘short-
lived’. It was also pointed out that, when it came to expertise, as ex-viceroys, Curzon 
and Hardinge had a combined experience of twelve years in India, and both doubted 
the agitation would be amount to anything. Montagu countered that things had 
changed dramatically since Curzon and Hardinge’s days and that India was actually 
‘in a more dangerous state today than it had been for the last thirty years’.631 The 
following day, at a Cabinet meeting, Churchill added his weight to Montagu’s 
argument, bowing ‘to the overwhelming evidence, supplied by the secretary of state 
for India, of the resentment that would be excited in India and throughout the 
Mohammedan world by the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople’. Ultimately 
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the decision of the Cabinet was that the Sultan and his government should be allowed 
to remain at Constantinople, although without a Turkish force under their control; 
Curzon dissented from a decision he believed to be a mistake.
632
  
To the Caliphate movement that had formed in 1919, this assurance was not 
enough.
633
 For the Caliph to be stripped of his powers and to become a mere figure-
head and a puppet to the West was unacceptable. For, as was explained by an Indian 
Caliphate Deputation when it visited Lloyd George in March 1920, the temporal and 
spiritual power of the Caliph could not be separated in the eyes of Islam. The Caliph, 
the deputation argued, was required to hold extensive temporal power in order to 
have the strength to act as protector of the Muslim world. According to the 
deputation, Arabia, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia all had to be under Muslim 
control, as well as the holy places of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. What was 
ultimately demanded by the Caliphate movement, which the deputation represented, 
was the ‘restoration of status quo ante bellum’.634 As Lloyd George pointed out, 
however, it had been Turkey that had declared war on Britain, and not vice versa. To 
accuse Britain of being anti-Turk, or even anti-Islam, as some were doing, was 
simply unfair, not least as both Germany and Austria-Hungary had faced harsh peace 
terms, even though both were Christian countries. Why should Turkey be allowed to 
escape justice?
635
  As to the need for the Caliph to hold such temporal power, there 
were even those among Muslims who disputed this, and did not recognise the Caliph 
as their leader, including the Arabs.
636
 As Dobbs argued when the Afghan delegation 
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at Mussoorie brought up the issue, ‘At one time there were three Khilafats in 
simultaneous and rival existence...This shows how very careful you should be in 
laying down the law and making all sorts of statements about the Khilafat.’637 In fact, 
in the opinion of some in the British government, the Caliph issue was simply an 
excuse for anti-British propagandists, ‘who have in past times betrayed no great 
interest in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire’.638 Indeed, with Gandhi lending his 
support to the Caliphate movement, Crowe argued that this was ‘further evidence 
that the religious side of the movement is purely fictitious. It is a nationalist and anti-
British movement of all extremist parties’.639  
Whether the Caliphate agitators were genuinely moved by religion or not was 
somewhat irrelevant to the matter at hand.
640
 The Nizam of Hyderabad summarised 
the issue to Chelmsford: 
The Headship of Islam has been a polemic for years during which it did not 
rise beyond academic interest, but the present situation has given it a turn 
which defies sober reasoning and theological examination. Popular psychology 
is not necessarily logical or answerable to historical verities, and in practical 
politics what counts is fact and not theories.
641
 
In effect, the Caliphate issue was a convenient rallying point for all the discontent 
that was accumulating in India and South Asia at large in the post-war period.
642
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Muslims who had once shown complete loyalty to the Raj now ‘felt so thoroughly 
ashamed of themselves’ for having fought in the British Indian army against their co-
religionists; ‘They had joined the Christian powers to fight against Muslims and had 
not received any reward for that, neither any degree of self-government for India nor 
any particular advancement in the status of the Muslim community.’643 Kemal 
Ataturk was astute in exploiting such feelings of Muslim solidarity and the Caliphate 
issue was one which captured the imagination of the public.
644
 As one historian has 
explained, ‘Turkey became a symbol of the past greatness of Islam and its 
predicament in a hostile world in the twentieth century’.645 And with Gandhi 
encouraging Hindus to support the Muslim cause, the movement gained true mass 
appeal in India, much to the discomfort of the government.
646
 
 
In January, Chelmsford tried to diffuse the situation by reassuring a Caliphate 
deputation that the views of Indian Muslims were being strenuously pressed at the 
peace conference in Paris, and that within the British Empire the religion, lives and 
property of Muslims had and always would be protected.
647
 Unfortunately the 
viceroy’s statements did not convince the deputation, which put out a statement that 
‘should the peace terms result unfavourably to Muslim religion and sentiments, they 
would place undue strain upon Muslim loyalty’.648At a Caliphate conference held in 
Bengal on 28 February 1920 a resolution was passed stating that: 
if the settlement of peace with Turkey is in any way against the religious 
injunctions and demands of Islam, that is, if the dominions of the Khilafate are 
not kept intact as they were before the war, then Muslims in obedience to the 
laws of Islam will be compelled to cease all relations of loyalty with Great 
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Britain and shall be duty bound to assist their Khalif against all his enemies by 
all possible means.
649
 
Despite the viceroy’s attempts to prevent it, the sentiment was growing in the 
Muslim world that the British Empire, once the friend of Islam, was increasingly its 
enemy. 
Unable to counter the Caliphate movement with reason and theory, and 
finding that its calls for Muslim loyalty were also being rebuffed, the Indian 
government chose to handle the situation by remaining as uninvolved as possible. 
Chelmsford explained to Montagu in March, that ‘at the present moment the 
extremists are somewhat in a quandry. They would like to attack the Government of 
India, but there is nothing on which they can take hold because the Government of 
India have been uniformly in sympathy with their desires.’650 Just as with the Gandhi 
issue, however, the Indian government came under criticism from the Home 
government for its reticence in being heavy-handed with the Caliphate movement. 
The Foreign Office believed the Indian government was simply looking on and 
watching the opposition grow,
651
 while Curzon argued that the movement was being 
‘rendered formidable by [the] shocking weakness of the Gov. of India’.652 The first 
test for the Indian government’s policy came on 15 May when the proposed Turkish 
peace treaty was made public. Among the terms was the removal of Smyrna and 
Thrace from Turkish authority to be placed in Greek hands.
653
 This move was 
actually opposed by a number of figures in the British establishment, particularly 
among military members and the Indian government, who believed not only would it 
incite Muslim unrest but that Britain lacked the military capability to enforce it. 
However, as Wilson noted in his diary in June 1920, Lloyd George ‘is as much 
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convinced as ever that the Greeks are splendid soldiers and the Turks perfectly 
useless. It is a most dangerous obsession.’654 Indeed, if Curzon was the champion of 
Britain’s Persian policy in 1920, then the prime minister was the key orchestrator of 
the Turkish peace. It was due, in large measure, to the anti-Turkish-pro-Greek 
‘personal policy’ of Lloyd George that the British Empire was to become even 
further estranged from the Muslim world in 1920.
655
 As Admiral de Robeck warned, 
‘the proposal to dismember the Ottoman provinces of Turkey in the interests of 
Greece will drive the remaining Turks into the arms of the Bolsheviks, will set the 
Near East and Central Asia aflame, and will intensify the menace of Bolshevism to 
the British Moslem world’.656 
In an effort to temper any potential trouble, Chelmsford published a message 
to all Indian Muslims acknowledging that the proposed treaty terms must be painful 
to them and asking them to accept the agreement ‘with resignation, courage and 
fortitude and to keep your loyalty towards the Crown bright and untarnished...’657 
Despite such worries, however, the immediate reaction to news of the proposed 
treaty was actually relatively muted. The disturbances which the Indian government 
had been bracing themselves for did not materialise.
658
 Instead, it seemed that the 
extremists of the Caliphate movement had succeeded through their violent speeches 
in frightening away more moderate supporters to their cause.
659
 The policy of the 
Indian government, which had been to largely ignore the extremists and allow them 
to talk themselves out seemed to have been successful. The Indian government 
remained cautious, though, for, as Chelmsford noted, it was still early days and there 
was no way yet of knowing whether the anti-government agitators where simply 
lying low for now, making underground preparations.
660
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The greater test for the policy of the Indian government came with the involvement 
of Afghanistan in the Caliphate issue. On 3 March 1920 Chelmsford had relayed to 
Montagu the emir’s wish to send a deputation from Afghanistan to Britain in order to 
make his sentiments known there on the Turkish peace. As the viceroy noted, such a 
move was probably designed to enhance Amanullah’s reputation in Asia by making 
himself appear as the champion of Islam. While Chelmsford wanted to encourage 
such ambitions in order to bring Afghanistan and Soviet Russia to clash over Asia,
661
 
Montagu vetoed the idea, fearing that allowing the emir a say over the Turkish peace 
would only enhance his ability to influence Muslim hostility against Britain.
662
 It was 
with the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres by Turkey in August that the real trouble 
began, however. It was a ‘great disappointment’ for Indian Muslims.663 Amanullah 
had made known through a proclamation that he would welcome into Afghanistan 
any Muslims who wanted to escape from their ruler for religious reasons. With this 
encouragement, some 20,000–30,000 Muslims decided to perform Hijrat (religious 
migration) during the month of August, as a protest against the treatment of Turkey 
by the Allies.
664
 A Central Hijrat Office with branches all over India was opened, and 
a propaganda campaign launched.
665
 With such a large movement of people, the 
Indian government was unsurprisingly anxious, particularly Hamilton Grant, who 
was now chief commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, from where the 
majority of the Muhajirun (those performing Hijrat) originated. Nevertheless, despite 
such worries, Grant also realised that the least interference that his administration 
made in the movement, the better.
666
 In this policy of allowing things to take their 
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course Grant was supported by Chelmsford. For one thing, as was observed, ‘the 
people are extraordinarily orderly’ and there was little need for action in order to 
keep the peace.
667
 Indeed, Grant believed that his policy of non-interference was one 
of the very reasons for the relative calm proceedings of the Hijrat.
668
  
 For another thing, as the viceroy explained to Montagu, although led perhaps 
by political extremists, ‘the poor misguided folk who have left their homes have left 
them because they genuinely thought that they were bound to do so on religious 
grounds. It was all important therefore that we should give no ground for the 
suggestion that we were interfering with a religious movement.’669 Once again, the 
Indian government was vindicated in its policy of non-interference. By late August, 
the Muhajirun were flocking back to India after a less than warm welcome from the 
Afghan government. Amanullah had been expecting more prosperous and educated 
Muslims to migrate to his country; when he learned that the vast majority of the 
Muhajirun were the poorest elements of Indian society, he quickly lost 
enthusiasm.
670
 With no help from the Afghan government, and no resources of their 
own, the Muhajirun were forced to return to home.
671
 Reports soon spread through 
India of the hardship endured by the Muhajirun, many of whom died on the return 
journey from exhaustion and disease – the road from the Frontier to Kabul was said 
to be dotted with Muhajirun graves.
672
 All together, the episode constituted a major 
setback for the Caliphate movement. As Grant observed, ‘[the] Khilafat Committee 
realise that they have aroused forces they cannot control and are paralysed with fear 
of public who are bitterly resentful at having thus been duped’.673 The affair was also 
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a disaster for Amanullah, resulting as it did in a blow to his prestige across Central 
and southern Asia.
674
 
While the policy of the Indian government had helped avert an even bigger 
crisis for the British Empire, the Caliphate movement and the general Muslim unrest 
that was felt in South Asia in 1920 was ultimately a gift to the Bolsheviks. Not only 
did it create a group of captive discontents, it also allowed the Bolshevik regime to 
paint the British government in the light of imperialist oppressors, while posing itself 
as the friend and ally of the Muslim world – which was just the aim of the First 
Congress of the Peoples of the East, which was held in Baku in September 1920.
675
 
According to Bolshevik figures, 1,891 delegates attended representing a number of 
Asian countries and various extremist movements.
676
 (This was certainly much better 
attendance than its pre-cursor, the first All-Russian Congress of Muslim Communist 
Organisations, had garnered in November 1918).
677
 An account given by H.G. Wells 
describes the Congress’s Chair, Zinoviev, and his colleagues holding an event at 
Baku ‘at which they gathered together a quite wonderful accumulation of white, 
black, brown and yellow people, Asiatic costumes and astonishing weapons. They 
had a great assembly in which they swore undying hatred of capitalism and British 
imperialism’.678 Zinoviev claimed that the event showed ‘the living strength of our 
revolution’, and even went so far as to call for a jihad against British imperialism.679 
The practical effects of the Baku Congress, in bringing about an understanding 
between Bolshevism and pan-Islamism were, however, limited. Stephen Blank 
contends that the Congress revealed all Zinoviev had to offer ‘was empty rhetoric, 
not a well-conceived policy’.680 One report to reach British Intelligence stated that 
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while many violent speeches were made, the general effect was spoiled by large 
numbers of the Muslim representatives going outside to say their prayers and that 
‘not the faintest notice was taken of most of the numerous speeches made, the 
delegates being far more interested in each other’s swords and revolvers’.681 Far from 
being a vehicle for open debate and discussion, the Congress consisted of a list of 
speakers that had ‘been made beforehand and consisted only of Russian 
Communists’, with few being allowed to speak freely: ‘Several of the Mussulman 
orators made an attempt to speak but were not allowed to continue’.682 One delegate 
described the Congress as ‘a badly-acted comedy...a mere farce, having no 
significance for Eastern peoples, especially for Moslems’.683 Wells himself admitted 
the event was ‘an excursion, a pageant, a Beano. As a meeting of Asiatic proletarians 
it was preposterous’.684 British Intelligence even reported that one of their agents had 
seen a telegram from Zinoviev to Lenin admitting that the Congress was a failure.
685
 
The chairman’s rant against Muslim clergy, labelling them parasites and oppressors, 
did not go down particularly well with his audience.
686
 
However, while Zinoviev and his colleagues may have been clumsy in their 
handling of the delegates to the Congress, as a work of propaganda the event was a 
huge success. As the report by British Intelligence concluded, if the delegates to the 
Congress were really elected by the people they claimed to represent, the Bolsheviks 
had done themselves great harm in the East by the bad impression they had given. 
However, ‘If it was merely a plan to collect together a heterogeneous mass of Asiatic 
undesirables with a view to enlisting them as agents and agitators, then the 
Bolsheviks appear to have been most successful’.687 The gathering together of a large 
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number of anti-British malcontents was a worry in itself for Britain. As one Tiflis 
newspaper pointed out, at the Congress the representatives of the revolutionary and 
nationalists movements ‘will have facilities for meeting and discussing mutual 
measures and co-operation. If they do this, then the Conference will serve as the first 
step towards a union of the forces of the Eastern peoples...’688 The last thing the 
British government needed was for the revolutionary movements in Central and 
southern Asia to combine and organise themselves. Indeed, one of the few practical 
results of the Congress was the creation of a Council of Propaganda and Action in 
the East.
689
 Two months after Baku, a school would also be set up in Tashkent under 
the direction of M.N. Roy with the specific aim of training Indian and Asian 
malcontents in Communist revolutionary theory (its first students were a handful of 
Muhajirun who had not returned to India with the others).
690
 
The crucial result of the Baku Congress then, was that it served to disturb the 
British government. Stephen White in his work on the event has argued that it held 
particular importance because it helped motivate the British government to seek an 
accord with the Bolshevik regime which would lead to the Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement of 1921.
691
 Furthermore, the Congress was an apt summary of the 
relationship between Bolshevism and the  pan-Islamist and nationalist movements in 
Asia in the post-war period. In true Great Game style, it was an event of all show and 
little substance, just as the relationship between these groups did not go much deeper 
than a mutual anti-British fervour. As White points out, not only was this the ‘First 
Congress of the Peoples of the East’, it was also the last.692 For the British 
government, however, any level of collaboration between these movements was 
enough to make it uncomfortable.
693
 Montagu summarised the situation when he 
wrote to Chelmsford in September 1920: 
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What does alarm me is that up till now it has always seemed to me that 
extremism in India has really been either anti-British or national. It seems to 
me that it is going to be international. The Bolsheviks, in their animosity to all 
settled government, are using the grievances of the Mahomedans, and what 
frightens me is the way in which Pan-Islamism which, as I think foolishly, we 
have made hostile to the British Empire, is taking charge of the extremist 
movement.
694
 
That the actions of the British government had helped foster Muslim opposition to 
the empire in the post-war period was certainly true. While the Indian government 
tried its best to mitigate the problem, ultimately it could not overcome the attitude of 
some in the Home government towards Turkey or make them fully appreciate what 
bad policy was contained in the Treaty of Sèvres.  
 
An Act of Dementia 
The year 1920 was one of extraordinary strain for the British Empire. It seemed that, 
on all fronts, it was facing popular unrest and waning international influence. In 
India, the government struggled to deal with mass popular discontent that was 
becoming ever more vocal and organised under the leadership of Gandhi and of the 
Caliphate movement, while all the while trying to pacify a fickle neighbour in the 
form of Afghanistan. Throughout Asia an over-stretched and under-resourced army 
was being called upon to maintain Britain’s imperial influence against a surge of a 
pan-Islamist and nationalist feeling that was gradually engulfing this area of the 
world. At home, the British government faced economic decline, rapid 
unemployment and mass industrial unrest; while in Persia, its inability to enforce the 
terms of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, or to prevent Staroselskii reaching 
dominance over the military operations of that country, was matched only by its 
impotence in the face of the Red Army landings at Enzeli. Indeed, compounding all 
of these troubles facing Britain in 1920 was the ever-present shadow of Soviet 
Russia, its propaganda efforts threatening the very core stability of the empire, its 
growth in strength and confidence in Asia high-lighting even further Britain’s own 
relative decline. Any one of these issues would have been enough to place pressure 
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on the resources of the British Empire, and test the abilities of the country’s leaders; 
combined as they were in a synergy of opposition and hostility toward Britain and it 
created at this time the possibility of a very real crisis. It was how the British 
government addressed these issues in 1920 which determined just how big of a crisis 
would develop. 
For example, in two key areas – the army and the Caliphate issue – did the 
British government ultimately make the situation worse for itself. What is quite 
apparent is that in both cases, Curzon and his Foreign Office held a great 
responsibility for the policy that was ultimately pursued. Curzon’s authority on 
foreign affairs in South Asia had been given further impetus by his gaining sole 
control of the Foreign Office towards the end of 1919. By 1920, the belief that 
Curzon was a driving force behind Britain’s affairs in South Asia was so prevalent 
among contemporaries, that the foreign secretary was forced to defend himself in the 
House of Lords: 
Incidentally I have noticed in some quarters that our policy in that part of the 
world is described as an act of dementia on my own part, dragging after me a 
body of reluctant colleagues...It is unfair to assume at any moment that an 
important branch of policy, even of foreign policy, is the work of any 
individual Minister.
695
 
While it is true that government foreign policy of this period cannot be solely blamed 
on one person (Curzon was supported in Persia by Milner for example, and had Cox 
telling him what he wanted to hear), there is no doubt that Curzon proved a stubborn 
obstacle in the way of a more prudent military policy in South Asia at this time. It 
was due to him ‘more than to anyone else’ that British forces were maintained in 
their position in Persia.
696
 For while Churchill, Wilson and the Indian government 
were preaching military retrenchment, Curzon would do nothing to risk jeopardising 
an Anglo-Persian agreement which was already clearly defunct. In allowing his 
ambition to over-ride military caution Curzon must take the bulk of the blame for 
Britain’s humiliation in Persia. The reluctance of the foreign secretary to accept a 
more limited role for Britain in Persia and elsewhere in Asia, was eventually, 
however, to have repercussions for him. For as Chelmsford pointed out to Montagu 
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in December 1920, ‘When one considers the failure of his [Curzon’s] policy in Persia 
and Mesopotamia, one is at a loss to understand how he can retain the position of an 
authority on Eastern affairs’.697 Wilson summed up his regard for the Foreign Office 
when he noted in his diary how the newly appointed ambassador to Constantinople, 
Sir Horace Rumbold, had come to see him; in their half hour talk, Rumbold had 
learnt more ‘than in all the Foreign Office palavars and papers. That Foreign Office 
and Curzon are hopeless. They have not even got maps’.698 
 
The lacking of maps aside, the most crucial mistake that Curzon made in 1920, 
however, was to inadvertently encourage a greater affinity between Bolshevik Russia 
and the Muslim world. In December 1919 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Walter 
Long had tried to warn of the progress Bolshevism was making in Asia: 
The recent Bolshevik successes are likely to give an impetus to what is, it is 
submitted, one of the most important of Bolshevik aims, namely, to turn the 
Moslem world against the British Empire... Skilfully making use of every 
circumstance lending itself to mis-interpretation or distortion, the Bolsheviks 
have succeeded to make large numbers of Moslems in various parts of the Near 
and Middle East honestly believe that Great Britain is the enemy of 
Islam...Very skilfully, too, the Bolsheviks are contriving to turn the somewhat 
vague and unformed aims of the Pan-Islamic movement, such as it is, into anti-
British channels.
699
 
Indeed, the ability of the Bolshevik regime to subvert the more extreme points of its 
doctrine in order to try to appeal to Asian and Muslim malcontents is testament to the 
pragmatism and opportunism of Lenin and his colleagues. Long’s warning that the 
danger of a Bolshevik–pan-Islamic combination was not fully realised by some in the 
British government would indeed appear to be true, given the policy which both 
Curzon and Lloyd George insisted on pursuing with Turkey. For Curzon in 
particular, such blindness was at odds with the almost obsessive warnings he had 
made in 1918–1919 over the Bolshevik threat to Persia. It would seem that when it 
suited his ambition to see a weakened and dismembered Turkey, Curzon found it 
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convenient to downplay the Bolshevik regime’s ability to exploit pan-Islamic 
agitation.  
In comparison to the Home government, the Indian government was to prove 
its shrewdness when it came to dealing not only with the Bolshevik danger to India, 
but also with the pan-Islamic and nationalist movements that threatened to 
undermine Britain’s position in that country. By refusing to engage with Gandhi, by 
allowing the Muhajirun to proceed freely, and by letting the Caliphate extremists talk 
themselves out of mass support, the Indian government was in effect allowing the 
popular unrest in India to run out of steam. By its determination not to provoke 
further unrest or make martyrs of the cause, the Indian government also robbed the 
extremists of what would have been an even greater anti-British rallying point – 
government-sponsored oppression. In its dealings with Afghanistan, the Indian 
government further demonstrated the realism and practicality of its approach to 
foreign affairs. While the Home government may have worried about a loss of 
prestige for India, by appearing too keen for Afghan friendship, Chelmsford and his 
colleagues realised that the greater loss would be to India’s security should a hostile 
Afghanistan develop on its borders. Again, it is to the Indian government’s credit that 
it realised the crucial component in combating Bolshevism in India was information. 
The web of communication that was set up between the central and the peripheral 
administrations ensured that the government was able to maintain a clear picture of 
the level of Bolshevik agitation occurring in India and, therefore, to take appropriate 
action, such as the extension of the rouble ordinance. That, in 1920, relatively little 
Bolshevik agitation occurred in India must be, at least in part, attributed to the 
government’s measures. Despite the criticism it often faced from some in the Home 
government, the choices made by the Indian government in dealing with its problems 
in 1920 proved to be correct. Indeed, there is some irony in the fact that the Foreign 
Office was so quick to disparage Delhi’s policies – with Gandhi, for example – when 
the latter proved far more successful in its endeavours in 1920 than the former.  
The year 1920 was one in which the British government had been forced to 
face its limitations. For some, the struggle between ambition and pragmatism took 
longer than others. The following year, 1921, would be one in which the government 
would really have to come to terms with these changes. For, while 1920 had proved 
the military and seditious capabilities of the Bolshevik regime, 1921 would 
demonstrate how far their diplomatic abilities could take them. The Soviet 
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agreements with Britain, as well as those with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan in 
1921 would signal a marked evolution in the progression of Bolshevik Russia from 
its status as an international pariah in 1918.  
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Chapter Four: Making Friends, 1921 
            
The events of 1920 had shown that Curzon had been wrong in the policies he had 
tried to pursue in Persia. The 1919 agreement had been categorically rejected by the 
Persian people, and the Enzeli debacle had exposed the impotence of Britain’s 
military for all to see. What is more, given the state of its economy, Britain no longer 
had the physical resources to support the forward policy which the foreign secretary 
favoured. Unfortunately for Curzon, Britain’s position as unrivalled authority in 
South Asia was not to be. A change was now needed in Britain’s foreign policy. But 
how far did the foreign secretary recognise this? And what was the change to be? 
1920 had been a rude awakening for those in London who had been overly optimistic 
about the empire’s capabilities in the post-war period. By 1921 it appeared that 
realism needed to be the order of the day – the guiding principle which the Indian 
government had been following itself since 1918. As John Gallagher has put it 
‘policy had to fall in line with weakness. Retrenchment meant contraction’.700 
However, while Delhi was confident that Britain could still play a central role in 
South Asia even from a position of retrenchment, the Home government was not so 
convinced. As discussed in the Introduction, prestige was always a key factor in the 
international standing of the empire. However, by 1921, without any economic or 
military clout, prestige appeared to be of even greater importance to many in 
London. How the empire was to pull back from its current position without 
appearing weak was a particular worry to the Home government, and one which 
would bring it into conflict with the Indian government yet again, as will come to be 
seen. 
The changes which 1921 wrought on British foreign policy have been noted 
by other authors, albeit for quite different reasons. The Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement was signed by Britain and Russia in 1921, and for some, this event has 
been seen as a watershed moment in the relationship between these two countries, 
marking as it did a level of recognition of the Soviet government by Britain that it 
had never previously admitted.
701
 The third part of Richard Ullman’s three-volume 
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work on Anglo-Russian relations, for example, is devoted entirely to the trade 
agreement, such is the importance the author places on it. In Ullman’s opinion, the 
period of negotiation leading to the conclusion of the accord represented a turning 
point, not only in Britain’s policy towards Russia, but in its perspective on its foreign 
relations in general. Ullman describes 1920–1921 as witnessing a move from the 
militaristic mind-set that had dominated Britain’s immediate post-war foreign policy, 
to a peace-time mentality.
702
 The continued attempts in those years to curb military 
expenditure, perhaps lends some credence to this argument. However, how far such 
practical developments represented a change in the actual attitude of the British 
government is questionable. In Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, Stephen White 
makes a similar point. In White’s opinion, the trade agreement did not represent a 
change in Britain’s attitude towards Soviet Russia, but, rather, a change in the tactics 
of its fundamental anti-Bolshevik mentality. The diplomatic manoeuvres involved in 
the trade negotiations ‘in political terms represented a continuation of the military 
intervention of the immediate post-revolutionary period’.703 Perhaps financially the 
British government could not afford to continue the military fight against 
Bolshevism, but according to White, this would not stop it using other means to 
achieve the same ends.  
The trouble with the studies by the likes of Ullman and White, is that while 
both make some attempt to discuss Britain’s relations with Persia and Afghanistan in 
this period, the focus of these works is entirely on the Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement, which is placed in a unique position within the field of British foreign 
policy. Despite their different arguments regarding the intention behind the accord, 
both these authors (and many others) presuppose a fundamental anti-Bolshevism 
within the British government. Hence, debate focuses on whether or not the British 
government remained anti-Bolshevik after the signing of the agreement and how 
much so. Yet, if this original supposition is removed, the entire perspective on the 
trade agreement and on Britain’s foreign policy as a whole in this period is changed. 
If Britain is viewed as being, not necessarily anti-Bolshevik, but anti-Russian (as 
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dictated by Great Game thinking), then the trade agreement starts to look like simply 
one part of Britain’s attempts in 1921 to preserve its imperial interests in South Asia. 
For, as has been demonstrated throughout this work, the problem of Bolshevism was 
inextricably linked with the issues of pan-Islamism and Asian nationalism when it 
came to Britain’s imperial interests. The connection between Britain’s relations with 
Soviet Russia and with that of Persia and Afghanistan is clear, even from the terms 
of the trade agreement. While the document was supposed to be concerned with trade 
relations, the preamble required both parties to refrain from any hostile undertakings 
against the other (including, importantly, conducting propaganda). Accompanying 
the agreement, moreover, was a letter from the British government to the Soviet 
government, detailing the current areas in which Bolshevik subversive activity was 
being conducted and demanding this be stopped.
704
 In September 1921, when a note 
was sent to the Soviet government protesting against alleged violations of the trade 
agreement, it was examples of Bolshevik sedition towards India and within Persia 
and Afghanistan which was detailed.
705
 Hence, when it came to Russia, Persia and 
Afghanistan (or Bolshevism, Islamism and nationalism), the three were hard for 
Britain to separate in the post-war period.  
In fact, the trade agreement was not the only accord to be signed that year. 
Indeed, 1921 could be termed the year of the treaty. For, Moscow would sign 
agreements with the governments of Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey and, of course, 
Britain, while the latter would conclude its own treaty with Afghanistan.
706
 How 
these treaties all impacted on one another is a question, however, which has still to be 
fully explored.
707
 Leon Poullada, for example, writes that ‘Britain regarded with 
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great suspicion and displeasure the system of interlocking treaties between the 
USSR, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan that had as a common denominator hostility 
to Britain’. Unfortunately, however, he does not elaborate as to what this suspicion 
and displeasure meant for the formation of Britain’s foreign policy towards these 
countries.
708
 So, while others may have asked what the Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement meant for Anglo-Russian relations, the following pages will focus instead 
on how affairs with Russia affected Britain’s policies towards Persia and Afghanistan 
in 1921. Furthermore, this chapter will try to understand to what extent the British 
government underwent an actual change in attitude regarding not only its policy 
towards Soviet Russia, but, more specifically, towards Persia and Afghanistan too; it 
will try to see how far any such change was real or simply superficial. Finally, given 
the setbacks he had experienced, had the Great Game mentality of Curzon actually 
died a death by 1921 or was it struggling on?  
 
Shadow for Substance 
In a speech to the House of Lords in July 1921, Curzon described the situation in 
Persia as one which left him ‘with a feeling of disappointment, almost of despair’. 
All his previous efforts in Persia he believed to have been in vain, and he was 
‘unaware of any encouragement at the present moment to persevere in this task’.709 
This was an apt summary of Curzon’s feelings in 1921, as well as a telling indication 
of the change that the foreign secretary had undergone in relation to Persia in the last 
year or so. As noted, Persia was Curzon’s apparent area of expertise, and the policies 
pursued by the British government towards this country in the post-war period were 
created and driven almost entirely by him. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
foreign secretary should feel such despondency when surveying what the last two 
years of his handiwork had done to Britain’s position in Persia. Rather than attaining 
a position of unrivalled hegemony over a secure and stable buffer state, Britain’s 
standing in that country – and its reputation in Asia at large – appeared to have sunk 
to an all time low. And yet, rather than realising the error of his ways, and admitting 
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that he may have failed to appreciate the nature of the post-war world, Curzon was to 
react as if he had been personally insulted by the Persians. Even at this point it would 
have been possible to negotiate an agreement more in line with the suggestions of the 
Indian government and E.G. Browne’s five point plan, and potentially save Anglo-
Persian relations from sinking any further. Instead, after 1920 the foreign secretary 
commenced on what can only be described as a monumental sulk towards Persia. In 
January 1921, the Persian government was still obfuscating when it came to ratifying 
the agreement with Britain. When Norman enquired as to the possibility of 
modifying the agreement to make it more palatable to the Persian public, George 
Churchill of the Foreign Office noted quite plainly that such action seemed 
pointless.
710
 Curzon made clear his position a few days later when he explained to 
Norman that he was now ‘wholly indifferent as to whether [the] Medjliss is 
summoned or not’. The time for submitting the agreement had passed six weeks ago 
and now Britain’s only interest was that a decent government be formed for Persia’s 
own sake.
711
 When Norman further suggested annulling the current agreement and 
creating another to replace it Curzon responded: 
I have no desire to negotiate a new agreement...Personally I will never propose 
another agreement with the Persians. Not unless they came on their knees 
would I even consider any application from them...In future we will look after 
our own interests in Persia not hers.
712
  
The bitterness in Curzon’s reply is palpable. Having invested so much of his time, 
energy and reputation in the Persian agreement, the failure of the Tehran government 
to ratify the document had apparently resulted in the foreign secretary washing his 
hands of the entire matter. 
 
Although it was not interested in negotiating an amended or entirely new agreement 
with the Persian government, neither did the British government have ‘the slightest 
intention of denouncing the agreement themselves and of accepting thereby the 
responsibility for a proceeding the blame of which must rest exclusively upon 
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Persian shoulders.’713 For Curzon, it no doubt seemed that denouncing the agreement 
amounted to admitting that it had been wrong to create it in the first place. In 
Norman’s opinion, such sensitivity was a mistake: officially declaring the agreement 
to be defunct, the British government could start to repair the damage done to its 
reputation.
714
 However, by leaving it neither enacted nor annulled, the agreement 
hung like an albatross around the neck of Anglo-Persian relations – a focus for anti-
British feeling within Persia and for Britain a reminder of its failure to bring Persia 
under its control. Norman was not alone in believing that his government should 
distance itself from the accord. Unsurprisingly, Chelmsford supported this view: 
it seems to us essential that we should seize every possible opportunity of 
working back to our old role of champions of Islam against the Russian ogre. 
At present the roles are reversed and our position not only in Persia but 
throughout Middle East is one of greatest difficulty in consequence. Scrapping 
of Anglo-Persian Agreement would go far to right the matter. 
Curzon’s minuted response was typical of the ill feeling he constantly displayed 
towards the viceroy: 
Considering that the Gov. of India decline to take the slightest interest in 
Persia, have steadily opposed the Anglo-Persian Agreement from the start, cut 
off their expenditure there without even a reference to us, and wash their hands 
of all responsibility – I regard the above with which they so liberally regale us 
as an impertinence and would not pay it the compliment of a reply.
715
 
Despite Curzon’s dismissal of Chelmsford’s opinion, the idea that the agreement was 
now worse than useless was growing within the British government. Even Sir Percy 
Cox, the chief architect of the agreement (and now high commissioner of 
Mesopotamia), had come to concur with Norman and the Indian government. In his 
opinion, the agreement ‘has become such a red herring to the Bolshevik[s] and such a 
pretext for extremist propaganda, that I agree with the Government of India that we 
must drop it in its present form as a basis of policy’.716 Curzon’s minute that Cox was 
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closer to the mark than anybody else when it came to Persia shows that the Indian 
government’s ideas were always more palatable to the foreign secretary when they 
were proposed by anyone other than the viceroy!
717
 
Indeed, unfortunately for Norman, relations between the new British 
ambassador and the foreign secretary were to be tense. Cox had been Curzon’s man 
and his recommendations on British Persian policy had been exactly what the foreign 
secretary had wanted to hear. Norman, however, had a much different perspective to 
his predecessor. While he had served in the Egypt and Turkey, he had also held 
positions in the US, Latin America and Europe. Before his appointment to Persia he 
had been part of the British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Norman had 
therefore ‘seen a wider changing world and witnessed the rising tide of nationalism’, 
whereas Cox had spent much of his career ‘dealing with hereditary sheikhs and tribal 
leaders’.718 Norman also had no personal attachment to the 1919 agreement and so 
took an objective view of the situation. Unfortunately, although he was a man of 
‘intelligence and vision’, Norman’s views of the Persian situation were not what 
Curzon wanted to hear. Try as he might, the diplomat was unable to make the foreign 
secretary listen to him. Indeed, the relationship between the two became so bad that 
when Norman finally left Tehran in October 1921, Curzon refused to see him when 
he arrived in London (as was the general courtesy when a diplomat returned from 
abroad).
719
 
Despite the pleas of Norman to abrogate, nevertheless, Curzon remained 
unmoved. As Mikhail Volodarsky puts it: ‘This stubborn clinging to an obviously 
imperialistic treaty could only make the worst impression on nationalistically minded 
Iranians’.720 The situation became even more farcical when the new Persian prime 
minister, Seyyed Zia’eddin, took it upon himself to denounce the agreement.721 On 
26 February 1921 in a declaration to the Persian public, Zia’eddin explained: 
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The occasion of the conclusion of this agreement was a different world 
situation, and the causes which obliged us to profit by it are no longer 
existent...I announce the denunciation of the Anglo-Persian Agreement that it 
may not have a bad influence on our conduct of affairs...
722
 
The wording of the declaration demonstrates Zia’eddin’s efforts not to offend the 
British government by his actions. Indeed, he even suggested that Curzon send a note 
to the affect that the British government had concluded the agreement because it 
believed it to be in the best interests of the Persian people, but in no way insisted on 
its acceptance by the Persian government. Publication of such an announcement 
would ‘at once add very greatly to our popularity and prestige here’, as Norman put 
it.
723
 Curzon’s response was to minute that he had no time ‘for a Gov. that 
simultaneously denounces and fawns’.724  
 
The foreign secretary’s response not only illustrates the bitterness now apparent in 
his attitude towards Persia, but also hints at a cynicism in regards to that country’s 
government. The rulers of Persia were in a difficult situation in this period: they did 
not want to alienate the British government, but needed to distance themselves from 
an agreement so derided by the Persian public that it had contributed to the downfall 
of the men who had aided its creation. As Zia’eddin tried to explain to Norman, ‘if 
Great Britain wished to save her position here she must sacrifice shadow for 
substance, remain in the background and help Persia effectively but 
unostentatiously’.725 For Curzon and others in the Foreign Office, however, such 
caution by the Persian government was taken as proof of its insincerity towards 
Britain. The attempts made by Zia’eddin in April of 1921 to enlist American advisors 
to help with some of Persia’s administrative issues – including bringing back W.M. 
Shuster to head a Persian national bank – appeared to confirm such suspicions.726 
While Norman tried to explain that the Persian prime minister was simply aiming to 
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create a strong and reformed Persia by seeking any help he could,
727
 to Curzon such 
courting of Washington amounted to a betrayal of Britain.
728
 Nevertheless, Norman 
was rather more understanding of the Persian government’s situation in 1921 than 
was Curzon. The foreign secretary was apt to believe that the Persian political system 
was much as it was prior to the war – based on personalities – and that the way to 
achieve anything was to work with sympathetic individuals.
729
 Much of Norman’s 
communication with London was spent trying to explain that the old system was in 
decline. As he told the Foreign Office in April 1921, the forces of nationalism within 
Persia were now so strong that any prime minister that hoped to survive had to 
harness this force and, hence, had to be seen to be internationalising and reforming 
the country.
730
  
Just how precarious a position any Persian government was in is apparent 
simply from looking at how short their terms of office were. Seyyed Zia'eddin had 
come to power following a coup d’état by the commander of the Cossack Division, 
Reza Khan (Staroselskii’s successor), who had claimed that he was ‘tired of seeing 
one inefficient Government succeed another at Tehran’.731 Yet, within a few months, 
Zia’eddin had been ousted – ostensibly because of his ‘pro-British attitude’ – and 
replaced with Qavam os-Saltaneh.
732
 Such political turbulence did not make for 
better relations between Britain and Persia. Probably aware of his precarious 
position, the new Persian prime minister, os-Saltaneh, immediately sent to London a 
                                                 
727
 TNA/FO371/6403/E4804, Telegram from Norman to the Foreign Office, 23 April 1921. 
 
728
 TNA/FO371/6403/E4675, Telegram from Curzon to Norman, 18 April 1921. Curzon’s suspicion 
of Persian sincerity was not entirely unfounded; throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, many Persian officials were apt to use British and Russian rivalry for their own gain, 
playing one off against the other, all the while increasing their own privledge and power. Olson, 
Anglo-Iranian Relations, p. 10. Nonetheless, by 1918 Persia’s rulers were certainly under more 
pressure than ever before to avoid being seen as pandering to foreign desires. Olson, Anglo-Iranian 
Relations, p. 10. 
 
729
 Ibid., p. 256. 
 
730
 TNA/FO371/6403/E4804, Telegram from Norman to the Foreign Office, 23 April 1921. 
 
731
 TNA/FO371/6401/E2379, Telegram from Norman to the Foreign Office, 21 Feb. 1921. For more 
on the coup see Chaqueri, Birth of a Trauma, pp. 307–326. For more on Norman’s alleged 
involvement in the coup, and Britain’s apparent support of Reza Khan’s political intrigues see M.P. 
Zirinsky, ‘Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah, 1921–1926’, 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Nov., 1992), pp. 639–663. 
 
732
 Zia’eddin was overthrown on 25 May 1921. TNA/FO371/6406/E6678, Memorandum on meeting 
between Oliphant and Persian Minister, 11 June 1921. 
 
175 
 
communication of friendship. He hoped, of course, that the British government 
realised that he had to remain ‘impartial’, in Persia’s foreign relations, but that this 
would not prevent Britain from giving its support to himself and his new Cabinet. 
Nevertheless, Lancelot Oliphant epitomised the British Foreign Office’s view when 
he noted that it appeared that ‘the new [Persian] Cabinet wished to keep their cake 
and yet eat it’: it wanted to place all nations with an interest in its country on a par, 
and yet gain all the advantages which Britain had bestowed on previous Persian 
governments ‘which had actively worked with us’.733 Curzon, meanwhile, was 
apparently entirely sick of a succession of Persian ministers ‘all taking anti-British 
action but sneaking round to protest British sympathies’. As for the constant 
interchange of personnel in the Persian government, this elicited in the British 
foreign secretary ‘no more concern than the rapid and inevitable fall of (British) 
wickets in an International test match’.734 
 
What made the Persian government’s position even harder in 1921 was the decision 
by the British Cabinet to recall its troops from north Persia by the spring of that year. 
This resolution sent panic through the officials in Tehran, and prompted the shah to 
ask Norman ‘whether withdrawal of British troops indicated that His Majesty’s 
Government had ceased to take any interest in Persia’.735 While the British minister 
tried to reassure that this was not the case, such worry was understandable.
736
 The 
presence of its troops on Persian soil had been a crucial component of Britain’s 
policy since their arrival there during the First World War. Curzon himself had 
argued throughout 1919 and 1920 that Norperforce was instrumental in preventing a 
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Bolshevik penetration of Persia.
737
 Thus, by removing its troops, Britain was 
potentially opening the door for Soviet Russia to gain an ascendancy in Persia – 
something Curzon had fought against for the last two years. Norman for one firmly 
believed that the removal of Norperforce ‘will be immediately followed by a 
Bolshevik occupation, or, at least, by arrival of numerous Bolshevik agents’ into the 
country.
738
 Nor was the British minister alone in his fears. The head of the Persian 
Imperial Bank believed that for Britain ‘to desert before we are compelled by 
force...will be simply doing what [the] Moscow Government are anxious we might 
do’.739 The India Office too, was anxious about what the recall of Britain’s troops 
would mean for the growth of Bolshevik influence in Persia. As Montagu explained 
to Chelmsford, any Bolshevik advance into that country:  
would not necessarily take [the] form of military invasion. More probably it 
would follow customary line of political propaganda among disaffected 
elements of [the] population...We must therefore be prepared, if we withdraw 
from Persia...to see [the] whole country fall under direct Bolshevik influences, 
which will then extend right up to [the] frontiers of India and Mesopotamia.
740
 
In Hardinge’s opinion, Britain was ‘simply throwing away the fruit of a hundred 
years of effort in Persia for the sake of the withdrawal of three or four thousand 
men.’741  
The Indian government, however, was one of the few bodies which did not 
share these concerns over Bolshevik influence in Persia. Since 1918, Chelmsford had 
been advocating a reduced role for Britain in Persia anyway, arguing that the current 
policy towards that country was contributing to anti-British feeling in the Muslim 
world that was making the Indian government’s job that much harder. Hence, the 
viceroy’s reply to Montagu: 
Unpleasant though Bolshevism up to our border would be, it is to us 
questionable whether it would be more dangerous than the present position 
                                                 
737
 The foreign secretary ‘had always maintained that force was an adjunct of diplomacy’. Ghani, Reza 
Shah, p. 66. 
 
738
 TNA/FO371/6399/E406, Telegram from Norman to the Foreign Office, 8 Jan. 1921. 
 
739
 TNA/FO371/6400/E1691, Telegram from McMurray to the Foreign Office, 26 Jan. 1921. 
 
740
 TNA/FO371/6400/E1219, Telegram from Montagu to Chelmsford, 18 Jan. 1921. 
 
741
 BL/MSS/Eur/F112/199 (Curzon), Letter from Hardinge to Curzon, 15 Jan. 1921. 
 
177 
 
when...British attitude in Persia is regarded in Moslem Asia, especially in 
Afghanistan and largely in Moslem India, as another example of Britain’s 
crushing of Islam.
742
 
As ever, pan-Islamism and Asian nationalism were of more concern to the Indian 
government than Bolshevism. Thus, the withdrawal of British troops from Persia was 
practically welcomed by the viceroy. Together with the abrogation of the Anglo-
Persian Agreement, Chelmsford no doubt hoped this represented a change in 
Britain’s Persian policy. Indeed, in January 1921 the Indian government made clear 
its intention to end its share of the maintenance of the South Persia Rifles (SPRs), 
effective the end of March.
743
 As the Indian government had been threatening since 
1918 to bring its financial contributions to Persia as a whole to a close, this 
announcement regarding the SPRs should not have been a surprise to the Foreign 
Office. Nevertheless, it helps explain, in part, the animus displayed by Curzon 
towards the Indian government as expressed above. The foreign secretary was not the 
only one unhappy with this decision regarding the SPRs, however. In February 1921, 
the British financial adviser in Tehran, Sydney Armitage-Smith, composed a 
memorandum outlining his opinion on the Persian situation and arguing that the 
SPRs would now play a crucial role in that country following the withdrawal of 
Norperforce:  
I am still not without hope that when the Government of India fully 
understands the hideous results of a complete abandonment of Persia and the 
disruption of the only disciplined force which can maintain law and order, they 
may yet consent to make a further contribution to the upkeep of the South 
Persia Rifles after 31
 
March.
744
 
Like many in the Home government, Armitage-Smith failed to understand the Indian 
government’s perspective on Britain’s Persian relations. As long as the Persian 
government and people were not overtly anti-British to the point of becoming a 
threat, and as long as the southern and south eastern borders were relatively stable, 
Chelmsford and his colleagues were unconcerned with the internal state of that 
country, particularly if such a concern required expenditure of Indian resources – 
                                                 
742
 TNA/FO371/6400/E1196, Telegram from Chelmsford to Montagu, 22 Jan. 1921. 
 
743
 TNA/FO371/6400/E1219, Letter from the India Office to the Foreign Office, 25 Jan. 1921. 
 
744
 TNA/FO371/6401/E1985, Memorandum by Armitage-Smith, 14 Feb. 1921. 
 
178 
 
financial or military. This had been made clear in the original Eastern Committee 
debates in late 1918, and was perhaps the most consistently held view within the 
British government in this period.  
As is hinted at in Armitage-Smith’s statement, the arguments over the 
maintenance of the SPRs represented a wider issue for Britain’s position in Persia at 
this time. And, as John Darwin has pointed out, the main reason the government had 
acquiesced to Curzon’s plans for Persia in 1919 in the first place was that ‘among his 
ministerial colleagues there was...an ignorance, perhaps, of its likely implications, 
financial and military’.745 Now that it had become apparent what maintaining a 
significant presence in Persia was really costing the British government – both 
financially and in terms of reputation – withdrawal was advocated. Some British 
officials now began to believe that if they did not have the military and economic 
means to hold onto a position in the north of that country, then they might as well cut 
their losses and concentrate their limited resources in the south. Winston Churchill 
gave a good summary of this view in February 1921:  
The withdrawal [of Norperforce] from Persia leading to the loss of the 
Northern part of Persia may be attended by the moving of the capital from 
Teheran [sic] to Ispahan. This is surely very much in our interest, but it is 
impossible unless the South Persian Rifles are maintained...It might indeed 
have been impossible for us to hold North Persia as long as an unfriendly and 
uncivilised Russian Government is in existence, but South Persia ought 
certainly not to be thrown away without an effort.
746
 
Although it begs the question as to when was there ever a Russian government that 
would have been happy to see a British hold on north Persia, Churchill’s statement 
appears logical. After all, it was in the south of Persia that British interests had 
traditionally been centred prior to the First World War. Protection of, and access to, 
the oilfields in the south was of vital importance to the British Navy, as the 
Admiralty had reminded the Foreign Office in December 1920.
747
 W.A. Smart, the 
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Oriental Secretary of the British Legation in Tehran, also advocated a shift in focus 
towards the south. Writing in June 1921, Smart argued that by that point the north of 
Persia had become so infested with Bolshevik agents that the British Legation simply 
did not have the resources to counter them. Smart believed the British government 
should be realistic regarding the Persian situation, and retreat south to make its stand 
against the Bolsheviks.
748
 In Armitage-Smith’s words: ‘Let the North have its taste of 
Bolshevik rule; let the experiment of reconstruction be tried in the...South.’749 
However, Curzon, was opposed to the ‘southern policy’, as Brian Pearce has termed 
it.
750
 In a telegram to Norman the foreign secretary asked would ‘not damage to our 
prestige, of which you complain, only be enhanced by a precipitate retreat and 
abandonment of whole of Northern Persia to an enemy, whose advance is by no 
means certain, and a revolution which can probably still be avoided [?]’.751 And for 
once, the Indian government and the foreign secretary appeared to be singing from 
the same hymn sheet. Because, although Delhi’s interests in Persia certainly lay in 
the south, in Chelmsford’s opinion, having ‘a Soviet Government in the north, and a 
Shah Government, supported or dominated by Britain, in the south’, would have an 
equally bad, if not worse effect on India as Britain’s current Persian policy.752 The 
Indian government welcomed the removal of British troops because it saw it as a step 
back from Persian internal affairs; what it did not want is for Britain to simply turn 
its attention from the north to the south of that country. It had been just such an 
attempt to carve up Persia into spheres of influence that had gained the British the 
animosity of the Persian people in the first place. Indeed, the plan as advocated by 
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Churchill of bringing the Persian capital south under British auspices seemed likely 
to cause even more resentment towards Britain than the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
Convention had done. Instead, Delhi would rather leave Persia to its own devices, 
interfering only as far as was necessary to secure the southern borders and protect its 
interests in the south should they be threatened – which was far from the case in 
1921.
753
 
 
It is perhaps no wonder, then, that the Persian government was feeling decidedly 
nervous in 1921. The Red Army landings at Enzeli the previous May had shown that 
it could not rely on British militarily support to protect it from Bolshevik aggression. 
Now, the withdrawal of Norperforce, the disinterestedness in the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement, and the seeming willingness of the British government to abandon north 
Persia to the Bolsheviks as it scuttled south, all combined to leave the Persian 
government feeling somewhat abandoned by Britain. It is, therefore, hardly 
surprising that Zia’eddin or his successors sought the financial and administrative 
help of America, or wanted closer relations with France, or even tried to enlist 
Swedish officers to help organise a national army.
754
 Curzon may have seen this as a 
betrayal towards Britain, but one wonders what other choice Persia really had in 
1921. It was just this lack of choice that would lead to what one would have thought 
was the greatest blow to Curzon’s Persian policy of the entire period – the signing of 
a ‘treaty of friendship’ between Persia and Soviet Russia on 26 February 1921.755 In 
Norman’s opinion, at least, it was Britain’s lack of commitment to Persia that had 
directly contributed to the creation of this treaty. In January the minister had warned 
that the withdrawal ‘of our troops and discontinuance of financial assistance must 
sooner or later involve loss of our influence over Persian Government, who, having 
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nothing to hope for from us, must turn elsewhere for help’.756 In May, he expanded 
further: 
When once we had abandoned the Transcaspian railway, evacuated the 
Caucasus and surrendered control of the Caspian Sea itself, and, still more, 
when our troops had retired before Russian aggression in Ghilan...it was 
obvious that a helpless Persia had no alternative but to negotiate with an enemy 
firmly established on Persian soil.
757
 
Moshaver ul Mamalek, the Persian envoy who had been dispatched to Moscow 
following the Enzeli affair, certainly believed that, should Persia refuse to sign a 
treaty with the Bolsheviks, it would ‘be attacked from all sides, Gilan, Azerbaijan 
and Khorassan. The English will not make any resistance...’758 By signing the treaty, 
the Persian government certainly hoped to convince the Russians to remove their 
troops from northern Persia.
759
 In Survival and Consolidation, Richard Debo 
characterises the Soviet-Persian Treaty as essentially being anti-British, rather than 
pro-Soviet or pro-Persian. Debo argues that the both the Persian and Soviet 
governments were ‘determined to limit British influence in Persia’760 Indeed, it 
would seem that many in the Persian government remained suspicious of the 
Bolshevik regime. The Persian consul general in Georgia believed that ‘All their 
promises are false, and they are only trying to deceive us’,761 while Norman noted 
that Zia’eddin ‘fears Russia, and his nervousness regarding her policy appears to 
increase as Soviet Minister draws nearer to Tehran’.762 Hussein Ala, the Persian 
minister in Washington told the US State Department that the signing of the treaty 
‘does not mean that our country wishes to come under Moscow’s influence or accept 
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Bolshevik doctrines. We were obliged to reach a modus vivendi with a powerful 
neighbour because of territorial closeness.’763 
Whatever the reasons that motivated the Persian government to sign a treaty 
with Soviet Russia, the reaction of the British government, particularly the Foreign 
Office, was somewhat surprising. In contrast to the virulent anti-Bolshevik rhetoric 
that Curzon had used in 1918–1919 to justify his Anglo-Persian agreement, the 
Foreign Office response to news of the Soviet-Persian treaty was somewhat muted. 
When the treaty was published in the Manchester Guardian in March 1921, Oliphant 
described the document as ‘absurd’. As he pointed out (somewhat amusedly), if 
Article I of the agreement (which renounced all prior treaties between Russia and 
Persia) was to be taken literally, it would mean the surrender to Persia of practically 
all of the Caucasus.
764
 In the opinion of George Churchill, the treaty was ‘probably 
meant by the Soviet Government as a piece of propaganda...and they probably know 
that it will never be much more than a piece of paper...British interests are not 
directly affected by the treaty.’765 Such calm acceptance of what one would have 
thought was a huge blow to Britain’s position in Persia is perhaps indicative of the 
level of indifference the Foreign Office seemed to have towards that country by 
1921. It also inevitably leads to a questioning of Curzon’s motives in 1918–1919, 
when he  had seemed so fiercely against allowing a Soviet presence within Persia to 
develop. Was the foreign secretary simply using the spectre of Bolshevism then as a 
convenient excuse to justify extending Britain’s influence within Persia? For it seems 
that once the possibility of British hegemony over Persia had been completely laid to 
rest, Curzon was nonchalant about the threat of Bolshevism to Persia.  
Or, perhaps, it was simply a case of sour grapes. Indeed, when in April 1921 
the Bolshevik-inspired rebels in Gilan unexpectedly opened fire on the Cossack 
Division, the British Foreign Office seemed almost smug in its reaction. While the 
Soviet government denied it had any involvement in the events in north Persia,
766
 
Oliphant noted that ‘the Russians are coming out in their true colours and the 
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Persians will rue the day of their famous treaty’.767 When, in May, Norman 
suggested that Britain use the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement to bring pressure to 
bear on the Bolsheviks regarding Persia, the Foreign Office declined.
768
 The 
cynicism of that department towards the Persian government seemed to have now 
developed into something near malevolence. Having refused Britain’s help, Persia 
was to be left to face the machinations of the Bolshevik regime on its own, while the 
Foreign Office looked on. In his speech to the House of Lords in July 1921, Curzon 
characterised the Persian government as being now willing ‘to accept the caresses of 
the Soviet Government’. ‘Caresses’, he noted wryly, ‘which usually end up by 
strangling those to whom they are applied’.769 In the same month Robert Lindsay in 
the Foreign Office noted that: ‘The Bolsheviks are pursuing towards Persia their 
usual policy pursued towards Bokhara, Georgia, and Great Britain. They make a 
treaty, then set up some other Power – Azerbaijan, Soviet Armenia, or the Third 
International over whom they profess to have no control, to tear it up.’770 However, 
perhaps the Persian government was not in such a predicament as the Foreign Office 
believed. In late November 1921, Moscow addressed two letters to the Persian 
government, complaining that the Soviet–Persian Treaty had still not been ratified by 
the Medjliss.
771
 The reply from Persia was that the delay was due to ‘difficulties in 
certain clauses’.772 As Reginald Bridgeman of the British Legation in Tehran noted 
in his telegram to the Foreign Office, ‘it looks as if fate of Anglo-Persian agreement 
may overtake Russo-Persian [one]’.773 Perhaps, then, it was the Persian government 
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which had played Soviet Russia off against Britain, and was now having the last 
laugh.
774
 
 
Quid Pro Quo  
One place in which the combined forces of Bolshevism, Islamism and nationalism 
can be clearly seen in 1921 is Afghanistan. In this year India was to conclude an 
official treaty with its neighbour, a project made particularly difficult as the Indian 
government found itself negotiating with both Kabul and London at the same time, 
as well as trying to outmanoeuvre Moscow as it looked to secure its own treaty with 
the emir. Indeed, it is through examining the Afghan debates of 1921 that some of 
the fundamental differences between London and Delhi can be seen. In essence, the 
divergence lay in what each government believed to be the best way of securing the 
future of the empire. For the Indian government, having a friendly and stable ally in 
Kabul was essential for two main reasons. First, the viceroy and his council were 
adamant throughout this period that a treaty of friendship with Afghanistan would be 
important to the stability of India, not only in that it would help quell the tribal unrest 
on its borders, but because it would remove some of the impetus of the pan-Islamic 
movement. Secondly, it was believed that by such a treaty, Britain would be able to 
counter any Soviet presence within Afghanistan and prevent its neighbour from 
becoming a conduit for the dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda and agents into 
India. Crucially, the Indian government believed these points to be intertwined and 
therefore of equal importance – so that the welfare of India was as reliant on having 
Afghanistan as a friendly Muslim neighbour as it was of having an Afghanistan free 
from Bolshevik dominance. 
 One such example of the critical role that country played in India’s security 
is when M.N. Roy suggested a plan to Moscow in 1920 to march a Russian ‘army of 
liberation’ into India through Afghan territory. This audacious scheme was defeated, 
however, when the emir made it quite clear that he would not allow Russian troops to 
enter his country.
775
 The ability of Afghanistan to be friend or foe was, therefore, 
something of which the Indian government was keenly aware, and in order to make 
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friends, it was willing to acquiesce in whatever diplomatic games Kabul wanted to 
play. For the Home government, however, uppermost in its concerns was that Britain 
should not appear to lose prestige in its dealings with Afghanistan. That a friendly 
Afghanistan was important to India was acknowledged in London, but did not appear 
to be as crucial a factor as it did in Delhi. The Home government was unwilling to 
pay the price of what it deemed was Britain’s imperial dignity in order to gain the 
friendship of the Afghan emir. Indeed, it seems that, in 1921, the Home government 
looked upon its Afghan relations as something of a test-case for the strength of 
Britain’s diplomatic influence in south Asia in general. This is particularly apparent 
when it came to the problem of Afghanistan’s relationship with Soviet Russia. 
While, for the Indian government, the problems of pan-Islamism and Asian 
nationalism were just as (if not more) important than that of Bolshevism, for the 
Home government, combating Bolshevik influence within Afghanistan was 
paramount. In this way, Afghanistan was viewed as a diplomatic battleground by 
London; a show-down of the political strength of Soviet Russia versus that of the 
British Empire.  
 
As may be recalled, the discussions conducted between the Afghan and British 
representatives in Mussoorie in 1920 had been largely seen as a preliminary to the 
negotiation of an official treaty of friendship between the two nations. As such it was 
suggested by Amanullah at the end of 1920 that a British delegation travel to Kabul 
to resume talks. However, if the Home government had been sceptical about the 
Mussoorie conference, it disapproved entirely of this proposal. For London was 
aware that, in October 1920, an Afghan representative, Muhammad Wali Khan, had 
been despatched to Moscow to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet 
government.
776
 In the eyes of some British officials, signing an agreement with 
Russia, while negotiating another with India, appeared too much like the traditional 
Afghan technique of playing one of its neighbouring countries off against the other (a 
definite legacy of the Great Game). To Whitehall, a mission sent to Kabul would risk 
being exposed ‘to humiliation and misrepresentation’. Nevertheless, in the final 
debate, the Home government was unwilling to overrule the Indian government and 
                                                 
776
 The Soviet–Afghan Treaty of Friendship was duly signed in Moscow on 28 February 1921. 
Degras, SDFP, pp. 233–235. However, it would take a number of months for Afghanistan to ratify it, 
during which time Delhi and Kabul wrangled over both this and their own treaty. 
 
186 
 
authorised the Kabul mission, should the viceroy insist on it.
777
 (Although 
Chelmsford was somewhat hurt that his policy had ‘not secured the whole-hearted 
support of His Majesty’s Government’).778 
Afghan duplicity aside, one of the main concerns for Britain, when it came to 
a Soviet-Afghan treaty, was what practical gains the Soviet government could make 
from such an agreement. As Montagu noted, the Bolsheviks were not ‘going to agree 
to pay the Afghans money from mere love of Afghanistan’.779 The biggest worry for 
Britain was to be Article V of the treaty, which allowed Soviet Russia to open 
consulates close to the Indian frontier, including at Kandahar, for example.
780
 It was 
undoubted that such establishments would become centres of Bolshevik intrigue 
directed south, towards India, and both Delhi and London agreed that these 
consulates should not be allowed to open.
781
 For the Home government, as important 
as the practical issue of the consulates, however, were the political ramifications of a 
friendship between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. For many British government 
figures imbued with Great Game thinking, it was simply inconceivable that 
Afghanistan could maintain equally friendly relations with both Russia and India. 
History dictated that one or other nation had to be dominant in Afghanistan; 
London’s biggest fear was finding itself in the subordinate role. It was this worry that 
led the Home government to demand, as a prerequisite to negotiating a treaty with 
Britain, that the Afghan government make a full disclosure of any agreement it had 
with Soviet Russia. Rather than wanting to know the details of what was contained 
within the document, the Home government saw this as a matter of principal.
782
 As 
Montagu explained to Chelmsford, compliance with this demand was to be viewed as 
evidence of Afghan good faith towards Britain.
783
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The problem, however, lay with the idea that the British government was in a 
position to make such a demand of the Afghan government in the first place. While 
there were certainly advantages for Kabul in gaining a treaty of friendship with 
Britain, Afghanistan was by no means in a position of desperation. Not only did it 
now have Soviet Russia as an ally and potential source of funds and military 
supplies, but it was also busy making friends with the likes of Turkey and Persia; a 
Turko-Afghan treaty being concluded on 1 March 1921, followed in June by an 
agreement with Tehran.
784
 Afghanistan also had less to fear from India than since 
before the First World War. The Afghan government could be relatively certain that 
the current weakness of its military meant the Indian government would only use 
force against its neighbour if extremely provoked. The ability to incite the tribes on 
India’s borders to unrest against the Indian government was also a crucial advantage 
to Afghanistan. And, as the Afghan delegation pointed out to Dobbs, it was also 
aware that ‘almost the whole world [is] hostile to Great Britain. All Musalmans are 
against you over the Khilafat question. You are in trouble in India.’785 Thus, 
Afghanistan could have confidence when it was negotiating with India in 1921: 
All the Islamic world looks to us and considers us the leaders of Islam. We 
shall be taking a great burden on ourselves if we make friendship with you, and 
must have a substantial quid pro quo which will satisfy our people. You are in 
great need of our friendship, for if you make friends with us, India will turn 
towards you.
786
 
Naturally, Dobbs tried to disabuse the Afghans of this belief by arguing that 
‘Afghanistan needs British friendship far more than Great Britain needs hers. You 
are a small country between two big Powers. You have to be very careful.’787 Such 
public bravado between the two delegations was inevitable. In reality, Afghanistan 
and India probably had an equal need for the friendship of each other – a fact that the 
Home government failed to recognise but of which the Indian government was well 
aware. In the opinion of Delhi, Britain was faced with two choices (other than 
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another Afghan war): to accept working alongside the Bolsheviks within 
Afghanistan, or to remain entirely detached from that country. As Chelmsford put it: 
‘The exclusive domination of Afghanistan, which we should doubtless much prefer, 
has been rendered impossible by development of events unless we go to war’.788 It 
was the first course that the Indian government would much prefer, and as such 
would push for in 1921. As for Afghan duplicity, Chelmsford explained in March 
1921 that ‘as much as we may object to Amir’s trying to get the utmost out of both 
sides without committing himself against either, it is not in our power to object 
effectively’.789 This was the reality of the situation in Delhi’s eyes and, as such, in its 
opinion, Britain could not afford to be sensitive or overly demanding when it came to 
its negotiations with Afghanistan.  
Unfortunately for the Government of India, the Home government did not 
agree with its judgement of the Afghan situation in 1921. Indeed, there were some in 
London who could still not accept that it was out of Britain’s power to hold sway 
over Afghanistan’s foreign relations. In February 1921, in response to a draft treaty 
Chelmsford proposed to offer the emir, Montagu suggested that the viceroy: 
should consider the possibility of adding some provision such as that it will be 
open to [the] Government of India to offer [the] Afghan Government, and for 
the Afghan Government to ask of the Government of India, advice in a friendly 
way in regard to foreign relations of Afghanistan.
790
  
This, despite the persistent argument from the Indian government that it had 
absolutely no chance of gaining any such concession from Afghanistan. In spite of 
the viceroy’s best efforts, London still either did not understand or refused to accept 
the changes that had overcome that nation since the Third Anglo-Afghan War. In all 
of their negotiations, Amanullah and his government were fiercely protective of their 
new found independence in foreign relations and highly-sensitive to any perceived 
encroachment upon it. Indeed, part of the reason that the Afghan delegation 
continually refused to disclose the details of its treaty with Soviet Russia, as 
demanded by the Home government, was that this was deemed an affront to their 
country’s independence in conducting its foreign affairs. As Chelmsford tried to 
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explain, ‘It is Afghanistan’s determination to parade her complete independence and 
she will not be driven from this attitude by anything short of war’.791 It is with this in 
mind that the viceroy argued that failure of the Afghans to disclose the terms of the 
Soviet–Afghan treaty should not result in a breakdown of Dobbs’ negotiations. As he 
explained further, ‘if we now attempt to base our policy on what is not any longer 
practical politics we shall not secure a Treaty. We shall be playing into the hands of 
the Bolsheviks, leaving them a free field and a very fruitful field for machinations 
directed against us.’792  
Nevertheless, the India Office disagreed and, in March 1921, the matter was 
brought to the Cabinet. During the discussion ‘stress was laid on the extent of the 
concessions we had offered the Amir, including the raising of the subsidy...and, 
above all, the surrender of our control over Afghan foreign policy, all of which 
justified us in insisting on a substantial quid pro quo’.793 (The fact that the Home 
government saw the end of its control over Afghan foreign affairs as a ‘concession’ 
is telling: as if it had given up this privilege out of magnanimity and not necessity.) 
The decision was taken to instruct Dobbs not to sign any agreement with Afghanistan 
until the Cabinet had had a chance to consider the terms of the Soviet–Afghan 
Treaty.
794
 For Chelmsford, this was highly irritating. What the viceroy had tried to 
point out was that the only way Britain could obtain the concessions it was insisting 
on was through force of arms and, since it was ‘on India and Indian resources, 
financial and militarily, that the brunt would fall’ of any such campaign against 
Afghanistan, the Indian government thus had the right to be listened to.
795
 As 
Chelmsford complained to Montagu, the Indian government should be given more 
freedom in its dealings with Afghanistan, while those in London should trust those in 
Delhi to make the right decisions.
796
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Such concerns were soon no longer Chelmsford’s, however, as in April 1921 Lord 
Reading replaced him as viceroy. The relationship between Montagu and Chelmsford 
had always been slightly strained. The foreign secretary believed the viceroy was 
‘cold, aloof and reserved’, describing him once as ‘rather sloppy ice’.797 For his part, 
Chelmsford often struggled to understand Montagu’s erratic and depressive 
temperament.
798
 As he explained to the secretary of state in 1918: ‘We are built on 
different lines; you are full of imagination and impulse, I am prosaic and cautious.’799 
During their correspondence, Montagu would often complain of the 
misunderstandings and apparent lack of affinity between himself and his viceroy.
800
 
By 1921, this contrast in temperaments had led to such a deterioration in their  
relationship that Montagu was relieved to have Reading heading out to India in 
Chelmsford’s place.801  
Unfortunately for Chelmsford, Montagu was apparently not the only one to 
be happy at his leaving office. Among the population of India, the viceroy seems to 
have been generally unpopular.
802
 The Indian commentator, Akshaya K. Ghose, for 
example, delivered a scathing attack upon him at the time of his retirement: ‘A weak, 
tactless and incompetent ruler – for that is the verdict of History – Lord Chelmsford 
leaves India in April 1921. India will breathe a sigh of relief!’803 Another (slightly 
more generous) contemporary, believed that ‘Chelmsford’s lack of ideas of his own, 
his sound if cautious judgement, his coolness in all circumstances and his respect for 
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orderly administration, contrasted sharply with Montagu’s under-disciplined 
initiatives and constant state of excitement’.804  
Yet, the criticisms made of Chelmsford have often been contradictory. On the 
one hand, he is portrayed as a lack lustre viceroy – weak and unimaginative and 
dominated by his council. Hugh Tinker has described Chelmsford as a ‘mediocrity’, 
for instance,
805
 while others have categorised him as merely and administrator and an 
agent rather that a policy maker.
806
 Reading was also inclined to believed that 
Chelmsford ‘was too disposed to tread conventional lines and was apparently 
apprehensive of any action for which there was no precedent...’807 However, he was 
also blamed by the likes of Ghose for all the trouble to have beset India in this 
period, and for the violence and acts of repression that occurred during his tenure as 
viceroy. Thus, although apparently ruled by his council, it is Chelmsford that takes 
the fall for all of the Indian government’s failures in these years – and is given no 
credit for its successes.  
One has to feel some sympathy for Chelmsford. For it is undoubted that he 
faced one of the most difficult periods of British rule in India, caught as he was 
between the Conservatives in London, who opposed too many concessions to the 
Indian people, and those Liberals and Indian agitators who pushed for greater reform 
to the rule of the Raj. This is not to mention his having to continually battle with the 
Home government over Britain’s Asian policy at large, while also desperately 
keeping a lid on Muslim and nationalist agitation and Bolshevik sedition. The post-
war period was a time of high tension between those on the different ends of the 
political spectrum and if Chelmsford was inclined towards caution in his work, 
perhaps that was the necessary strategy, given his need to placate so many disparate 
groups. Chelmsford himself was aware of the accusation of weakness that were being 
made against him:  
I am told that people say that my Council run me. I am indifferent to that 
accusation...I think you will own that I had only to lift my little finger and I 
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could have obtained dissent from the majority of the proposals to which you 
and I with certainly the bulk of my colleagues have given agreement.
808
  
P.G. Robb tends to be more positive towards the viceroy than others have been. In 
particular, Robb argues that while Chelmsford did, indeed, like to find a consensus 
within his council before taking action on certain matters, that actually this was an 
astute way of governing: ‘a method of the future rather than the past, of devolution 
rather than autocracy’.809 Others have also been more generous to Chelmsford than 
the likes of Ghose. One report written in 1921, for example, summed up his tenure 
thus: ‘To few Governor-Generals has it been given to accomplish so much towards 
the enduring welfare of their great charge; to fewer yet has the meed of praise and 
appreciation been so scantily rendered.’810  
 
Nevertheless, whether it was justified or not, Montagu certainly appeared happier to 
have Reading as his viceroy, always referring to him by his first name, Rufus, in 
their correspondence (which he had not done with Chelmsford) and continually 
praising his work in India.
811
 For his part, while he may have been more adept at 
coping with Montagu’s particular personality, Reading did not actually differ greatly 
in his policies from that which had been followed by Chelmsford.
812
 Hence, the 
Afghan negotiations continued along the same path as they had under the ex-
viceroy’s direction. In fact, it was in this same month that Reading took office in 
Delhi that the Indian government heard encouraging news from Kabul. Since the 
Rawalpindi negotiations in 1919, the Indian delegation had been trying to uncouple 
Afghanistan from Soviet Russia, constantly intimating to the emir that the Bolshevik 
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regime could not be trusted. In March 1921, Dobbs even presented Amanullah with 
information gathered by British intelligence demonstrating the duplicity of the 
Bolsheviks towards Afghanistan.
813
 (Likewise, when news had reached Malleson in 
Meshed that the Afghans had sent letters and presents to the anti-Bolshevik rebels of 
Ferghana, he made sure to let the Soviet government know.)
814
  
These attempts to drive a wedge between the two countries appeared to have 
finally succeeded when, on 12 April, Dobbs reported that the Afghans wanted to 
comply with Britain’s wishes, but could only risk throwing over the Soviets if they 
could get reassurance of support against any backlash from Moscow.
815
 Two days 
later, Dobbs repeated a conversation he had had with Amanullah, who had admitted 
plainly that he had tied himself up with the Bolsheviks because Britain would not 
make friendship quickly enough and that he was now in a mess.
816
 By 20 April, the 
Afghan government was apparently very doubtful that it could ratify the agreement 
with Soviet Russia, since the latter were not sincere in their promises of not 
interfering in Khiva’s and Bokhara’s internal affairs.817 For, while Soviet Russia had 
orchestrated the removal of Khan Abd Allah and Emir Amil, it had always 
maintained that it had merely been helping the Khivan and Bokharan people to attain 
freedom from their autocratic rulers. Thus, article VIII of the Russo-Afghan treaty 
had recognised ‘The actual independence and freedom of Bukhara and Khiva, 
whatever form of government may be in existence there’. Yet, throughout 1921 the 
Bolshevik government would gradually gain greater authority over the regimes in the 
two new Soviet republics, so that by 1923 Bokhara and Khiva had gone from 
subordinate allies of Soviet Russia to ‘thoroughly controlled satellites’.818 
Unfortunately for Amanullah the phrasing of article VIII did not afford him much 
recourse to prevent Bolshevik actions in Central Asia. By April 1921 then, Mahmud 
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Tarzi, the Afghan foreign minister, was asking outright whether Britain would 
support Afghanistan should a rupture with Russia take place.
819
 
The Home government immediately seized on this chance. On 22 April, 
Dobbs was instructed by Montagu to inform the emir that if he repudiated the treaty 
signed with Russia, and agreed to consult Britain before embarking on any more 
foreign agreements, Britain would give him the arms, money and assistance asked 
for. As the secretary of state explained to Reading:  
By such means as these we get our treaty of friendship, in the East we appear 
as the protector of an independent Moslem State against aggression and...we 
once again by the act of the Amir get a position of influence, if not of authority, 
over Afghan foreign relations. 
Furthermore, Montagu noted, Curzon was also ‘in full agreement with this view’ 
(clearly, the foreign secretary was still somehow clinging to the idea of forming a 
‘Moslem nexus of states’ around India).820 By the end of April, Montagu reiterated 
his consent ‘to any offer of money and arms, and assurance of support, which the 
Government of India would be prepared to give to secure [a] complete break with 
[the] Bolsheviks’.821 The new viceroy, however, was sceptical, believing Dobbs was 
‘unduly optimistic over [the] Afghans’ willingness to throw over [the] Russian 
treaty’.822 In a long telegram to Montagu, summarising the entire Afghan situation 
from his point of view, Reading explained the impossibility of completely purging 
Afghanistan of Bolshevik influence.
823
 Even if Amanullah was to overthrow the 
Russian treaty, this would not necessarily mean the removal of the Soviet 
representative at Kabul, which would still allow the Bolsheviks to stir up anti-British 
feeling among the Afghan public. As he reiterated a few days later: 
I recognise that if we could make a clean sweep of the Bolshevik Treaty and of 
Bolshevik influence from Afghanistan, it would be a serious check for the 
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Bolsheviks and a valuable diplomatic triumph...But it is essential to get a clear-
cut idea what it is possible for us to buy.
824
 
It would appear, then, that the new viceroy was apt to be as cautious when it came to 
the issue of Afghanistan and Bolshevik sedition as his predecessor had been. 
Montagu responded: 
In order to achieve the object of getting rid of both the Bolshevik Treaty and 
the Bolsheviks themselves we would agree to, and indeed urge, your going to 
the very limit of your financial capacity in this direction. ...we would urge you 
not to put too low a limit upon the expenditure necessary for the production of 
a result so greatly to be desired.
825
 
Despite Reading’s doubts, the temptation to reinstate Britain’s hegemony over 
Afghanistan was just too much for Montagu and the Home government. On 10 May, 
a meeting of the Cabinet decided ‘that an effort should be made to offer Afghanistan 
sufficient inducement in money and arms to make her throw over the Bolshevik 
Treaty entirely’.826  
 
Through the summer of 1921, then, Dobbs attempted to pin the Afghan government 
down to an ‘exclusive agreement’, as it became known, with offers of a subsidy, 
airplanes, telegraph equipment and munitions, in the event of Russia making an 
unprovoked attack upon Afghanistan.
827
 However, the Afghan government 
procrastinated over this commitment, asking for the treaty with Britain to be signed 
and the munitions delivered before it cancelled the agreement with Russia.
828
 In July, 
with still no exclusive treaty signed, Dobbs suggested that Amanullah could simply 
be playing a game: drawing out the negotiations until its treaty with Soviet Russia 
could be ratified and it had received Soviet aid, at which point it would break off 
with Britain.
829
 Reading was a little more gracious towards the Afghan government, 
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believing that the real reason behind its procrastination was its reluctance to face a 
definite break with Russia.
830
 As the viceroy had noted, even if Soviet Russia did not 
attack Afghanistan militarily, pressure would undoubtedly increase on the emir 
should he sign an exclusive treaty, as the Bolsheviks would no doubt claim that he 
had sold out his country to Britain.
831
 Whatever the reasons, by the end of July it had 
become clear that despite Dobbs’ efforts ‘there is now little hope of [the] Afghans 
accepting [an] exclusive treaty’.832  
Reading began, instead, to advocate a pis aller (‘last resort’) agreement – a 
treaty which would prevent Bolshevik consulates being established near India’s 
frontiers, but would not insist on Kabul making a complete break with Moscow. In 
return, Britain would still offer the emir munitions and a (albeit reduced) subsidy.
833
 
However, reluctant to lose the possibility of an exclusive treaty, on 5 August 1921 
the Cabinet expressed its disapproval of Reading’s suggestion, ‘which, it was felt, 
conceded too much, obtained too little, and, if offered by Sir Henry Dobbs, would be 
the extreme limit of humiliation for the British Empire’.834 During the meeting, 
attention was paid to ‘well-informed’ articles in the Manchester Guardian which 
indicated that the reluctance of Afghanistan to sign an exclusive treaty with Britain 
was less to do with fear of the Bolsheviks than with pan-Islamic pressure. In the 
Cabinet’s opinion, therefore, the current Greek successes over Turkey would soon 
weaken the pan-Islamic movement and make the Afghan government more willing to 
sign an exclusive treaty.
835
 That the Cabinet appeared more prepared to listen to a 
newspaper than the Indian government when it came to Afghanistan would be 
surprising were this any other Cabinet. Nevertheless, when the Afghan government 
finally decided to ratify the Soviet treaty, in late August 1921, the issue of the 
exclusive treaty became a moot point.
836
 The Home government now became willing 
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to consider a pis aller agreement, but reverted back to the original proviso that the 
Afghans make full disclosure of their relations with Soviet Russia.
837
 The disclosure 
of its dealings with Moscow was still a contentious matter with the Afghan 
government, however. In a outright rude letter, the Afghan foreign secretary, Tarzi, 
refused Dobbs’ demand to see the agreement, telling him instead that he could read 
its terms in the newspapers.
838
 Anglo-Afghan relations appeared to be taking a turn 
for the worse. 
For the Indian government, the inability of the Home government to temper 
its demands was extremely frustrating. The worst possible scenario in its eyes was 
for Dobbs to leave Kabul without any form of an agreement. As Reading explained 
to Montagu: ‘If I am insistent it is because of my desire to avoid failure, which would 
stimulate Mohammedans and other extremists in India, and would necessitate 
continued heavy military expenditure, with all its opportunities for creating [a] 
troublesome position with [the] Legislature.’839 Furthermore, for the Indian 
government, the pan-Islamic and nationalistic sentiment that was amassing in South 
Asia and being directed against the British empire was another crucial reason for 
fixing its relations with Afghanistan: 
We are supposed by Moslem India to be bent upon crushing Turkey...We are 
supposed to have turned against Persia after failing to impose our domination 
upon her... This being so, failure to make [a] treaty of friendship with 
Afghanistan would be regarded by Moslem India as further proof of a fixed 
policy of antagonism to independent Moslem nations.
840
 
Desperate to try to convince London of the need to find a resolution to the situation, 
the viceroy even enlisted the help of his key officials, including the chief 
commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, Sir John Maffey, who entirely 
agreed with Reading’s justifications for wanting a treaty of friendship with 
Afghanistan.
841
 Montagu had no hesitation, however, in dismissing the Indian 
                                                 
837
 TNA/FO371/6748/N10093, Telegram from Montagu to Reading, 2 Sept. 1921. 
 
838
 TNA/FO371/6768/N10112, Telegram from Reading to Montagu, 30 Aug. 1921.  
 
839
 TNA/FO371/6749/N11732, Telegram from Reading to Montagu, 17 Oct. 1921. 
 
840
 TNA/FO371/6749/N12229, Telegram from Reading to Montagu, 1 Nov. 1921. 
 
841
 TNA/FO371/6749/N11920, Telegram from Maffey to Reading, 23 Oct. 1921. 
 
198 
 
government’s protests, arguing that he was simply unconvinced that a breach with 
Afghanistan would have such a negative impact on India, or that a pis aller treaty 
would have such positive effects.
842
 When the Cabinet met again, on 3 November, to 
discuss the issue, it concurred with Montagu’s judgement: no pis aller agreement 
was to be negotiated without disclosure of the Soviet-Afghan treaty.
843
 
 
But why were Montagu and the Cabinet determined to follow a course of action so 
contrary to the advice of Delhi? When it came to the Soviet–Afghan treaty, for 
example, the Home government was actually well aware of its terms, not only from 
its own intelligence sources but from having been furnished with a copy by the 
Bolshevik diplomat, Leonid Krasin, during his stay in London to negotiate the trade 
agreement. This, then, was not about the practicalities of knowing if the treaty 
contained terms problematic to Britain. Rather, the Home government had decided to 
make the agreement a point of principle, an issue over which it quite simply refused 
to back down. In essence, these protracted debates between London and Delhi are a 
clear demonstration of what has been noted above – namely that each government 
placed a different value on Britain’s relations with Afghanistan in this period. While, 
for the Indian government, stability within India and on its frontiers was paramount, 
for the Home government the issue with Afghanistan was clearly one of prestige. 
Indeed, Afghanistan appeared almost to be a testing ground for London for seeing 
whether Britain could still retain an authority in South Asia. As was discussed in the 
Introduction, prestige was the currency of the British Empire – if Kabul could not be 
brought to heel, this could prove a bad omen to Britain’s imperial future. As Reading 
noted quite aptly, in a letter to Montagu in August 1921: ‘I wish...I had been better 
able to understand from the telegrams what was in the Cabinet’s mind...The adjective 
“humiliating” I suppose gives the key.’844 
Indeed, for the Home government, Afghanistan appeared to represent the last 
area in South Asia where it had a chance to remain a dominant force. In Persia, 
Britain’s attempts to attain hegemony had failed; in India its rule was being daily 
challenged by the likes of Gandhi and others; even in Turkey, although the military 
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situation in the ongoing Greco–Turkish War had recently swung in Greece’s favour, 
the signing of a treaty between Moscow and the nationalist regime at Ankara was a 
further reminder of Britain’s waning influence in this area of the world.845 Worse 
still, it would seem everywhere British officials looked, not only was its own position 
faltering, but Soviet Russia was actually on the ascendancy. So confident did 
Moscow appear by 1921, that it was flagrantly ignoring the terms of the trade 
agreement with Britain, much to the chagrin of men such as Curzon.
846
 All was 
compounded by the embarrassing fallout following the despatch of the note of 
protest to the Soviet government in September 1921 over its agreement violation. 
When the Soviet reply came back, it unsurprisingly contained a denial of all that the 
British government had accused it.
847
 Unfortunately for Curzon, it turned out that 
much of the evidence on which the note of protest had been based was actually rather 
shaky and that which was reliable was too sensitive to be made public.
848
 The foreign 
secretary was said to be ‘appalled’ at the situation in which he had now been placed. 
Not only had his objections to the Soviet trade agreement been overruled in the first 
place, but now he had been put into the position and faced ‘the odium of having 
made public charges which I cannot sustain’.849  
It could be postulated, then, that one reason the Home government was so 
stubborn over the Afghan negotiations was because, when faced with failure and 
humiliation elsewhere, it could not cope with the same results in Afghanistan. Much 
like with Persia, when the Afghans appeared to be rejecting the British proffer of 
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friendship in the form of the exclusive treaty, London became intractable. This time, 
however, it was not simply Curzon proving difficult. Montagu was adamant that 
more could be extracted from Kabul than the Indian government would gain with the 
pis aller treaty. Nevertheless, that the secretary of state was being influenced by the 
foreign secretary is clear from the statement noted above regarding Curzon’s 
agreement with his course of action. Montagu had taken Curzon’s side against 
Chelmsford when it came to the Persian agreement of 1919 – now he appeared to be 
doing the same over Afghanistan. And yet, considering his mistakes in Persia, it is 
surprising that the foreign secretary still appeared to command such authority over 
his colleagues. The Times newspaper certainly recognised the seeming contradiction 
here, criticising Curzon for his involvement in Afghan affairs: 
The Anglo-Persian Agreement fiasco should convince the British Cabinet, 
despite the influence of Lord Curzon, whose great knowledge of the East is out 
of date and tends to confirm his pro-consular attitude – an attitude unjustified 
now, when modern notions of self-determination have spread even to the 
pastoral ruggedness of Afghanistan.
850
 
Why the head of the India Office did not recognise what the Times and the Indian 
government did, is perplexing. 
 
Indeed, the Times was not the only one to question Curzon’s apparent expertise in 
South Asian affairs. At the end of 1920, the decision had been taken by Cabinet to 
create a new Middle Eastern Department but to place it within the Colonial Office, 
rather than the Foreign Office.
851
 Unsurprisingly, Curzon took this as a personal 
affront, and commenced on a battle of wills with the secretary of state for colonial 
affairs, Winston Churchill. Difficulties arose almost immediately over the exact 
remit of the new department, with Curzon complaining in a letter to his wife in 
February 1921 that he had spent the day arguing with Churchill in Cabinet over the 
Middle East: ‘He wants to grab everything into his new Dept, and to be a sort of 
Asiatic Foreign Secretary. I absolutely declined to agree with this...’852 Two days 
later, Churchill informed his own wife: ‘Curzon will give me lots of trouble and have 
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to be half flattered and half overborne. We overlap horribly. I do not think he is 
much good.’853 For the foreign secretary, matters became worse when Churchill 
began to insist on making speeches within and outside of Cabinet on issues relating 
to foreign affairs. As Curzon complained to Lloyd George, in June 1921: ‘I have for 
some time been a good deal disturbed at Winston’s unauthorised and sometimes not 
too helpful incursions into Foreign affairs which do not render my task or position 
any the more easy...’854 While the prime minister agreed with Curzon ‘that it is most 
improper and dangerous for any Minister [other than the foreign secretary] to make a 
pronouncement upon questions of foreign policy’, there was little he could do to 
temper Churchill.
855
 When Curzon complained directly to the colonial secretary,
856
 
he simply received the dismissive reply that Churchill, always spoke ‘with very great 
care on these matters’.857 Curzon, however, was not prepared to let the issue rest, 
countering that he could not ‘admit that the Minister of a Dept other than that of 
Foreign Affairs has any right without consultation with the FO to make speeches on 
Foreign Affairs, merely because he holds strong views upon them...’858  
Such protests appeared to fall on deaf ears, however, since in November 
1921, Curzon had cause yet again to complain of Churchill’s behaviour: ‘I find it 
very difficult to conduct foreign affairs at all under the conditions which are 
constantly created, not infrequently by yourself at Cabinet meetings.’859 Such 
problems with Churchill compounded what was already a trying time for Curzon. 
The foreign secretary’s speech to the House of Lords in July, in which he had 
confessed experiencing a feeling of ‘disappointment, almost of despair’ at the 
situation in Persia, certainly had an element of truth to it.
860
 Given his self-promotion 
as an expert on Persia, the failure of the Anglo-Persian agreement represented both a 
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professional and personal blow. By the end of 1921, then, Curzon’s ego was feeling 
quite bruised. This may go some way to explaining the foreign secretary’s sensitivity 
towards Churchill’s actions that year, as well as the apparent mood of sulkiness 
towards all things Persia and his stubbornness when it came to Afghanistan (for it is 
apparent that he was an influence on Montagu in this regard). Nevertheless, Curzon 
rarely accepted fault for anything, but instead complained that ‘the responsibility for 
all the catastrophes that impend in Persia is that of the War Office to begin with, the 
India Office in the second place, and the Cabinet in the third’. In a letter to his 
replacement in Tehran, however, Norman put forth a very different account of 
Curzon’s actions in 1921. He reminded his successor how lucky he was: 
You have not been called upon to push through an impossible and insane 
policy, been loaded with the most virulent abuse because you could not do it, 
and been thwarted at every turn when you tried to save your official chief from 
the consequences of his own vanity and folly.
861
 
 
The Year of the Treaty 
This chapter started with questions surrounding the notion of change in Britain’s 
foreign policy in 1921. Was this year a turning point for Britain? In the year of the 
treaty, did these numerous documents produced between Britain, Soviet Russia, 
Afghanistan and Persia actually change the dynamic within South Asia? In practical 
terms, yes. The signing of a treaty between Moscow and Tehran, for instance, meant 
that from 1921 onwards, a Bolshevik envoy would now receive full recognition from 
the Persian government – no longer were Lenin and his comrades international 
pariahs. The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement may not have been a watershed in 
relations between those two countries, but it did mark a begrudging acceptance by 
the British government that it could not continue to ignore the Soviet government. In 
Afghanistan too, things were to change to an extent. Despite the unreasonable 
demands of the Home government, Dobbs was finally able to negotiate an agreement 
with the emir in November 1921 – one that even resolved the thorny issue of Soviet 
consulates.
862
 Now that Afghanistan was an independent country in all its external 
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affairs, it also insisted that following this treaty all its future relations with Britain 
were to be conducted through the Foreign Office in London, just as any other 
sovereign nation, as opposed to through Delhi. This meant that, at least superficially, 
from 1921 the Foreign Office was now to have control over Britain’s Afghan policy. 
While care was taken by Montagu to set up a system whereby the India Office still 
retained a final (albeit surreptitious) say over Afghan affairs, it was inevitable that 
after 1921 the Indian government would lose some of the little freedom of action it 
had had in Afghanistan.
863
 
Psychologically, however, there were many British officials who struggled to 
cope with these developments. Curzon, for example, resented the position Britain 
was now in in Persia, and the move towards a southern policy, but found himself 
powerless to do anything about it. Rather than admit his mistakes and adjust his 
policies accordingly, Curzon expressed his frustration with bitter remonstration 
against those he felt had personally affronted him – the Persian government. When it 
came to Afghanistan, Montagu could not come to terms with the idea that Britain 
was no longer able to control that country’s foreign relations. By insisting on 
unattainable concessions from Kabul, the secretary of state made the Indian 
government’s work during the peace negotiations that much harder. The trouble was 
that despite all the changes occurring in South Asia, London was still viewing the 
world with Great Game vision, and formulating policy based on a time when a 
perceived affront to the empire’s prestige could be met with implacable hostility. 
While the Home government remained worried about imperial appearances, 
however, the Indian government appeared altogether more interested in practicalities. 
In the opinion of Delhi, Britain could no longer afford to be so uncompromising as 
London advocated. Instead, British officials needed to swallow their pride, and 
accept the little offences caused by the Persians and Afghans, for the sake of 
attaining stable relations with those two nations. By 1921, Britain could no longer 
rely on the threat of its military prowess to gain what it wanted in South Asia. 
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London appeared to forget that Britain had won (and lost) its control over 
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs following a military campaign. That it expected the 
Afghan government to relinquish its independence in external relations in 1921 
without such a military threat was an unrealistic hope on the Home government’s 
part. As Reading put it to Montagu, although there might be disappointment in the 
policies followed by the Indian government the ‘pressure of facts seems 
inexorable’.864 
 
Compounding the discomfort of those struggling to accept Britain’s reduced standing 
was the constant reminder that, in contrast, Soviet Russia appeared to be going from 
strength to strength in South Asia. Briton Cooper-Busch has described the position of 
Britain and Russia in this region of the world as that of an ebb and flow – when one 
country’s influence was at a peak, the other retreated, and vice versa.865 By this 
analogy, it could be said that in 1921 London’s authority was receding in the face of 
Moscow’s full flow. The retreat from Enzeli in 1920, in the face of the Red naval 
invasion, demonstrated the apparent impotence of the British military compared to 
Soviet Russia; the creation of treaties between Moscow and Tehran and Kabul in 
1921 heralded a decline in British imperial clout, when its own diplomatic efforts 
towards these two nations proved unsatisfactory. For, as much as the Foreign Office 
might have appeared nonchalant, it is hard to deny the political blow the Soviet–
Persian Agreement represented to Britain, particularly when one compares the 
optimism of the Foreign Office in 1918–1919 regarding Persia, to its negativity in 
1921.  
Hence why, when it came to the Soviet–Afghan Treaty, London became 
almost obsessed with the need to use this as a test case to see how British persuasion 
fared against Russian proffers of friendship. It was Russian intrigue that, in the 
opinion of Whitehall, was ousting British influence from Persia and Afghanistan in 
1921. In typical Great Game thinking, Russia was the one who could really cause 
humiliation for the British Empire, and hence was the true enemy; pan-Islamism and 
Asian nationalism were simply irritants. The Indian government instead tended to 
believe that it was the practical problem of having a pan-Islamic-nationalist-
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Bolshevik syndicate of mass popular discontent in South Asia that was the real threat 
to Britain’s imperial position. Therefore, it was not so concerned with becoming 
entangled in shows of diplomatic strength with Russia. The trouble for Curzon, 
Montagu and others in London, was that despite their desire to see their empire win 
out against the Bolshevik regime, times had changed since the Great Game. Whether 
they chose to recognise it or not, Persia and Afghanistan were no longer to be 
subservient to the empire. If Britain wanted to retain its authority in the region, it 
needed to change tactics from the pre-war period. The battle for influence in South 
Asia was now to be one of subtlety and persuasion – ‘soft’ powers, as it were – rather 
than of imperial bluster and condescension: in today’s terminology, a game involving 
‘hearts and minds’, instead of ‘shock and awe’ tactics. The power-play that had 
characterised Anglo-Russian rivalry during the Great Game was no longer 
applicable. The events of 1920 had demonstrated this. The Indian government had 
been perpetually trying to persuade the Home government of just this fact. When 
would London finally pay heed remains to be seen.  
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Chapter Five: A Gigantic Drum, 1922–1923  
 
As the year 1922 dawned, Britain’s position in southern Asia was a far cry from that 
which Curzon had hoped it would be when he was formulating his plans in 1918. 
Between 1919 and 1922 things had appeared to go from bad to worse for the foreign 
secretary.
866
 In Persia the 1919 agreement had proved a highly embarrassing failure, 
matched only by apparent British impotence in preventing the Bolshevik regime 
establishing its influence in the country. When it came to Afghanistan, Britain had 
also been unable to exert its authority to retain hold of Kabul’s foreign relations or 
negotiate an exclusive treaty at the expense of Russia. The Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement had been completed in spite of Curzon’s objections, and his attempt to 
bring Moscow to task over its violations of the agreement had left him red in the 
face. Even Britain’s policy towards Turkey had proved a mistake, contributing as it 
did to the impetus of the nationalist movement there. When Persia, Turkey and 
Afghanistan decided in 1921 to sign diplomatic agreements with Soviet Russia, it 
seemed that all of Curzon’s worse fears had come true – Britain’s patronage had 
been rejected for the friendship of the revolutionary upstarts now governing Russia. 
As Britain slunk away from its 1918 position of optimism, Curzon meanwhile 
reacted by throwing tantrums at the Persians, the Russians, the Indian government, 
Winston Churchill and anyone else who happened to cross him. 
And yet, as this chapter will show, there were actually many reasons for 
London and Delhi to remain cheerful in 1922 and 1923. While things may not have 
developed exactly as Curzon had planned, neither had they turned out as bad as the 
foreign secretary had warned of in 1918. For one thing, despite all his anti-Bolshevik 
rhetoric, the exposure of Afghanistan and Persia to Bolshevism proved far from fatal 
for the native governments. As John Darwin has pointed out in regards to Persia, ‘the 
consequence of British withdrawal and the resurgence of Russian influence at Tehran 
proved much less damaging that at first appeared’.867 Much the same can be said for 
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Afghanistan. For although Whitehall had made its fair share of mistakes in its 
handling of Asian nationalism and Muslim discontent, the Soviet government had 
been committing its own blunders along the way. It has already been noted, for 
example, how the Baku Congress was not as successful a meeting of Muslim and 
Bolshevik minds as Moscow would have liked it to be.
868
 As Stephen White has 
shown, the signing of the trade agreement between Russia and Britain in 1921 had 
also proved a blow to the morale of Asian revolutionaries who had hitherto looked 
with expectation to the Soviet government for support in their anti-imperialist 
crusade. By agreeing to the clauses regarding dissemination of propaganda, it 
appeared to some that the Bolsheviks had sacrificed revolution in southern Asia for 
the sake of trade with Britain. As two Asian agitators lamented, the conclusion of the 
agreement had ‘dealt a fatal blow at [sic] our work’.869  
Furthermore, when it came to the treaties Soviet Russia had made with the 
various Asian nations, there was actually little significant gain to the Bolshevik 
cause. In fact, in the opinion of Ivor Spector, rather than being a sign of the Soviet 
government’s increasing stature, the agreements of 1921 instead indicated ‘the 
failure of Soviet propaganda to make any appreciable headway among the Muslims 
outside Soviet territory’.870 The early Bolshevik hopes of being able to dispense with 
traditional diplomacy had proved wishful thinking, as year-on-year the world 
revolution failed to materialise. By 1921 the practicalities of international relations 
had forced the Soviet government to pay more attention to the matter of 
ambassadors, formal treaties and trade agreements; in the words of one writer, 
‘diplomacy was foisted upon a revolutionary regime’.871 So began Bolshevik ‘dual 
foreign policy’ – the conducting of formal diplomatic relations with a country while 
using the Comintern to incite revolution among the people of that same nation. 
However, while the Bolsheviks may have been more organised in their foreign 
affairs after 1920, they still faced two fundamental difficulties when it came to this 
dual policy in Asia: first was the incompatability of Communism and Islam. The 
second was the difficulty in getting Asian governments to play ball. Unlike most 
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western governments, who appeared to have more respect for formal diplomacy, the 
Asian rulers were much more fair-weather in their diplomatic commitments. As the 
previous chapter has shown, the Bolshevik regime had quickly realised having the 
Persian government sign an agreement and having the Medjliss ratify it were two 
different things. Even though they may have created treaties with Russia, Tehran, 
Kabul and Ankara had carefully ‘avoided committing themselves to the principles of 
the Soviet social order’. They felt no qualms about breaching the terms of their 
agreements when desired.
872
 These Asian nations had spent decades negotiating 
between their two powerful imperial neighbours, and were thus astute Great Game 
players. By 1922 and 1923, the survival instincts of the rulers of Persia and 
Afghanistan had become even more potent given their need to appease growing 
nationalist and pan-Islamic feeling among their people. Indeed, in a somewhat ironic 
twist, it was ultimately the intensification of these movements in the post-war years 
that actually helped prevent Bolshevism from taking hold in this region.
873
 Rulers 
who had fought to remove a British imperial strangle-hold on their country were not 
about to simply replace that with Soviet dominance. Reza Khan, Amanullah, Gandhi 
and Kemal Ataturk may not have been particular friends of Britain, but neither were 
they prepared to become bed-fellows of Lenin.  
 
Excellent Medicine 
While Russia was being frustrated in its Communist plan for southern Asia, by 
1922–1923 Britain appeared to be developing some breathing space from the 
rampant nationalism and pan-Islamism that had taken hold of the region in the post-
war period. In Persia, for example, affairs were starting to stabilise for Britain, due, 
in no small part, to a change in Whitehall’s policy towards that country; a shift from 
the more forward policy of Curzon to something more akin to the Indian 
government’s point of view. Marking this new phase in Britain’s relations with 
Persia was the appointment of Sir Percy Loraine as ambassador to Tehran in January 
1922. Unfortunately for him, Herman Norman had never been very popular with 
Curzon. One cannot help but feel sorry for the hapless diplomat, stuck in a rather 
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hopeless position in Tehran and seemingly never able to set a foot right in Curzon’s 
eyes. In contrast, Loraine was to prove very popular with the foreign secretary and 
would cultivate a reputation ‘as a brilliant manager of British interests’.874 In fact, 
Curzon had wanted to appoint Loraine as Counsellor under Norman, but he had 
ended up serving in Poland instead. However, Curzon’s high regard for Loraine 
remained and when Norman relinquished his position the foreign secretary was quick 
to offer it to Loraine, making him one of the youngest appointees to such a sensitive 
post.
875
 That Loraine was cousin to Lancelot Oliphant, the head of the Eastern 
Department in the Foreign Office, no doubt helped his position.
876
  
Furthermore, although he differed in the policy he believed Britain should be 
pursuing in Persia, Loraine appeared to be attuned to Curzon’s thinking. In August 
1922, for example, Loraine wrote to the foreign secretary giving his impression of 
the entire Persian situation, which he summed up in an allegorical story. In this tale, 
Britain and Russia are cast as competitive beaus, vying for the position as the 
paramount love of Persia – a fickle woman happy to play her courtiers off against 
each other. Loraine characterises ‘John Bull’s’ downfall as insisting on giving 
‘tiresome lectures and good advice’ to ‘Miss P.’, when all the latter wants ‘is that he 
should pay, and take charge again of the household expenses as well as giving 
handsome pin-money. Then, so long as some rather nominal appearances are kept up, 
he can do what he likes with the house’. Of course, the allegory of ‘Miss P.’ and 
‘John Bull’ entirely over-simplifies the relationship between Britain and Persia. It 
also conveniently lays the blame for Britain’s current troubles with Persia solely at 
the door of the latter – for it is ‘John Bull’ who is trying to do the best for ‘Miss P.’, 
while she is simply disloyal and petulant. Yet this idea that Britain was being 
something of a martyr, suffering as it was for having tried to better things for Persia, 
appealed to the likes of Curzon. It was easier to believe this than admit that the 
Persian policy which he and his allies had pursued since 1918 had failed because of a 
fundamental misjudgement of the Persian situation. Even by 1922 Curzon still 
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refused to recognise that he had made a miscalculation with the Anglo-Persian 
agreement. Writing to Loraine in May 1922 Curzon insisted that it had been the 
Cabinet’s decision to withdraw Britain’s troops together with the ungratefulness of 
the Persian people which had led to the failure of his Persian schemes.
877
 As the self-
proclaimed expert on Persia, Curzon was, of course, above reproach himself.  
Together with being able to get on well with the foreign secretary, Loraine 
was also very much the right man at the right time. From the outset of his arrival in 
Tehran the new ambassador was to follow a policy of studied aloofness from Persia’s 
political turmoils. In Loraine’s opinion, the Persian people simply had to learn how 
to govern their nation properly, ‘and if you want them to do that it’s no use fiddling 
with them, and their affairs, still less intervening and pretending you don’t’.878 The 
idea of simply letting the Persians get on with things while Britain took a back-seat 
had, of course, long been advocated by the Indian government. Indeed, such 
language by Loraine is reminiscent of views put forward during the Eastern 
Committee debates on Persia in late 1918. Had Loraine tried to follow such a policy 
of detachment in 1919, however, no doubt he would have found himself at odds with 
Curzon. Yet by 1922, the foreign secretary was so disgruntled with the entire Persian 
situation that Loraine’s haughty aloofness was well received in the Foreign Office. In 
the wake of the debacle which was the Anglo-Persian Agreement and a number of 
years of failed interference in Persia’s internal affairs, it also seemed worth trying a 
change in tactic. After all, there appeared few other options for Britain by 1922–
1923.  
 
A further reason that Loraine tended to have London’s approval was that, as noted, 
despite the prophecies of Curzon, Cox and Mallet in 1918, the retreat of Britain’s 
influence in Persia did not portend the fall of that country to Bolshevism. Indeed, if 
one believed all the anti-Bolshevik rhetoric with which Curzon had surrounded his 
creation of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, one would be fairly surprised by the lack 
of progress the Bolshevik regime had made in Persia by 1922. As previously noted, 
the Soviet-Persian Agreement concluded in 1921 did not hail a particularly close 
friendship between the two signatories. Indeed, as White has noted, it in no way 
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prevented the Persian government from actions which were in fact a complete 
violation of the terms of this treaty, including, for example, the seizure of Russian 
property within that country.
879
 In January 1922 Loraine telegrammed home that the 
Bolsheviks had apparently become thoroughly sick of the Persians and their methods 
(perhaps also referring to the obfuscating of the latter when it came to having the 
agreement ratified by the Medjliss).
880
 It also seemed that the Bolsheviks were 
regretting having given up all of Russia’s previous privileges within Persia, realising 
all too late the bargaining value of these concessions when it came to dealing with 
the Persian government (a lesson from the Great Game they should have taken note 
of).
881
 The new Bolshevik representative in Tehran, Theodore Rothstein, remarked to 
an American journalist that the Persians: 
…will take money from everybody. From the British today from the Russians 
tomorrow or from the French or the Germans or anyone else. But they will 
never do anything for the money. You may buy their country from them six 
times over but you will never get it.
882
 
By the end of the year this frustration had led Rothstein to address a letter to the shah 
complaining about the prime minister and stating that the Soviet legation could not 
work with a Persian government so hostile as the present one.
883
 This letter was to 
cause a definite cooling in Soviet-Persian relations, much to the happiness of 
Loraine, who noted with satisfaction that the Russians ‘can always be depended on to 
make gaffes’.884 Too late did Rothstein realise he had overstepped the mark.885  
The frustration with the Persian government was more than likely 
compounded by the little progress that was being made in advancing Communism 
within Persia. On his arrival in Tehran in April 1921, Rothstein had immediately 
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begun agitating among the Persian population. One of his first acts had been to open 
the Russian embassy grounds, Atabak Park, to the public, thereby immediately 
increasing his legation’s popularity among the Persian people.886 Indeed, the 
appointment of Rothstein to Tehran is perhaps indicative of the seriousness with 
which the Bolsheviks now viewed relations with Persia. Compared to Bravin, 
Rothstein was a heavy-weight diplomat; he had lived and studied in England and 
taken part in the labour movement there so he understood well how to deal with his 
British counterparts in Tehran.
887
 He was also close to both Lenin and Trotsky and 
‘his voice carried weight in the highest quarters of the Soviet hierachy’.888 By the 
time Rothstein had arrived in Tehran, the Second Comintern Congress had also 
resolved some of the conflicting policies the Bolsheviks had hitherto been pursuing 
in Persia. All of which meant that, in contrast to Bravin, who had been giving no 
credentials and no funding, Rothstein was well-financed and was able to expand his 
staff and open consulates in almost all the major cities of Persia. 
And yet, in the opinion of the British military attaché in Tehran, Lieutenant-
Colonel Saunders, the propaganda that Rothstein had been distributing ‘has produced 
remarkably small results when one takes into consideration the numerous staff 
employed and large sums expended by him’.889 Major Bray of the India Office 
concurred in this judgement, pointing out that ‘the Bolsheviks have admitted that 
their Communist activities in Persia had not...met with great success’.890 In fact, 
according to Bolshevik figures, by 1922 there were only 2,000 declared Communists 
within Persia.
891
 As Loraine noted, ‘bolshevism [sic] among the Persians themselves 
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is losing its early glamour’.892 It seemed that, despite his best efforts, Rothstein was 
faced with that perennial issue of the fundamental incompabatability of Communism 
and Islam.  
It was not just from the Russian side that things were unsatisfactory. In 
January 1922 Oliphant noted how the Persians appeared disappointed that their 
agreement had not brought about better relations with the Soviet government.
893
 One 
person within the Persian government who was finding relations with the Bolsheviks 
particularly difficult was Reza Khan, minister of war and – since 1921 – arguably the 
strongest personality within the Persian government.
894
 The British government had 
always held mixed views on Reza Khan. By replacing British control of the Cossack 
Division with Persian officers, and by involving himself in various governmental 
intrigues, Reza Khan had gained the suspicions of some British figures. Norman 
believed that the minister of war was ‘an ignorant peasant’ and ‘not to be trusted’,895 
while Armitage-Smith argued that the man was ‘entirely in the hands of...Rothstein’ 
who found it easy to manipulate the lower-born, lesser-educated Persian.
896
 Loraine 
was more positive about Reza Khan, however, believing him to be far more practical 
than most Persian political figures.
897
 Victor Mallet, a legation staffer, was also well 
disposed towards the Persian minister: 
Our essential interests in Persia demand a stable and strong central government, 
able to resist Russian penetration and the spread of Communist propaganda, to 
keep order on the trade routes, in the oil fields district and in the provinces on 
the Baluchi and Afghan frontiers…It is towards such conditions that Reza 
Khan appears to be aiming. If in the efforts to obtain his objective, he 
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occasionally falls foul of some minor British interest, it may be that at times it 
will be worth our while to give way…898 
It was also quickly apparent that Reza Khan was just as determined to prevent a 
Bolshevik ascendancy over Persian politics as he was to remove any overt British 
influence. In a conversation with Loraine, Reza Khan explained his purpose was to 
do what the British had wanted to do themselves, namely to create a strong army, 
restore order and create a stable and independent Persia.
899
 As Michael Zirinsky 
explains, ‘Loraine backed Reza as a man who could achieve order in Iran and thus 
further British interests’.900 
Above all, Reza Khan appeared to be a pragmatist. On a number of occasions 
he was to insist that he was not pro-Bolshevik as some accused him of being, since 
Bolshevism was ultimately incompatible with Islam.
901
 Indeed, by early 1922 the war 
minister was complaining of the Communist activities of the Soviet legation in 
Tehran which he felt were destabilising Persian society.
902
 Nonetheless, he was 
convinced that Persia could not afford to irritate her powerful neighbour, or to give 
the Bolsheviks any pretext for intensifying their activities. As Loraine explained, the 
Persians ‘evidently suppose that Russia may at any moment recover her power, and, 
mindful of Persia’s former sufferings at the hands of her northern neighbour, they 
anticipate...a swift vengeance’.903 It is sometimes easy to forget that the period of the 
Great Game had left its impression not only on the minds of British officials but on 
Persian’s as well. Persia had been a pawn in the game between Britain and Russia for 
so many decades that it is unsurprising that it experienced something akin to 
institutionalisation. For despite all its protestations against foreign interference in its 
affairs, in truth Persia did not know how to function without such outside 
involvement. A key factor of the Great Game is that Britain and Russia’s 
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competitiveness had ultimately prevented Persia from being absorbed by either 
nation. Indeed, prior to 1907 Persia had always looked upon Britain as its guardian in 
the face of Russian aggression. In Loraine’s opinion, even the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement of 1919 had actually been viewed by some Persians as British protection 
of Persia against Russia. The Enzeli landings had quickly changed this.
904
 However, 
even now in 1922, as relations with the Bolshevik regime were floundering, the 
Persian government looked to Britain for aid. As Loraine aptly put it in a letter to 
Lindsay, the Persians ‘go on hoping that someone will pull their chestnuts out of the 
fire so that they may take the profits if he succeeds, and he the blame if he don’t 
[sic]. And there...you have the whole basis, theory and practice of Persian 
politics’.905 
In order to sever this traditional fear of Russia, Loraine wanted to break the 
illusion of Moscow’s capabilities. In a telegram to the Foreign Office in February 
1922 he asked to be furnished with information which he could pass on to the Persian 
government exposing the Bolshevik government’s weakness domestically, 
economically and militarily. Both Gregory and Lindsay, however, saw this as 
problematic. Just as many examples could be found of Russia’s strength and power, 
while ultimately the whole scheme appeared too close to the promise made in the 
trade agreement to refrain from anti-Bolshevik propaganda.
906
 Curzon agreed, telling 
Loraine that the Persian government would no doubt hear for themselves about 
Russia’s internal problems.907 To some extent it suited Britain to have Persia fearful 
of Moscow anyway. As long as the Persian government remained apprehensive of 
the Bolshevik regime, and at odds with its representatives in Tehran, Britain was able 
to cast itself in the role as benevolent arbitrator. Should Persia realise Russia’s bluff, 
it might give it unwarranted confidence in its own capabilities and rebuff even 
further British proffers of aid. As Curzon commented on a report by Loraine 
regarding the friction between the Persian government and the Soviet Legation: 
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I consider these political crises inevitable and may prove excellent 
medicine for Persia until she recovers her senses. We should let them 
succeed each other with mathematical regularity but without showing 
slightest concern ourselves. One day Persia will knock again at the door 
of the British Legation.
908
 
Again one gets the sense that the British foreign secretary was revelling somewhat in 
Persia’s current difficulties with the Bolsheviks, seeing it almost as karmic 
retribution for having snubbed the Anglo-Persian agreement. 
By 1923 then, it would appear that things were on the up for Britain. When it 
came to Persia, Loraine declared in November that ‘Russian shares politically are 
declining, and ours are undergoing a steady rise’.909 Loraine’s policy of non-
interference and Rothstein’s difficulties had combined to create a relatively 
comfortable position for Britain by 1922–1923. A report by the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Eastern Unrest (IDCEU) in June 1923 reiterated the fact that the 
Bolsheviks were making little ideological headway in Persia.
910
 Indeed, such was the 
growing confidence in London that when some suggested increasing British 
propaganda in Persia there was little enthusiasm for the idea. The sheer relentlessness 
of Rothstein’s activities had made a few officials nervous enough to advocate a 
counter campaign. As one observer pointed out, such British propaganda need not be 
anti-Bolshevik, rather pro-British; defensive, not offensive, and involve the 
establishment of pro-British newspapers, and the support of local Mullahs to act as 
pro-British agents.
911
 In his memorandum on Soviet propaganda in Persia, Saunders 
had agreed that to combat Rothstein’s work, Britain would need to start subsidising 
newspapers and even open up its own press bureau. As Saunders pointed out, 
however, this would cost a considerable amount, and it was questionable whether the 
results would justify the expenditure.
912
 In the opinion of R. Bridgeman, if Britain 
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was to try to strengthen its position in Persia, it should do so through more subtle yet 
substantial forms of propaganda, such as founding local schools and hospitals. In 
Bridgeman’s words, if money were to be spent, it should ‘be spent on the Persians 
rather than against the Russians’ – a far cry from the Russian-centric policies 
advocated by the likes of Cox in 1918.
913
 Unsurprisingly, Reading agreed with the 
idea of trying to cultivate Persian friendship rather than worrying about the 
Bolsheviks.
914
 Indeed, the Indian government had been advocating just such a course 
of action since the end of the First World War. As it was, it had taken a number of 
years, a failed agreement, an embarrassing military rout, incompetent Bolshevik 
officials and the ascendancy of an astute British ambassador for the British 
government to finally attain a position within Persia which the Indian government 
had advocated from the outset. 
 
Despite the growing confidence in their position in Persia, what was particularly 
worrying to British observers were the indications that Russia was growing ever 
closer to the new nationalist regime in Turkey, using Persia as something of a 
rendezvous point, and even involving Afghanistan in some of its intrigues.
915
 As 
early as December 1921 Saunders had produced a report detailing the increased 
activity of the Kemalist party in Persia, and the involvement of the newly appointed 
Afghan minister to Tehran in these schemes.
916
 Again he was supported in his 
judgement by a report from Major Bray, also showing the links between Rothstein, 
the Kemalist Pan-Islamic Committee and the Afghan minister.
917
 As Loraine 
informed the Foreign Office, ‘Turks, Russians and Afghans lose no opportunity of 
impregnating the Persians with anti-British feeling’.918 In a Cabinet meeting of 30 
March 1922 the connection between Turkey and Russia was discussed. Churchill 
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himself ‘hoped the Cabinet would realise that our policy in regard to Turkey had 
resulted in achieving the impossible, namely the marriage of the Bolshevists [sic] and 
the Turks in spite of the entire conflict of principles between them’.919 For, just as 
with Persia, Britain was a crucial factor in bringing Ankara and Moscow closer 
together. Traditionally, Russia’s desire to have a warm water port and access to the 
Straits had caused conflict with the Ottoman Empire, and initially this tension 
between the two nations looked set to continue after the Russian Revolution (once 
Turkey had surrendered to the Allies at Mudros and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had 
thereby becoming null and void in Bolshevik eyes).
920
 In 1920, for instance, 
nationalist Turkey and Soviet Russia had nearly come to blows over their rivalry for 
influence in Armenia and Georgia. However, the Treaty of Sèvres had made Kemal 
Ataturk more open to friendship with Russia (needing, as he did, support against the 
Allies) and thus led to the signing of the treaty between Ankara and Moscow in 
March 1921.
921
 By its adherence to the Sèvres agreement, then, Britain had not only 
brought upon itself the animosity of the Muslim world, but had succeeded in creating 
an ‘unnatural alliance between Turks and Russians...contrary to the teaching of 
history, and...opposed to all racial and religious instincts’.922 By early 1923 there was 
further indication that the Soviet government was making efforts to bring about a 
pan-Islamic bloc ‘consisting of Russia, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and possibly 
other Moslem States, the object being to enable Russia to exercise an influence over 
Moslem Nationalist movements’.923  
                                                 
919
 Curzon could not help making a dig in his reply ‘that this union was inevitable when the decision 
had been taken to abandon the Caucasus. He had foreseen it at the time’. TNA/CAB/23/29, Cabinet 
19, 20 March 1922. 
 
920
 It is also worth noting that Britain had traditionally been a supporter of the Ottoman’s and had 
actually encouraged the affiliation of Indian Muslims with the Caliph; during the 1857 revolt the 
Indian government had procured a proclamation from the Sultan advising Indian Muslims to remain 
loyal to his British allies. Naeem Qureshi, Indian Politics, pp. 18–20. 
 
921
 It was agreed by the treaty that Batum would go to the Soviet government and the districts of Kars 
and Ardahan of Armenia would go to the Ankaran government. For more on Turko–Soviet relations 
see: Kapur, Soviet Russia; Gokay, Clash of Empires and R.H. Davison, ‘Turkish Diplomacy from 
Mudros to Lausanne’, in Craig, Diplomats, pp. 172–209.   
  
922
 TNA/FO1011/123, Letter from Lord D’Abernon (Ambassador to Berlin) to Loraine, 29 Oct. 1922. 
 
923
 Woodward, DBFP, First Series, Vol. XXV: No. 10, Memorandum respecting Co-operation of 
Moslem Countries and Russia, 26 Jan. 1923. 
 
219 
 
Nevertheless, the agreement between Turkey and Soviet Russia had been a 
marriage of convenience, and once Kemal had improved his with relations with the 
Allies (see below), then he would not be quite so keen to be in close collaboration 
with Moscow. That it was unlikely, however, that Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan 
would acquiesce in Russian interference in Muslim affairs was not as important to 
the Home government as the fact that the Soviet government was trying to bring 
about such an alliance. When combined with the increase in Bolshevik-sponsored 
agitation in India in 1922, and a variety of smaller irritations, these intrigues by the 
Soviet government took on greater meaning.
924
  To London, it was becoming more 
and more apparent that Russia was not taking the terms of the trade agreement 
seriously. By May 1923, Curzon had reached the end of his patience, and gained 
Cabinet approval of a draft despatch to the Soviet government, detailing the various 
ways in which the trade agreement had been violated by the latter.
925
 The ‘Curzon 
Note’, as it became known, included, among other things, complaint of Soviet 
subversive activities in Persia, Afghanistan and India. The note concluded with a 
demand that the acts of propaganda carried out in these countries be ‘repudiated and 
apologised for’, and that the officials responsible for them be ‘disowned and 
recalled’. Unless this and the other terms of the agreement were complied with 
within ten days of receipt of the communication, the trade treaty was to be 
terminated.
926
 One historian has described the note as an example ‘of Curzon’s 
diplomatic style at its imperious best’ and it is probably this action which White is 
referring to when he sees Curzon as taking a stronger role in Anglo-Soviet affairs 
after 1922.
927
  
The Curzon note of 1923, however, was not dissimilar to that which had been 
sent to Moscow in 1921, the key difference being that the foreign secretary had learnt 
his lesson from that debacle and this time made quite certain that the 1923 complaint 
was based on irrefutable evidence, largely in the form of decrypted telegrams 
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(portions of which Curzon could not resist taunting the Soviet regime with).
928
 This 
time around too, although the Soviet government made some attempts at denying the 
charges laid by Curzon, it was ultimately conciliatory.
929
 As the foreign secretary 
explained to Cabinet in June 1923, a series of communications had passed between 
the two governments, the result of which ‘was that the Russian Soviet Government 
had given way on every point...’930 Curzon believed himself ‘to have won a 
considerable victory’.931 The Bolsheviks had even moved to replace their 
representative in Kabul, Fedor Raskolnikov, who had proved so objectionable to 
Britain. The Soviet government did refuse to recall B.Z. Shumiatskii, from Tehran, 
as Curzon had also demanded, but this was not in fact a crucial issue.
932
 Indeed, in 
February 1923 Loraine had noted how Shumiatskii’s ‘tactless blundering has done 
more to revive [the] fear and detestation of the Russians than could have been 
accomplished by any other agency. With him as a political opponent, it’s like taking 
candy from a baby’.933 As for Anglo-Soviet relations themselves, Thomas Preston, 
the British representative in Petrograd, believed that Curzon’s note ‘has resulted in 
our reaching a new phase in Anglo-Russian relations’. In Preston’s opinion, ‘The 
prestige of Great Britain in Russia has been...restored, and would seem to have 
reached its highest point since the evacuation of British troops from Russia in 
1919’.934 How far this was actually the case, and how far Preston simply supposed it 
to be true, is difficult to tell. One thing for sure is that Curzon’s feelings towards the 
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Bolshevik regime had not improved, nor were they likely to. The foreign secretary 
had made this perfectly clear in April 1922 when Loraine had asked whether he 
should participate in the Bolshevik celebrations of 1 May. It was decided by the 
Foreign Office staff that the ambassador ‘should do the minimum consistent with 
courtesy’. Curzon reluctantly agreed: ‘very well. But I abominate these flirtations 
with a declared enemy’.935 For the foreign secretary the Bolsheviks would always be 
the ‘enemy’, no matter how many diplomatic agreements Britain signed with them. 
Yet, despite his best efforts, a Soviet presence in southern Asia was by now an 
established reality. All Curzon could now do in response was to adjust his 
expectations for Britain accordingly, and keep a sharp eye on those Bolsheviks.   
 
Russians, Turks, Afghans and Indians 
While in Persia things might have been settling down for Britain, 1922 was still an 
eventful year for officials in London. One of the most important occurrences at this 
time in relation to the subject at hand was the resignation of Edwin Montagu as 
secretary of state for India. While the event itself has been noted by the likes of 
Sigismund Waley and Briton Cooper Busch, these accounts have not fully 
emphasised the significance of Montagu’s resignation to the broader struggle 
between the Home and Indian governments over Britain’s foreign relations.936 For 
while there is something to be said for Darwin’s assertion that Montagu’s ‘influence 
on the ultimate direction of policy in the Middle East [and Asia] was minimal’, the 
secretary of state’s demise embodies many of the points made throughout this work 
regarding the tensions between London and Delhi in the post-war period.
937
 From the 
outset, Montagu, Chelmsford and Reading had never missed an opportunity to 
impress upon the Cabinet the importance to India of having a stable relationship with 
Turkey. Caliphate agitation had remained steady in India, and the viceroy and 
secretary of state had no doubt that Britain’s dealings with Turkey had been 
contributing to Muslim dissatisfaction with the empire. In February 1922, Reading 
made one more plea to London to take into account India’s views. With the 
                                                 
935
 TNA/FO371/7804/E4076, Minute by Lindsay and Curzon on Telegram from Loraine, 18 April 
1922. 
 
936
 Waley, Montagu. See also, Cooper-Busch, Mudros, pp. 330–334. 
  
937
 Darwin, Britain, p. 22. 
 
222 
 
Conference of London proving unsuccessful in bringing about a resolution on the 
Turkish issue, the conflict between the Kemalist and Greek forces was still in flow at 
the end of 1921. In early 1922, Curzon was therefore preparing to head to Paris to try 
to bring about an Allied mediation between these two belligerents.
938
 In view of this, 
the Indian government composed a telegram on 28 February once again explaining 
the intensity of feeling in India regarding the necessity of revising the Treaty of 
Sèvres. Reading pointed out that ‘as the greatest power in the Mahomedan world, 
Great Britain must, no less than the other Allies, be sympathetic towards Moslem 
feeling and ready to take active steps on behalf of Islam’. Although there was 
nothing particularly new in this plea from Delhi, the crucial point is that the viceroy 
asked to be allowed to publish the telegram, presumably to demonstrate to the Indian 
public his support for the Muslim cause.
939
 On 6 March, without consulting the 
Cabinet, Montagu consented to publication.
940
 Bypassing the Cabinet in this way and 
taking it upon himself to allow the Indian government to speak publically on this 
matter was to prove a serious error on the part of the secretary of state. On 9 March 
when Lloyd George found out about the telegrams he summoned Montagu to his 
office and asked for his resignation: 
without being urged by any pressing necessity and without consulting the 
Cabinet, or the Foreign Secretary, or myself, or any of my colleagues, you 
caused to be published a telegram from the Viceroy raising questions 
whose importance extends far beyond the frontiers of India...Such action 
is totally incompatible with the collective responsibility of Cabinet...
941
 
In the aftermath of his resignation, Montagu remained defiant, telling Reading ‘I do 
not regret it. I believe I was right’.942 On 11 March the ex-secretary of state gave a 
speech to his constituents in Cambridge where he argued that his 
‘disappearance...has nothing to do with the doctrine of collective responsibility’. 
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Instead he believed it was due to his opposition to Lloyd George’s pro-Greek policy 
and to the erosion of Cabinet responsibility which the prime minister had resided 
over.
943
 There was probably some truth to his claims. As Reading pointed out to 
Lloyd George, there was little if anything in the telegram which he had asked to 
publish that was new and had not already been approved for publication in previous 
communications.
944
 While Montagu may have made a mistake not consulting the 
Cabinet, one cannot help feeling that this would not have been enough to have forced 
his resignation if it had not been for the general level of animosity that appeared to 
be growing within government and Parliament against him. Instead it is likely that 
the incident proved to be the straw that broke Lloyd George’s back. Montagu’s 
incessant criticism of the Cabinet’s Turkish policy was irritating to the prime 
minister, and despite the fact that both men were members of the Liberal Party, there 
was no love lost between the two. As Montagu had complained to Reading in 
September 1921: 
All the time I feel that it is a thousand pities for India that the Prime 
Minister has not a little more confidence in his Secretary of State, and 
how bad a thing it is for India that the Secretary of State has so little 
confidence in the Prime Minister...
945
 
It was not just Lloyd George who had a problem with Montagu, however. 
Unfortunately for him, the Liberal, Jewish, secretary of state had never been popular 
with the Conservative party. His appearance in front of the House of Commons in 
July 1920 in which he denounced the action of General Dyer in the Amritsar 
Massacre had demonstrated just this.
946
 Montagu did not appear to be a good debater, 
nor was he adept at winning people over to his point of view (a skill particularly 
crucial in a coalition government). As Darwin puts it, the secretary of state’s 
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‘hypersensitive temperament...was ill-suited to his political role’.947 His joint 
authorship of the Indian reforms of 1919 also meant that ‘An idea was prevalent 
that...he was an exponent of an anti-British policy in India’.948 As trouble developed 
in India during this period, much of the good-will felt by Britain towards the Indian 
people following the war began to dissipate. As Montagu explained to Reading in 
February 1922: 
The fact of the matter is, Rufus, that people here are fed up with India, 
and it is all I can do to keep my colleagues steady on the accepted policy, 
let alone new instalments of it. The Indians are so unreasonable, so slow 
to compromise, so raw in their resentments, and the insults to the Prince 
of Wales have made fierce feeling in this country.
949
 
As well as a growing backlash against the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, there was 
also a belief among some that by his constant emphasis of the Caliphate issue, 
Montagu had lent that movement a level of legitimacy and publicity.
950
 Fairly or 
unfairly, the verdict was in on Montagu’s tenure as secretary of state for India.951 
Unfortunately for him, Montagu’s actions after his resignation only served to 
further his unpopularity. Together with his criticisms of Lloyd George, the ex-
secretary of state could not help attacking Curzon for his alleged role in the affair. 
According to Montagu, Curzon had known about the publication of the viceroy’s 
telegram at a Cabinet meeting the following day, and had said nothing: ‘But what did 
Lord Curzon do? He maintained silence in the Cabinet and contented himself that 
evening with writing to me one of those plaintive, hectoring, bullying, complaining 
letters which are so familiar to his colleagues’.952 On 14 March Curzon used the 
House of Lords as the stage to defend himself against Montagu who had: 
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vilified the colleague whose advice in relation to India, Foreign and 
Frontier affairs he has not seized [sic – ceased?] both to solicit and to 
receive in unstinted measure in most weeks of recent years and 
endeavoured to sift some portion of the responsibility for his lamentable 
indiscretion on to my shoulders. 
Again, the actual facts regarding Curzon’s role in Montagu’s downfall are not so 
important as what the affair tells us about the relationship between the Foreign 
Office, India Office and Indian government in the post-war years. Indeed, this spat 
between Montagu and Curzon provides part of the explanation as to why the Indian 
government was so ignored when it was trying to counter the foreign policy being 
developed in London. For Curzon was being truthful when he claimed that Montagu 
had frequently turned to him for advice regarding India and Afghanistan; Montagu’s 
communications with Chelmsford and Reading often mentioned Curzon’s opinion on 
matters. One contemporary even believed that the foreign secretary ‘terrorised’ the 
secretary of state.
953
 And yet, despite his apparent irritation with Curzon’s constant 
‘hectoring’, Montagu generally seemed ready to listen the ex-viceroy. As time 
progressed, he even appeared to value Curzon’s judgements more than that of 
Chelmsford or Reading – his acquiescence to the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement 
despite the protests of the Indian government is one such example. In fact, Montagu 
was apt to believe the views of numerous other sources both in India and in Britain 
over that given by the Indian government itself, something Chelmsford found 
particularly irritating. As P.G. Robb explains, generally speaking the India Office 
underrated the Indian government.
954
 Montagu might lament the fact that the prime 
minister had no confidence in him, but he in turn appeared to lack confidence in his 
viceroys. Given the constitutional position and physical distance of the Indian 
government to the Home government, Delhi needed an ally in London if it was to 
make sure its views were listened to. Unfortunately, Montagu failed to be that ally.  
Curzon’s reaction to the publication of Reading’s telegram is also very telling, 
and is clear from the letter he wrote to Montagu the following day: 
That I should be asked to go into Conference at Paris while a subordinate 
branch of the British Government 6,000 miles away dictates to the British 
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Government what line it thinks I ought to pursue in Thrace seems to me 
quite intolerable...For if the Government of India, because it rules over a 
large body of Moslems, is entitled to express and publish its views about 
what we do in Smyrna or Thrace, why not equally in Egypt, the Soudan, 
Palestine, Arabia, the Malay Peninsula or any other part of the Moslem 
world. Is Indian opinion always to be a final court of Moslem appeal[?]
955
 
Not only does this give an insight into Curzon’s thoughts on the Indian government’s 
input on foreign policy but, again, it goes some way to explaining why Delhi was 
ignored in these post-war years. In the foreign secretary’s views Reading’s opinion 
was both unwelcome and inappropriate. And unfortunately for the viceroy it was not 
only Curzon who thought so. Hardinge too argued that ‘If India is to dictate our 
policy in Europe the F.O. had better shut up shop’.956 Apparently being ex-viceroys 
did not equal greater sympathy from Curzon and Hardinge towards the Indian 
government. In Chapter One of this work it was shown how Curzon had himself 
lamented being ignored by the Home government when he was out in India. How 
short his memory appeared to be. The fact that both Curzon and Hardinge used the 
term ‘dictate’ is also interesting – as is apparent from the previous chapters, the 
Indian government was ‘dictating’ very little when it came to British foreign policy 
in the years after 1918. The remarks by Curzon are also indicative of a failing on his 
part to grasp the importance of the pan-Islamic issue in the post-war period. One 
contemporary ‘likened the Islamic world to a gigantic drum, the reverberations from 
one end of which could be heard at the other’.957 The idea that peace with Turkey 
was a European issue, and therefore did not concern the Indian government, 
demonstrates how short-sighted the Foreign Office was. As Briton Cooper Busch 
notes in his work on the subject, ultimately the Foreign Office failed to grasp the 
connections between the various problems facing the British Empire in this period. It 
refused to see the links between its treatment of Turkey, and Muslim agitation in 
India, and ignored the Indian government when such warnings were given.
958
 The 
                                                 
955
 BL/MSS/Eur/E238/16 (RC), Statement by Curzon to the House of Lords as quoted in Telegram 
from Chamberlain to Reading, 15 March 1922. 
 
956
 Cooper-Busch, Mudros, p. 333. 
 
957
 Nanda, Gandhi, p. 104. 
  
958
 Cooper-Busch, Mudros, p. 329. 
 
227 
 
international nature of the Caliphate movement and of nationalist agitation eluded 
London. The Indian government was more astute in realising the changing world 
post-First World War. It was just unable to make the Home government understand 
this. 
 
It was in the same year as Montagu’s resignation that Lloyd George would exit from 
British politics, also as an indirect result of Britain’s relations with Turkey. The 
Chanak Crisis had proved the last straw for those Conservatives who were unhappy 
with Lloyd George’s leadership and on 19 October 1922, after a meeting at the 
Carlton Club, leading Tories decided that they would run independent of the Liberal 
party in the next general election.
959
 Their vote of no confidence in the prime 
minister effectively ended both the coalition and Lloyd George’s career in 
government, and in the eyes of some writers, precipitated a new phase in Britain’s 
foreign affairs.
960
 As discussed in the Introduction, the creation of the ‘Garden 
Suburb’, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretariats were seen to represent 
Lloyd George’s priministerial style and, in particular, his contempt for traditional 
channels of diplomacy. It was certainly true that few tears were shed in the Foreign 
Office at news of the prime minister’s downfall. J.D. Gregory explained to Percy 
Loraine, ‘how much we have suffered under the old system’,961 while Robert 
Lindsay wrote of his hope that ‘the F.O. on the N. side of Downing St.’ (i.e. the 
Garden Suburb) would now be closed.
962
  
Nonetheless, while there may have been no love lost between the Foreign 
Office and Lloyd George, this did not necessarily mean that his removal from office 
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marked a seismic change in Britain’s foreign relations, as some have argued. Stephen 
White has claimed that after the fall of the Coalition, Curzon was able ‘to assume a 
greater degree of control over the making of British policy, and his perspective in 
foreign affairs...began to exert a more direct influence upon the development of 
British-Soviet relations’.963 White also believes that it was only after the removal of 
Lloyd George from the scene that imperial concerns once again became important to 
the British government.
964
 It may be true that when it came to Soviet Russia Curzon 
was able to be tougher in 1923 than he had done during the trade negotiations (with 
the Soviet note for example). However, this idea that Curzon was somehow ‘let off 
the leash’ after October 1922 is belied by the level of control the foreign secretary 
exerted over Britain’s policies towards Persia and Afghanistan since 1918, not to 
mention his close involvement in affairs related to Egypt, Turkey, Mesopotamia, the 
Caucasus and of course India, as well as the personal influence he held within 
Cabinet and over other government figures such as Montagu. Curzon may not have 
agreed with or liked the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement but if this work has 
demonstrated nothing else, it is that the foreign secretary was the central character 
when it came to all things Asian and Middle Eastern throughout the post-war period. 
Furthermore, the idea that imperial concerns only really influenced foreign policy 
after the fall of Lloyd George has been shown as untrue by the preceding chapters of 
this work. In fact, White appears to have got things the wrong way around: rather 
than seeing an increase in his influence Curzon was actually becoming increasingly 
impotent in the 1920s – at least when it came to Britain’s South Asian affairs. The 
ambitious plans he had conceived in 1918 had failed to come to fruition. Instead, by 
1922–1923 circumstances had conspired to prevent Curzon from seeing Britain’s 
influence extended throughout Asia and the Middle East as he had hoped. He now 
had to settle for what limited role Britain was able to play.  
 
Not that Curzon was willing to go quietly into the night. His note to the Soviet 
government in 1923 was one example of the important role he continued to play in 
British foreign relations in these years. The negotiations with Turkey in Lausanne 
was another. After the Chanak Crisis a peace had finally been achieved on 11 
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October 1922 when the Armistice of Mudanya was signed by the Allies and 
nationalist Turks.
965
 The following month a conference opened in Lausanne, 
Switzerland between the belligerents. Being the main architect of the conference and 
the chief Allied negotiator, Curzon was afforded an international stage for his 
diplomatic talents.
966
 After many months of wrangling, the Treaty of Lausanne was 
signed in July 1923, finally bringing to end the years of conflict between the Allies 
and Turkey.
967
 One of the most important results of Lausanne for the Muslim 
population throughout southern Asia was the recognition of the sovereignty of the 
new Republic of Turkey. The Turks had resisted the Allies and the punishing terms 
of Sèvres and had emerged successful from their nationalist struggle – ‘All over the 
country [sic – region], the South Asian Muslims celebrated this occasion with great 
joy’.968 However, for Muslim onlookers, the victory was to prove bitter-sweet. After 
the Armistice of Mudanya in 1922, the Kemalist government entered Constantinople 
and rapidly re-gained control of the city’s administration from the Allies. The 
republican Grand National Assembly under Kemal Ataturk were now de facto rulers 
of Turkey and thus the sultan, Mehmed VI, quietly left the country. On 1 November 
the Sultanate was abolished by the assembly, followed a few days later by the 
election of the ex-sultan’s cousin, Abdul Mejid, as Caliph – a democratised Caliphate 
for the newly democratic Turkish Republic.
969
 In one stroke, the new Turkish 
government had removed centuries of tradition. 
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It had also undermined the whole foundation of the Caliphate movement 
which argued that the Caliph was not just a spiritual leader but a temporal one too.
970
 
From November 1922, any power the Caliph/Sultan once held now rested with the 
Turkish Assembly. One would have thought that, given how vehemently the 
Caliphate movement had protested against any hint of interference with the Caliph 
by the Allies, the Kemal government’s actions would have been met with outcry. 
Instead, on 4 December, Reading reported that most Indian Muslims appeared 
confused and some distrusted the newspaper reports on the decision.
971
 They simply 
‘could not accept that the Turks, who appeared to be fighting for the elevation of the 
caliphate, were instrumental in destroying it’.972 Some even hoped that the Turks 
were only trying to save the Caliph from the burden of ruling the country so that he 
would have more time to concentrate on Muslim matters.
973
 In December 1922, the 
Caliphate Committee expressed its acceptance of Turkey’s actions and its continued 
support of the Kemalist government.
974
 By February 1923 the viceroy was able to 
report that the issue of the Caliph had caused little bad feeling against the new 
Turkish government.
975
 This, of course, was all good news to the Indian government. 
The admittance, however, that the dissolution of the Caliph was actually of little 
practical consequence brought scoffs from the Foreign Office. Curzon argued that 
this mistake on India’s part now meant that the Foreign Office was justified ‘in not 
attaching the slightest value to any future representation of the Govt. of India in 
European politics’.976  
Despite Curzon’s mocking, the reaction of Indian Muslims to the actions of 
the Turkish Assembly is not so surprising when the matter is considered further. For 
one thing, the fact that the new Kemalist government itself chose to abolish the 
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Sultanate, rather than having it forced upon it by the Allies, is a crucial factor in 
Muslim reaction. Indeed, the Caliphate movement had never really been about the 
issue of the Caliph per se. The plight of Turkey and the Caliph had instead been seen 
by Muslims as an embodiment of the erosion of Islamic power by the Christian 
western nations. The fact that the new Turkish government under Kemal had 
successfully challenged the Allies and the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, was a 
welcome demonstration of Islamic power to Indian Muslims that helped soften the 
blow of the dissolution of the Sultanate/Caliphate.
977
 Indeed, for the average Muslim 
the complexities of the Caliphate issue was probably more than they could 
understand, but it had been a convenient rallying point for anti-British agitation. The 
Foreign Office itself had previously argued this when it had been trying to undermine 
the Indian government’s fear of the Caliphate problem.978 However, as already noted, 
what London failed to grasp is that regardless of the legitimacy of the form which 
Muslim agitation took, the result was still the same for the Indian government. As 
Reading pointed out in January and repeated in February of 1923, while the 
dissolution of the Caliphate had been reasonably well received in India, the 
government still had to be careful what it said on the matter, lest it be accused of 
complicity in the Turkish decision and re-inflamed Muslim opinion.
979
 Even after the 
complete abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, Turkey still received the loyalty of 
Indian Muslims.
980
 Islamic Turkey had more leeway when it came to Muslim issues 
than did Christian, imperial Britain.  
 
The muted reaction of Indian Muslims to Turkey’s actions can also be explained 
somewhat by the fact that the Caliphate movement was on the wane anyway by late 
1922. In particular, the division between Muslim and Hindu agitators had been 
growing since 1921. Bal Ram Nanda has argued that the non-cooperation and 
Caliphate movements had always been ‘joined, but never really merged into an 
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integrated struggle’.981 As another has explained, ‘there was a constant tussle 
between Gandhi and the militant Khilafatists over violence and non-violence, as well 
as over the question of civil disobedience’.982 In trying to bring together these two 
disparate movements, Gandhi had repeatedly to defend his position to both Muslim 
leaders and Hindu activists.
983
 As early as May 1921, Reading had predicted that ‘the 
Hindu-Moslem combination...rests upon insecure foundations’.984 Later that year in 
August, a confrontation between the Indian government and Caliphate protestors in 
Malabar resulted in an uprising which developed into the committing of atrocities by 
Muslims against Hindus, including forcible conversion and murder.
985
 News of the 
Moplah rebellion, as it became known, caused serious upset among the general 
Hindu population, and Gandhi had to struggle to keep the Hindu-Muslim alliance 
alive.
986
 By January 1922, Reading was reporting how the extremist pan-Islamic 
language of some of the Caliphate leaders was also causing concern to more 
moderate Hindus.
987
 As Nanda puts it, ‘the religious fervour of the Khilafatists made 
many Hindus uneasy’ while the Muslim elite ‘had an ingrained distrust of the Indian 
National Congress, and indeed most Hindu leaders’.988  
The relative failure of the non-cooperation movement by mid-1922 caused 
further disenchantment among the population.
989
 In November 1921 a hartal (general 
strike) had been called in response to the arrival of the Prince of Wales in India, and 
there were a number of violent outbreaks throughout the country.
990
 By 4 February 
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1922 the movement reached a peak when a mob of around 2,000 agitators attacked 
government buildings in Chauri Chaura in the United Provinces, killing and 
mutilating the bodies of police and government officials trapped inside.
991
 To those 
watching from London, the Indian government’s hitherto lenient attitude towards 
Gandhi and his followers was to some extent to blame for this current crisis. In a 
Cabinet meeting two days later, ‘General regret was expressed at the delay which 
had taken place in arresting Gandhi, a policy which the Cabinet had favoured more 
than three months ago’.992 Feeling the pressure, Montagu was now far less supportive 
than he had been in 1920. Consequently the secretary of state fired off a telegram 
demanding those principally involved in the non-cooperation movement – including 
Gandhi – be promptly dealt with. As Montagu pointed out to Reading (somewhat 
obviously), the situation could not be dealt with simply with the issuing of a 
communiqué: ‘There is no doubt that you are confronted by a movement designed 
and supported with a view to overthrowing your Government and it is of the essence 
of such a situation that whatever measures are essential for dealing with it must be 
taken promptly’.993 Unsurprisingly Reading took offense at the strong terms of this 
telegram. While the viceroy realised the Home government must be anxious at the 
situation, ‘We must at the same time offer our respectful protest against the 
implication that so far we have failed to realise the gravity of the present situation as 
to think that it could be met merely by the issue of a communiqué’.994  
The debate on how to deal with the non-cooperation movement had 
effectively become a battle of wills between London and Delhi. Although Montagu 
had initially supported the viceroy, others in the Home government had never been 
happy with how the Indian government had chosen to deal with Gandhi, calling 
several times for the viceroy to simply arrest the Indian leader. In January 1922 
Montagu had informed Reading that the British public was apparently becoming 
more and more perplexed by the fact that Gandhi remained at liberty, despite his 
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seditious activities.
995
 However, as the viceroy had tried to explain to the secretary of 
state, were he to arrest the Indian leader now, ‘another will take his place and carry 
on in Gandhi’s name, with the additional stimulus that Gandhi, the saint, is in 
prison’.996 The Indian government had a strong belief that if left largely alone, the 
non-cooperation movement would eventually run its course. In the meantime it 
refused to make a martyr of its leader.
997
 As Reading respectfully pointed out to 
Montagu, while he understood London’s concerns, ‘the determination of the situation 
ought to rest upon my view of the effect in India and not so much in debate at 
Home’.998 Indeed, the Indian government had already given Sir George Lloyd, the 
Governor of Bombay, permission to arrest Gandhi before Montagu’s demanding 
telegram had actually arrived.
999
 However, on 8 February, following public outcry at 
the events in Chauri Chaura, Gandhi called a halt to the non-cooperation movement. 
The Indian government now decided to gamble and postpone Gandhi’s arrest, much 
to Lloyd’s chagrin.1000 
In his work on the problems of the British Empire after 1919, John Gallagher 
has argued that the actions of the Indian government in response to Gandhi 
demonstrate its apparent weakness in the post-war period, and its fear of Indian 
nationalist agitation. To corroborate this idea, Gallagher quotes George Lloyd, who 
claimed that Reading ‘was little short of panic stricken’ which was obviously 
affecting his policy towards Gandhi. However, in the words of Gallagher himself, 
George Lloyd was a ‘super-imperialist’ who – much like some in London – could 
only understand the viceroy’s refusal to arrest Gandhi in terms of weakness.1001 That 
the Indian government feared the consequences if it mis-handled the situation with 
Gandhi did not mean that it acted out of weakness. Indeed, by seeing the caution of 
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Delhi as a failure, Gallagher does the viceroy and his men a disservice.
1002
 D.A. Low 
has been a little more measured in his work, believing that Reading’s chosen course 
of action required calmness and shrewdness.
1003
 Ultimately, the viceroy was to be 
awarded for his patience. In the days after Chauri Chaura, as public opinion turned 
and moderates began to withdraw their support from the movement and its leaders, 
conditions now turned in favour of the Indian government.
1004
 By the beginning of 
March, it felt confident enough to re-issue the order for Gandhi’s arrest.1005 Reading 
had been patient, and timed his actions perfectly, so that when the arrest finally took 
place, there was virtually no public response. No unrest occurred, no hartals 
issued.
1006
 As one contemporary noted, ‘the fiery emotionalism of Non-co-operation 
has for the time spent itself’.1007 Yet again, the Indian government could feel 
vindicated that in its battle with the Home government it had been proved right.  
 
By the end of 1922 then, with Gandhi in prison, the collapse of the non-cooperation 
movement and the effective end of the Caliphate issue, the Indian government was 
able to breathe a little easier, and Reading could report that ‘for the present the 
outlook is thus more favourable than it has been at any time during the last three 
years’.1008 The Indian government had ‘managed to come out relatively unscathed’ 
from these troubled years.
1009
 Nonetheless, the viceroy and his men could never 
afford to become complacent in this post-war period of tension and upheaval when 
there were so many disgruntled groups ever-ready to exploit any perceived British 
weakness. Indeed, just as Muslim and Indian nationalist agitation appeared to be 
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calming down in 1922, intelligence reports began to note a resurgence of Bolshevik 
activity (which would ultimately precipitate the Curzon Note of 1923).
1010
 For the 
Foreign Office, this was seen as a direct result of Russia’s involvement in the Genoa 
Conference of April 1922. The Soviet government had been invited to participate in 
the conference discussions which centred mainly on economic issues – a further 
attempt by Lloyd George to ‘civilise’ the Bolsheviks (the first had been the trade 
agreement) by impressing fiscal responsibility upon them.
1011
 In a speech made to the 
House of Commons on 3 April 1922, the prime minister argued that, with the New 
Economic Policy, Lenin had effectively abandoned the principles of Communism 
anyway and that by attending Genoa Russia would have to ‘recognise all conditions 
imposed and accepted by civilised communities as the test of fitness for entering into 
the comity of nations’.1012 Such claims were largely wishful thinking on Lloyd 
George’s part, however, for it appears that the invitation to the Soviet government 
merely served to increase its confidence in its international position, as did the 
Rapallo Treaty which it signed with Germany during the conference.
1013
 As Gregory 
in the Foreign Office reported, the Soviet government was touting the invitation to 
the conference ‘first as being tantamount to de jure recognition, and secondly as a 
complete victory of the Soviet Government over the Governments of the West’.1014  
It was as a result of this boost in confidence that the Bolshevik authorities 
appear to have once again begun its propaganda activities, particularly its support of 
anti-British nationalist movements.
1015
 Following protests by Curzon during the 
Anglo-Soviet trade agreement talks and his note of 1921, the Soviet government had 
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been forced to temporarily pare back some of its more overt propaganda efforts, 
including the school for revolutionaries which had been set up in Tashkent by the 
Indian Communist M.N. Roy.
1016
 Despite this closure of Roy’s school, however, 
there was always very little hope that the Bolshevik regime was going to completely 
give up its agitation among the people of Asia, and in April 1921 the Communist 
University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) was founded in Moscow. Most of the 
students of Roy’s were transferred to Moscow, although soon the university would 
set up its own departments in Tashkent, as well as Baku and Irkutsk.
1017
 Thus by 
December 1922, the new secretary of state for India, Lord Peel, was warning 
Reading of Bolshevik-sponsored sedition in India: ‘The danger is increasing’.1018 
Peel seems to be referring particularly to the growing activity of Roy, who since 
April had been in Berlin from where he kept up a continual stream of agitation 
against the Indian government. Despatching propaganda into India such as the 
newspaper The Vanguard of Indian Independence, and the pamphlets India in 
Transition, India’s Problem and Its Solution and What Do We Want?, Roy was also 
devising various plans to send into India a number of the students from the 
KUTV.
1019
 It was probably these activities which Peel had in mind when he informed 
Reading in December 1922 of indications that the Bolsheviks were succeeding in 
smuggling literature and agents into India.
1020
 
Throughout his work on this topic, Zafar Imam has described the apparent 
British fear that Soviet Russia would attempt an invasion of India in the post-war 
years. Imam has used particular documents and quotes from the Indian press which 
seem to show panic over the problem of Bolshevism within India. However, Imam 
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has not sufficiently differentiated between the various departments and numerous 
officials of the British government and makes statements such as: ‘It was believed in 
official quarters that Bolshevik agents had penetrated into India...’. Presumably, 
Imam is referring to Peel’s telegram above, although he gives no citation.1021 Yet 
Imam does not record Reading’s reply to Peel which was evidently calm and 
reassuring: ‘We are fully alive to the necessity for exercising the closest watch over 
all Bolshevik activities directed against this country’. As the viceroy explained 
further, together with the provincial Criminal Intelligence Departments, there existed 
at Peshwar and Quetta, Intelligence Bureaus which were specifically charged with 
the detection of Bolshevik agents. The Department of Central Intelligence (DCI) co-
ordinated the work of these agencies and kept local governments fully informed of 
developments. The Indian government was also happy that its existing laws were 
more than adequate for prosecuting any of those who were found guilty of 
conspiracy against it, either inside or outside of India. As for the activities of Roy in 
particular, Reading believed that while his propaganda might excite a small number 
of people, the revolutionary in no way had the supporters and resources to carry out a 
proper Communist campaign on Indian soil.
1022
  
Indeed, although it remained ever vigilant, the Indian government was 
relatively confident in its ability to cope with Soviet and émigré revolutionary 
activity. In the opinion of Richard Popplewell, a large part of this confidence was 
owed to the Indian intelligence services. For one thing, by 1918 the Indian 
government had already had a strategy in place to combat possible German 
insurrection in Asia – it meant that when it faced Bolshevik agitation after the war it 
was prepared.
1023
 As Popplewell explains: 
Despite some initial uncertainty about the power of Communism to win 
support in India, the British very soon found out that the threat of Communist 
subversion there was not nearly as serious as the German intrigues during the 
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war which had caused serious difficulties... When they faced the Bolshevik 
threat, the British benefited from the experience they had gained in the earlier 
struggle against the Germans.
1024
  
Intelligence bases outside of India – in Meshed, Kashgar, the Far East, North 
America and Europe – also meant that by the early 1920s the Indian government had 
a reasonable understanding of Bolshevik and Indian revolutionary activity.
1025
 The 
apparatus put in place by the Indian government (as described above and in Chapter 
Three) was also very successful in its attempts to capture any anti-British literature 
and agents sent into India. The majority of the students from the school at Tashkent 
and the KUTV were either quickly arrested or ‘found the police so hot on their trail 
that they fled the country without having carried out their mission’.1026 Others were 
largely incompetent and some had simply taken advantage of the Bolshevik 
willingness to clothe and feed them – one graduate of the Tashkent school had 
reportedly succeeded in smuggling a large sum of money into India meant for the 
purpose of Communist propaganda. Instead, the man had used the money to build 
himself a house.
1027
  
Together with the vigilance of its border officials, another reason the Indian 
government was so successful at detecting any revolutionary infiltration into the 
country was that it was kept well informed of the activities of men such as Roy by 
intercepting his mail. Indeed, Roy’s letters had ‘been an unfailing source of 
information of proved accuracy as to the movements of men, money and 
literature’.1028 The British government had also been regularly decoding encrypted 
Soviet and Comintern communications
1029
 and monitoring Communist radio 
traffic,
1030
 while the Indian police force were adept at infiltrating any germinating 
Communist organisations within India. It was through such vigilance that by 1923 
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Roy’s main agents in India had all been arrested and tried in what became known as 
the Cawnpore Conspiracy.
1031
 As Popplewell points out, Indian intelligence reports 
also emphasised the fact that India was just not ready for Communism: ‘Roy’s main 
adversary was not just the Indian police, but also Gandhi. Gandhi from 1919 onwards 
had gained such a commanding position over the Indian nationalist movement that it 
proved almost impossible for the Communists to gain a foothold within it.’1032 
Indeed, it would not be until 1925 that an Indian Communist Party would be founded 
on Indian soil.
1033
 Just as the nationalism of Reza Khan and emir Amanullah had kept 
Bolshevism at bay in Persia and Afghanistan, so too did Gandhi do the same in India. 
Thus, in contrast to MI5 and Special Branch in Britain, who were ‘gripped by a deep 
anxiety’ in regards to Bolshevism, the DCI proved a calming influence on the Indian 
government.
1034
 Fisher confirms Popplewell’s conclusions, demonstrating how the 
IDCEU in London suffered from ‘imperial paranoia’, seeing isolated incidents of 
anti-British agitation as part of a vast conspiracy against the empire.
1035
 Victor 
Madeira also believes that ‘individuals in the defence and intelligence establishments 
[in Britain] frequently inflated the Bolshevik threat’, while in India there was 
‘recognition that the threat might easily be contained, given the ineptitude and greed 
of many Communist agents’.1036 This confidence in its understanding of, and ability 
to combat, Bolshevism, goes a large way to explaining why the Indian government 
was so less obsessed by the Soviet Russian threat during the post-war years than the 
Home government was.   
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When it came to Afghanistan, things were also gradually moving in Britain’s favour 
and just like with Persia, much of this appeared to be as a result of waning Bolshevik 
influence. The main problem with Soviet-Afghan relations throughout this period is, 
effectively, that each wanted to be the champion of Islam in Central Asia. Soviet 
Russia wanted to harness Muslim discontent in the region and use it, initially to bring 
down imperialist Britain, but also to extend Communism through Asia. For this 
cause, the Bolshevik regime was ready to subvert its more overt Marxist ideals and 
make alliances with revolutionary Muslim groups, such as the Jadids and Young 
Bukharans. For his part, Amanullah was ambitions to make his mark on the world 
stage and developing an image as protector of Muslims was one such way. Indeed, as 
Landau points out, ‘since the late nineteenth century, the Emirs [sic] who ruled 
Afghanistan had been partial to Pan-Islam [sic], which they considered as a 
potentially supportive force against the pressures of Russia and Great Britain’.1037 
The first attempt of Amanullah to harness pan-Islamism had been supporting the 
hijrat. Another opportunity appeared to present itself with the dissolution of the 
Caliph. In February 1922 Reading was warning London that there was a danger the 
emir would put forward a claim to be the new Caliph. An aggrandised Afghanistan 
with its leader presuming to be head of Islam, however, would cause untold problems 
for the Indian government.
1038
 Whether Amanullah seriously considered becoming 
the next Caliph is difficult to say, although it appears he had the support of some of 
his subjects.
1039
 Either way, as Dobbs pointed out: ‘Afghanistan will keep her eyes 
fixed on her Indian and Central Asian frontiers, ready to move forward in one or 
other direction on a certitude of real weakness’.1040  
Luckily, the emir seemed to have learnt his lesson in 1919 regarding invading 
India. Instead, a more promising venture appeared to lie in extending Afghanistan’s 
influence into Central Asia. For one thing, affairs were not going entirely in Soviet 
Russia’s favour by 1922. The treatment of Muslims by the Tashkent Soviet in the 
early days of its existence had considerably soured relations between the two. 
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Muslims had been excluded from the Soviet, and when they had then tried to set up 
their own government in Kokand, the Tashkent regime had attacked and destroyed 
it.
1041
 The Kokand massacre had been followed by an eruption of Muslim discontent 
centred in the Fergana region and the creation of the Basmachi resistance. The 
Basmachi were roaming bands of Muslim men who opposed the presence of 
Russians in Central Asia.
1042
 After the invasions of Khiva and Bokhara, the ranks of 
the Basmachi swelled and was joined by the emir of Bokhara and a couple of 
prominent Jadids, all of which raised the standing of the movement among the local 
population.
1043
 By 1921 then, the rebellion had become a refuge for all those who 
were opposed to Soviet Russia’s presence in Central Asia, thereby proving a constant 
source of irritation and embarrassment to the Bolshevik government who were trying 
so hard to maintain a pro-Islam image. Indeed, the Basmachi resistance and the 
invasions of Bokhara and Khiva demonstrate just how problematic Moscow’s 
foreign policy could be. Even after the Second Comintern Congress had apparently 
solved the theoretical issues about collaboration with nationalists and pan-Islamists 
(and tempered some of the initial extremism displayed by local activists), this did not 
remedy the practical problems the Bolsheviks faced in trying to extend their 
influence into Central and South Asia. For, try as the Bolsheviks might to temper 
their ideology and pander to nationalist sentiment, many Asian Muslims were not to 
be fooled;  ultimately the Russian Soviet government was a foreign Communist 
power whose belief system was fundamentally incompatible with Islam. 
Furthermore, Moscow’s dual policy of conducting diplomatic relations with 
Afghanistan while simultaneously deposing neighbouring native rulers was a risky 
one, as it threatened to alienate emir Amanullah and push him towards the British. 
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As it was, Amanullah faced a dilemma. As the new British ambassador in Kabul, 
Colonel Humphrys, explained, the emir could not afford to alienate Soviet Russia by 
becoming too involved in the affairs of the likes of Bokhara, yet he also could not 
outright abandon this region for fear of being regarded as a traitor to Islam. The idea 
of being the saviour of those Muslims who rejected Soviet rule was also a tempting 
proposition. In Humphry’s opinion, Amanullah had in fact become obsessed with the 
issue of Bokhara.
1044
 The presence of emir Alim, who had fled to Afghanistan in 
1921, was also a constant reminder of the plight of that country. How far this 
obsession was truly motivated by religious affinity, however, is questionable. The 
Indian government certainly believed that it was Afghan ambitions for northern 
expansion (since southern expansion was largely out of the question) which really 
inspired this interest in Turkestan. Despite some half-hearted protests on the Afghan 
side, the plight of Khiva and Bokhara had certainly not prevented the creation of the 
Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1921. Indeed, it soon became apparent that Amanullah 
intended on resolving the conflict between his ambitions towards Turkestan and his 
weakness in relation to Russia by turning to Britain. In his report following his return 
from Kabul, Dobbs noted that the real reason the emir had tried to gain an exclusive 
treaty with the Indian government had been in the hope that should a conflict arise 
with Soviet Russia, Britain would come to Afghanistan’s aid.1045 As Humphrys put 
it, the emir’s solution to his dilemma when it came to Bokhara was to try ‘to induce 
the British Government to pull his chestnuts out of the fire’.1046 With the exclusive 
treaty proving a non-starter, another way the emir hoped to involve Britain in the 
situation in Turkestan was to get the British government to publically recognise 
Khiva and Bokhara as independent states. Neither the British Foreign Office nor the 
Indian government, however, were prepared to jeopardise Britain’s own relations 
with Soviet Russia and possibly precipitate a conflict in Central Asia for the sake of 
two nations wholly unconnected to the British Empire’s welfare.1047 
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Complicating the situation in the region in 1922 was the presence of the 
Turkish revolutionary, Enver Pasha. Originally a close friend of the Bolshevik 
regime, Pasha had been celebrated at the Baku Congress as a ‘representative of 
Moslem hostility to the Western powers and particularly England’.1048 Having failed 
in his endeavours to rival Kemal Ataturk for power in Turkey, Enver Pasha had 
arrived in Turkestan in late 1921, ostensibly as a Bolshevik envoy to conciliate 
Muslim insurgents. It was quickly apparent, however, that the Turk had not gone to 
Bokhara to service the Soviet government but to fulfil his own desire for glory. 
Styling himself as leader of the Basmachi rebellion, Enver Pasha turned against his 
erstwhile Communist sponsors and began to help organise resistance against the 
Bolshevik presence in Turkestan.
1049
 To Afghanistan, Enver Pasha appeared to 
provide the leadership and stimulus needed to challenge Soviet Russia in Bokhara 
and elsewhere and the emir struck up a correspondence with the Turk, an action 
which inevitably brought protest from the Soviet government.
1050
 Again, Afghanistan 
tried to protect itself by garnering British support. In an interview with Humphrys in 
April 1922, Tarzi asked if it were not possible to use Enver Pasha as an instrument to 
promote the joint interests of Afghanistan and Britain and create a stable Bokhara. 
The Afghan Foreign Minister believed that Enver Pasha could remove the 
Bolsheviks from Bokhara if he was supplied with some 60,000 rifles.
1051
 In the 
opinion of both Humphrys and Reading, however, Britain should steer clear of the 
Bokhara situation in its entirety. As the viceroy pointed out, Enver Pasha in 
particular was an ambitious adventurer, and was not to be trusted.
1052
  
In an effort to try to win over Britain to his plans, Amanullah had even begun 
to try to appease the Indian government by cracking down on anti-British intrigue 
within his country. In February 1922, for example, the emir summoned many of the 
Indian revolutionaries who were resident in Kabul and warned them to refrain from 
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anti-British activity or risk being expelled from Afghanistan.
1053
 Economic and 
political considerations also required the emir to ease back on his more militant 
attitude towards India, as he simply could not afford to completely alienate Delhi.
1054
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this period of courtship towards Britain coincided with a 
period of decline in Afghan relations with Soviet Russia. As one British source noted 
in February 1922, ‘There appears no doubt that the Russians [in Kabul] are now 
subjected to all the petty restrictions and annoyances with which the British Mission 
was formerly favoured’.1055 Before he was recalled by his government following 
Curzon’s note, the Bolshevik representative in Kabul, Raskolnikov, was busy making 
himself unpopular, information reaching the Foreign Office of a ‘strong resentment 
felt by the Afghan Government at the disloyal activity of Monsieur Raskolnikoff, 
who is alleged to be intriguing with seditious persons with the object of encouraging 
disaffection within the country’.1056 Thus, just as in Persia, Bolshevik influence 
appeared on the wane.  
Afghanistan was a fickle friend, however, and such good-will towards Britain 
was not to be forever assured. By 1923, relations between the two countries would 
decline following a series of irritations and petty annoyances caused by Afghan 
behaviour, to the point where London was threatening to recall its Legation from 
Kabul.
1057
 Matters were not helped by the fact that Humphrys had quickly developed 
a dislike for Amanullah on his arrival in Afghanistan. The British minister looked 
down upon the emir, and opposed the nationalist and modernising forces prevalent in 
Kabul in the post-war period.
1058
 Nonetheless, Anglo-Afghan relations had a history 
of these ups-and-downs, and the Indian government had become particularly adept at 
dealing with its neighbour’s vacillations. As Vartan Gregorian has explained, ‘In the 
end, Amanullah drifted back to the traditional policy of seeking a balance of power 
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in the area’.1059 Importantly, the Indian government was also able to recognise the 
old Afghan trick of trying to play Russia and Britain off against each other, and was 
sensible enough to refuse to become involved in the emir’s Turkestan adventures. By 
1922–1923 then, Britain was in a relatively stable position when it came to 
Afghanistan. Just as the trade agreement with Russia did not preclude Britain 
experiencing irritations with that country, so too did India’s relationship with 
Afghanistan continue to see its peaks and troughs even following the treaty of 1921. 
However, as with the Soviet trade agreement, the treaty with Afghanistan did bring a 
level of resolution to some of the issues between India and its neighbour, not least 
because it provided the Indian government with much needed clout. From 1921 
Britain could always threaten to rescind the treaty and its concessions whenever 
Amanullah decided to become unreasonable. 
 
Build, Build, Build 
By the end of 1923 it appeared that Britain’s foreign relations in South Asia had 
come full circle. The ambitious optimism of the immediate post-war months had 
dissipated and the reality of the situation in the region had set in. Curzon’s temerity 
had been replaced with the Indian government’s sensibility. Britain might not have 
attained the position of hegemony in Persia and Afghanistan which Curzon would 
have wished it to, but at least by 1922–1923 its standing had improved from the low 
to which it had sunk in 1920–1921. In Persia, Loraine’s policy of detachedness 
proved effective damage control after the embarrassment of the failed Anglo-Persian 
agreement and the Enzeli debacle. After months of failing to come to grips with the 
Turkish question, the settlement at Lausanne and the creation of the new Turkish 
Republic finally resolved many problems for Britain, not least of which was the 
settlement of the Caliphate issue. The removal of this cause célèbre simultaneously 
resulted in a cooling down of pan-Islamic agitation and a weakening of the Hindu–
Muslim revolutionary bond in India.  Even in Afghanistan relations appeared to have 
settled into something of their old routine, with the Afghan ruler busily courting first 
one and then the other of his neighbours for his own gains. By 1923 then, affairs in 
South Asia had stabilised.  
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And while part of this improvement in Britain’s foreign relations can be 
attributed to the pragmatism of the likes of Loraine and Reading, undoubtedly this 
change was also helped along by the relative failure of the Bolshevik regime to attain 
their goals in Persia and Afghanistan. Despite all the anti-Bolshevik rhetoric of 
1918–1919, by 1922 it was clear that Lenin and his colleagues were struggling just as 
much as Britain was with pan-Islamism and nationalism. Superficially Moscow was 
still capable of stirring up trouble for Britain through its anti-imperialist propaganda 
and sponsoring of men such as M.N. Roy. However, it was becoming increasingly 
apparent that beneath all this bluster, the Bolsheviks were struggling to recruit to the 
Communist cause. On a diplomatic level, Asia’s rulers were proving almost as 
disloyal and adept at self-preservation as the Bolsheviks themselves were, while at 
the grass-roots, the failure to create many fully-fledged Communists out of the milieu 
of Asian revolutionaries was limiting the extent to which the Bolsheviks could really 
infiltrate the region. While the emir of Afghanistan or the shah of Persia would 
always find flirting with the Soviet government (and thus irritating the British) an 
enjoyable past-time, there always remained an invisible barrier of caution 
surrounding these rulers. Decades of British and Russian intrigue in this region of the 
world had taught these nations to be wary of allowing either of their powerful 
neighbours to get too close, whatever placations and promises the new leaders in 
Moscow might give. 
The failure of the Soviet Russia to make great revolutionary headway in 
South Asia by 1922 was particularly important as it meant that when the likes of 
Loraine advocated a detached policy in Persia, London was more inclined to listen 
that it had been in 1918. Despite Curzon’s warnings in 1918, Britain’s failure to 
extend its influence in this region had not portended the Bolshevik apocalypse. There 
therefore seemed no harm in now following a policy in Persia and Afghanistan that 
appeared to involve less effort and less risk than what Britain had been doing 
hitherto. Curzon’s sulkiness over the failure of the Anglo-Persian agreement also 
helped ensure a change of direction in Foreign Office policies by 1922. Not that 
Curzon ever fully relinquished his ambitions in this region of the world (just as he 
could never bring himself to feel positive towards Bolshevik Russia). In May 1922, 
for example, he could not resist instructing Loraine to ‘slowly Build Build Build’ 
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when he could.
1060
 But as stubborn as he was, Curzon had to admit by 1922 that 
pursuing a more limited role in Persia was actually working to Britain’s advantage. It 
was just unfortunate for Britain that the foreign secretary had not been made to 
realise this sooner. For, as demonstrated, there was nothing in Loraine’s Persian 
policy which the Indian government had not been advocating for years, and which it 
was already doing in Afghanistan – being as little involved in the country’s internal 
affairs as was necessary to simply retain a British presence. The foreign secretary’s 
peculiar inability to listen to the advice coming from Delhi had cost Britain valuable 
prestige points in the years after 1918. At least this was beginning to be rectified. 
Indeed, by 1923 Britain’s relations in South Asia had settled down to something akin 
to the pre-war years, with London accepting both the limitations of the empire’s 
capabilities and the inevitable presence of Russia in this region.  
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The End of An Epoch 
 
This work opened with a number of research questions, not least of which was why 
the Indian government’s opinions were ignored when it came to formulating 
Britain’s foreign policy in South Asia in the years after the First World War. Why 
was it that, even though relations with Persia and Afghanistan were intimately related 
with the security of India, Delhi’s point of view was marginalised? Why was it not 
recognised that perhaps officials in India might be better placed than those in London 
to understand the problems facing Britain’s imperial position in this region of the 
world? As noted in the Introduction, the answer to this hinges on the question as to 
who was formulating Britain’s foreign policy in this period. Montagu summarised 
the situation himself in 1919 in a letter to Chelmsford. In response to the viceroy’s 
complaints about being ignored, Montagu explained: ‘it so happens that you are 
interested in matters in which...Lord Curzon plays a very important part. That is 
really the whole secret.’1061 As we have seen, despite what some authors have said, 
the Foreign Office still dominated the formulation of Britain’s foreign policy in the 
post-1918 period. As foreign secretary, this meant Curzon would always have a large 
amount of control over Britain’s foreign relations – with his experiences in South 
Asia and his personality traits, Curzon in fact came to dominate Anglo-Asian affairs. 
Unfortunately, this meant that in the years after 1918 the Indian government faced a 
formidable obstacle to having its voice heard in London. Curzon had a certain way of 
viewing the world, and the fact that the Indian government disagreed with this view 
meant it was destined to be ignored by the stubborn foreign secretary.  
As for what influenced Curzon’s thinking, the answer is relatively simple. 
The foreign secretary was an old-fashioned imperialist who believed that the prestige 
of the British Empire was best protected by maintaining a physical dominance over 
India’s neighbouring states, thereby creating a buffer against Russia – for in 
Curzon’s opinion Russia was always the premier enemy of the empire. This was the 
Great Game mentality described in Chapter One – a mode of thought which 
continually viewed Russia with hostility and suspicion; which over-emphasised the 
supreme threat of Russia to Britain’s imperial interests in South Asia; which saw 
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Persia and Afghanistan as mere pawns; and which insisted on the use of the ‘iron 
hand’ to extend Britain’s influence in the region. Crucially, the Great Game 
mentality therefore blinded Curzon to the growth of nationalism and pan-Islamism in 
South Asia in the years after the First World War.
1062
 And it is this which brought the 
foreign secretary into conflict with the Indian government. Curzon saw the world as 
he thought it ought to be – and perhaps as it was prior to 1914. He did not see it as it 
was. Harold Nicolson has tried to contest the idea of Curzon being out of touch with 
how much South Asia had altered by this time.
1063
 However, a few pages later, 
Nicolson himself describes Curzon’s apparent bemusement at the Persian reaction to 
the 1919 agreement.
1064
 The foreign secretary’s inability to recognise why the 
agreement had failed is a clear indication of just how little he understood the changes 
which had over-come Persia since his travelling days. 
In his work on Curzon and the 1919 agreement, Christopher Ross has tracked 
the formulation of Curzon’s view of Persia, documenting how the foreign secretary’s 
early travels and reading were so crucial to the opinions he held later. Ross argues 
that, essentially, Curzon’s experiences as a young man led him to believe that the 
Persian people a) lacked a nationalist spirit and b) were generally friendly towards 
the British (and towards Curzon himself). It was, in Ross’s opinion, these two 
fallacies which led to the downfall of Curzon’s Persian policy. However, while there 
is no doubt that Curzon misjudged the situation in Persia in 1918, Ross’s thesis does 
not tell the whole story. For as we have seen, Curzon did not just get it wrong with 
Persia, he misunderstood the entirerty of nationalist feeling and Muslim agitation 
throughout Central and southern Asia after the First World War. Ross plays down 
Curzon’s anti-Russianism, and yet, the latter’s behaviour throughout 1918–1923, and 
the failure in his policies (Persian and otherwise) cannot be explained without 
placing Russia and the Great Game front and centre of his thinking. Curzon’s clashes 
with the Indian government over Afghanistan and the Caliphate movement and his 
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behaviour after the failure of the 1919 agreement are not explored by Ross, but they 
are telling. For they demonstrate not only the nature of Curzon’s ego in refusing to 
listen to others, but that his blindness to the nature of things in the post-war world 
was due to his distraction with Russia.
1065
 
The trouble was that Curzon’s obsession with Russia had had a long gestation 
– formulated during his early travels, and solidified while he was viceroy. It meant 
that it was hard for him to see anything else as a comparable threat. Which leads to 
another question which was posed in the beginning of this work – how far was the 
foreign secretary actually fearful of Bolshevism taking hold in South Asia? Was his 
anti-Bolshevik rhetoric based on ideological antipathy? Or to put it another way, was 
Curzon anti-Bolshevik or actually anti-Russian? And more importantly, does it 
actually matter? Frederick Stanwood believes that Britain’s policy towards Persia in 
the closing months of the First World War was initially neither ‘anti-Russian or anti-
Bolshevik’, but instead simply imperial. Only later did Bolshevism become 
‘important in British demonology...as a means of justifying military intervention 
against Persian nationalism’.1066 In Stanwood’s opinion then, Bolshevism was a 
convenient excuse for what the British government wanted to do anyway – extend its 
influence in Persia. In 1918–1919, there certainly appeared to be some confusion in 
London over who was the real threat to Britain’s interests in Persia: the remnants of 
the tsarist regime in the form of the Cossack Division and the Russian Legation, or 
the new revolutionary government in Moscow. Indeed, despite Curzon’s anti-
Bolshevik rhetoric, in these early years it was certainly the Cossack Division which 
could cause more immediate problems for Britain in Persia, given that the Bolshevik 
regime was distracted by the Russian civil war. A cynic could argue that Curzon 
realised he would have been unable to push through his Persian plans if he had 
couched them in imperialistic terms. In these months after the conclusion of the First 
World War there was great reluctance for Britain to be extending its responsibilities 
further than it had to. But Bolshevism provided a convenient justification – Britain 
needed to protect the Persians from this destructive ideology (or so Curzon claimed). 
The great fear which Bolshevism could incite in Britain was demonstrated in 
1924 by the case of the Zinoviev Letter. The ‘greatest Red Scare in British political 
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history’ was precipitated by the publication in British newspapers of a letter 
ostensibly written by Zinoviev to the British Communist party instructing them to 
prepare for the coming of a revolution in Britain.
1067
 The publication happened just 
four days before the general election of 29 October 1924 and is generally seen as the 
reason for the Conservative’s victory in the polls that month.1068 The Soviet 
government denied authorship of the letter and it was not until 1999 that the truth of 
the matter was revealed when Gill Bennett was able to conclude that the letter was a 
forgery, written most probably by White Russians in Berlin in an attempt to disturb 
the relationship between Britain and Russia at the time.
1069
 How far the Foreign 
Office of the time suspected the authenticity of the letter remains unknown – the 
years after the Russian revolution saw a veritable avalanche of documents  of 
dubious origin making their way into Britain, all purporting to provide information 
on the Bolshevik regime, or indeed claiming to be written by the Soviet government 
itself. The note of 1921, for example, which Curzon had presented to Moscow 
detailing Bolshevik transgressions of the trade agreement had been proven to be 
based on bad intelligence. The important point is that in 1924 the fear and suspicion 
which Soviet Russia could ignite amongst the British public was enough to 
apparently influence a general election. If Curzon wanted support for his Persian 
plans, using Bolshevism to scare his colleagues into action appeared a good idea. 
In the end Curzon’s scaremongering actually did not matter. For the likes of 
Montagu, it was financial considerations which persuaded him to support the 
creation of the Persian agreement. But Curzon’s use of anti-Bolshevik rhetoric for his 
own means does go some way to explaining some of his behaviour towards Persia 
after 1919. Given his doomsday warnings in 1918, Curzon appeared very complacent 
in 1920 when discussing the potential for a Bolshevik invasion of Persia. In the 
months that followed the Enzeli landings, as Soviet Russia gradually increased its 
presence within that country, Curzon remained relatively placid. If he had truly been 
that concerned about the threat which Bolshevism posed to Persia and to South Asia 
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at large, one would have expected greater agitation from the foreign secretary. 
Instead, Curzon wanted to create the Anglo-Persian agreement in order to make his 
mark on the region and extend Britain’s imperial influence while he was able to take 
advantage of Russia’s weakness. Curzon was a Great Game player by nature, and 
whether Russia was ruled by a Tsar or by Communists, the most important thing was 
for Britain to exert its authority in South Asia. After he had managed to conclude the 
1919 agreement, Curzon cared very little for what happened to Persia. The country 
was ‘a means to an end’, not a legitimate end in itself. As Olson puts it, ‘he saw the 
opportunity to secure India’s frontiers and was determined to do so in a manner he 
saw fit. He convinced himself that he spoke for Persia and then found the men who 
would listen’.1070 And when that agreement was wholeheartedly rejected by the 
Persian people, Curzon’s reaction was simply to sulk. All of which gives an insight 
into Curzon’s Great Game mentality. For the foreign secretary, Persia was a prize up 
for grabs. If he could not win it, he was certainly not going to invest his energy into 
the country for the sake of the Persians themselves. This demonstrates clearer than 
anything else that when Curzon had argued in 1918 that India’s policy of leaving 
Persia to its own devices was ‘immoral, feeble and disastrous’, it was simply all good 
oratory.  
   
So why did the Indian government appear so much more relaxed about the apparent 
threat of Bolshevism to Britain’s imperial interests than many officials in London? 
For even though Curzon’s scare tactics had not worked particularly well in regards to 
the Anglo-Persian agreement, throughout this period Whitehall did appear generally 
more distracted by the issue of Bolshevism than Delhi did – surprising, given that for 
so many decades the Indian government had always been the ones obsessed about 
Russia’s intentions towards South Asia. The answer is unclear. Indeed, this work has 
not been formulated to provide the answer, and the question has, therefore, only been 
of secondary consideration. A few possibilities have been discussed, but this is an 
area which would particularly benefit from further research. Since few have even 
acknowledged the difference of opinion between London and Delhi, this thesis has 
focused on trying to rectify that, and to understand why the Indian government was 
ignored. It has therefore been London-centric, looking at the likes of Curzon and his 
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Great Game mentality. The next step would be a greater study of how the Indian 
government was formulating its opinions, by looking closer at the thinking of key 
individuals in India to understand why their policies towards Persia and Afghanistan 
clashed with that of London. 
As already discussed, part of it was probably due to the different intelligence 
assessments made by the Home and the Indian governments. Officials in India 
seemed to have greater confidence in their ability to cope with Communist agitation 
in the country, and their success at disrupting the work of M.N. Roy and his allies 
helped boost this self-assurance. In the post-war period there were also other 
concerns which appeared more pressing to the Indian government than Bolshevism. 
While Moscow was struggling to recruit to its ideological cause, the likes of Gandhi 
and the Ali brothers were having no such troubles. It was the hartals of the non-
cooperation movement and the Caliphate Hijrat which were causing the real, 
practical problems for the viceroy and his men, not the bluster of the Bolsheviks and 
their incompetent fellow travellers. In contrast, domestic labour unrest and 
disturbances such as that which occurred in Glasgow in January 1919, appeared to 
bring the Bolshevik threat to Whitehall’s doorstep, while their intelligence reports 
only served to confirm their fears. The Indian government also seemed to have 
something of a better understanding of how Bolshevism functioned. Rather than 
viewing the new Russian government by the same parameters of the tsarist regime, 
Chelmsford and Hamilton Grant, for example, appeared to grasp the idea that the 
Bolshevik ideology was most successful when popular discontent supplied it with 
fertile breeding ground. Hence the warnings not to upset the Persians or the Afghans 
by forcing unpopular diplomatic agreements on them. Perhaps the simple answer as 
to why the Indian government did not hold the same Great Game mentality as 
Curzon is that the day-to-day exposure which its officials had with South Asians 
made it more attune to the changes which had overcome the region since the First 
World War. Russia was the threat of yesterday, even if it did have a new ideological 
form. The problem of today was how to manage the pan-Islamic and nationalist 
fervour taking hold of Persia, Afghanistan and India. 
The difficulty for the Indian government was that Curzon was not the type of 
man to listen to others. And herein lay the crux of the matter. That Curzon followed a 
Great Game mentality was not itself a unique fallacy. Indeed, there were others 
within the British government who shared aspects of his world view. Cox and Mallet 
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had, of course, encouraged the creation of the 1919 Persian agreement; Hardinge and 
Eyre Crowe had also on occasion questioned the Indian government’s apparent 
interference in what they deemed to be Foreign Office affairs; and Winston Churchill 
was perhaps an even greater Russophobe than the foreign secretary himself. That the 
Indian government might disagree with the Home government over issues of foreign 
affairs was also not an unusual occurrence. Minto had objected to the creation of the 
1907 Anglo-Russian convention, while Curzon had had his own battle with London 
over Kitchener’s reforms to India’s military. Instead, Curzon’s cardinal sin was to 
not recognise that in some circumstances it might be worth listening to others, even if 
what they were saying was not what he wanted to hear. By refusing point blank to 
pay the slightest attention to Delhi, to concede in even the smallest way that the 
viceroy’s contributions to the formulation of foreign policy was valid, it meant that 
the foreign secretary was ignoring valuable expert opinion. ‘Curzon’s actions were 
anything but logical’.1071 
The trouble was that Curzon’s travels, writings and time as viceroy had not 
only given him a Great Game mentality, but had also provided him with an 
unwarranted confidence in his own knowledge of South Asia. Despite the fact it had 
been a number of years since he had been in Persia, Afghanistan or India, throughout 
the post-war period the foreign secretary insisted that he knew best – in fact that he 
knew better than those officials currently in India. Curzon also possessed a 
‘competitive or even combative instinct’, which meant that rather than remaining 
open-minded to alternative points of view, he was apt to see this as a personal 
challenge and aimed to silence those who disagreed with him.
1072
 This explains why 
he did not simply ignore the Indian government, but actually went as far as degrading 
its expertise as in the case of the Anglo-Persian agreement, or mocking and belittling 
it such as with the Caliphate issue. Indeed, Curzon made his feelings on the Indian 
government perfectly clear in his letter to Montagu in 1922 prior to the secretary of 
state’s resignation. That he believed Delhi was trying to ‘dictate’ to London about 
Muslim affairs is indicative of his belligerent attitude towards the Indian 
government, as well as his sensitivity – boarding on paranoia – of having his 
authority questioned by others. Stubborn, combative and narrow-minded, Curzon 
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was also highly ambitious. As one biographer has put it, ‘The goal at which he 
[Curzon] ever aimed can be described compendiously as achievement’.1073 Curzon’s 
tenure as viceroy had ended ignominiously and for a number of years afterwards he 
had been left out in the cold from government business. As discussed in Chapter 
One, this meant that by the time Curzon had ascended to a position of authority in 
1918 he was looking to rehabilitate his image. The demise of imperial Russia 
appeared to provide the perfect opportunity for him to make his mark on South Asia, 
and thus the Indian government’s scepticism and constant criticism of his chosen 
course of action was highly inconvenient. 
 
The Indian government’s position was made worse by the fact that there were few in 
London who were willing to challenge Curzon when it came to South Asia. His 
travels and writings had given him a self-proclaimed expertise on the region which 
meant that others often deferred to his opinion. Curzon also frequently referred to the 
fact that he was an ex-viceroy whenever his advocated policies were questioned. 
David Gilmour believes that ‘Curzon may not have liked or understood the modern 
age, but his knowledge and comprehension of the outside world remained 
unrivalled’.1074 Laying aside the fact that Gilmour does not explain how it is possible 
for anyone to both misunderstand and comprehend something at the same time, this 
statement should carry the caveat ‘in London’. Because within the Home government 
Curzon’s knowledge of South Asia probably was unrivalled. Even if his arguments 
were wrong, there were few who were in a position to dispute this with him. As 
Khursheed Kamal Aziz puts it, in the post-war period ‘A prime minister who knew 
nothing about the East was matched by a foreign secretary who knew everything 
about it except how to deal with it...’1075 His position of authority within government, 
his apparent knowledge of the region, and his forceful personality meant that Curzon 
was adept at getting his way when it came to South Asia, often over-riding the 
objections of others. And when all else failed, he could always threaten to resign, as 
with the attempts to reform the Eastern Committee, or during the debates about 
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removing Britain’s troops from Persia. Curzon’s difficult personality was in fact one 
reason that he had been passed over as prime minister in 1923.
1076
  
Given its subordinate position and its physical distance, if the Indian 
government was to have its voice heard it needed an advocate in London – and one 
who was strong enough to stand up to an over-bearing foreign secretary. 
Unfortunately for Delhi, Montagu was to prove an inadequate ally. When it came to 
the Persian agreement, for example, the secretary of state allowed himself to be 
persuaded by Curzon rather than listening to his own viceroy. Luckily, in 
Afghanistan and India, the viceroy had more control and Curzon’s attempts to 
impose his Persian-style policies in Afghanistan were rebuffed. Curzon’s calls in 
1918 to make the emir an official ally in the war, and his latter belief that India could 
retain some control of Afghanistan’s foreign relations demonstrate that he not only 
got the Persia situation wrong, but entirely misread Afghanistan too. However, even 
then Montagu failed to defend the Indian government’s actions to the Cabinet. In his 
letters to Chelmsford, Montagu often complained that he felt the viceroy behaved 
unfairly towards him – making it known to the Indian public every time the secretary 
of state disagreed with the viceroy.
1077
 However, given what has been discussed, it 
seems hardly surprising that the Indian government often bridled at the lack of India 
Office support. The personal difficulties between Montagu and Chelmsford also did 
not help matters, and the secretary of state was not in office for long after Reading’s 
appointment. Montagu’s unpopularity with the Conservative party was a further 
problem for India. Despite all of his flaws, Curzon was extremely valuable to Lloyd 
George and to the coalition. Though he did not attract many friends, Curzon was a 
well-respected, prominent figure within the British political elite and an experienced 
statesman. Montagu was a Jewish Liberal, who appeared to take criticism very 
personally and often got far too emotional – a weakness for any politician.1078 His 
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performance during the House of Commons debate on General Dyer demonstrates 
his failings as a political operator, especially when compared to the speeches made 
by Churchill and Curzon.  
Unfortunately for both the Indian government and for Britain’s international 
standing, things only finally started to change for the better after Curzon’s policies 
proved a failure. Events in Persia, Afghanistan and India would show how potent the 
forces of nationalism and pan-Islamism were in the post-war years, and just how 
much the British foreign secretary was out-of-touch with the current climate in the 
region. It was only by 1922 that the British government at last abandoned the 
ambitious policies once advocated by Curzon for the more modest but realistic aims 
of the Indian government – even if it was actually Sir Percy Loraine who now 
represented this change of policy, rather than Delhi. Nevertheless, even after seeing 
his plans for South Asia collapse, still Curzon could not admit that he had been 
wrong. When it came to the agreement with Persia in 1919, for example, he 
attributed its failure to the ungratefulness of the Persian people, and the insincerity of 
the Persian government. It was because the Cabinet had decided to withdraw all of 
Britain’s troops from the country and because Herman Norman was incompetent – in 
short it was everyone else’s fault but his. When the Red Army landed at Enzeli, 
Curzon insisted he was not to blame, despite refusing to allow the British troops to 
withdraw earlier, thereby avoiding an embarrassing rout. When Muslim agitation 
was soothed by the Treaty of Lausanne, the foreign secretary could not admit that 
perhaps Britain had hitherto mishandled the Turkish – and by extension, the pan-
Islamic – question. Instead, Curzon simply took it as a sign that Delhi had been 
exaggerating Muslim unrest. Even in the face of over-whelming evidence, Curzon 
was unable to open his mind to the possibility that the Indian government had been 
right in what it said in 1918 and to recognise that perhaps he had underestimated the 
strength of the nationalist and pan-Islamic feelings of the day. The foreign secretary 
simply could not be shifted from his stubborn adherence to a Great Game mentality.  
 
To return to the central question of this thesis then, the reason that the advice of the 
Indian government was ignored when the Home government was forming its foreign 
policy towards South Asia is simple: Curzon. The foreign secretary’s Great Game 
mentality, his stubbornness, narrow-mindedness and ambition combined with his 
self-professed expert status and position of authority within the British government 
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to make him an obstruction for the Indian government. The fact that Delhi had no 
reliable advocate in London to support its position meant that it was doomed to being 
disregarded in this period. Only once Curzon’s forward policies had proved futile did 
the Indian government’s more pragmatic ideas find support. Even then, however, 
Delhi was still not afforded the credit for its foresight when it came to Britain’s 
relations with South Asia. Ultimately, it is hard not to feel that had London simply 
followed the advice of Delhi in the first place, it could have avoided many headaches 
during this period. As it is, it was lucky for Britain that the Bolshevik government 
also had fundamental problems with its Asian policy in the years after 1918. Indeed, 
it is interesting to note that both Britain and Russia were essentially trying to achieve 
the same ends in Central and South Asia – that of extending their own influence in 
the region at the expense of the other – albeit through different means. But both 
Moscow and London appeared to fall foul of pan-Islamic and nationalist feeling. 
Propaganda efforts such as the Baku Congress and the KUTV might alarm some 
British officials, but ultimately it was simply a lot of hot air.  
For despite all of these Bolshevik efforts ‘revolution in Asia – in the short 
term – proved even more illusory than revolution in Europe’.1079 As noted, while 
nationalist leaders might find it convenient to have a potential ally against imperial 
Britain, it did not mean that they were willing to replace one domineering foreign 
power with another.
1080
 The quality of the Asian recruits was also a real problem for 
Moscow in these early years after the October revolution. Most of those students of 
the KUTV, for example, were either incompetent or simply taking advantage of the 
Bolshevik willingness to feed and clothe them. Giles Bullard has noted that of the 
Asian revolutionaries willing to work with the Russians, ‘a high percentage of [them 
were] impractical intellectuals’.1081 Some, such as Barakatullah, were simply looking 
for any support in their struggle against the British. Fully fledged Asian Communists 
– like M.N. Roy – were hard to find. The one thing which the Bolshevik government 
did have going for it was its pragmatism, and its ability to learn and adapt to the 
current situation. For example, when it came to its failed first attempt at invading 
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Bokhara in March 1918 ‘Lenin drew the theoretical lesson of this event when he 
wrote that it was necessary to move cautiously in the matter of revolution’ in the 
Muslim world.
1082
 Unlike the British foreign secretary, the Russian leader was 
willing to be flexible in how he approached the Asian question. 
 
In December 1923 the Conservative party lost the general election and the very first 
Labour government was ushered into power in Britain. One of the first acts of the 
new prime minister, Ramsey MacDonald, was to extend official recognition to the 
Soviet government in February 1924.
1083
 If the Labour government was trying to 
differentiate itself from the previous  two administrations, it could not have chosen a 
more appropriate way of doing so. The world had moved on from the days when 
Karl Bravin was ignored and maligned by the Persian government. Soviet 
representatives now resided in Tehran, Kabul, Ankara and even London. And yet, 
MacDonald’s actions were not entirely unforeseen, nor were they a result of some 
sort of socialist solidarity, as might be expected. Economic pragmatism had dictated 
Britain’s conclusion of the Soviet Trade Agreement in 1921, and so it did in 1924 
with the issue of formal recognition. The trouble with the agreement of 1921 is that it 
had not stimulated trade between the two countries to the extent that had been hoped 
for. British business still felt wary of dealing with Russia when no British consulates 
existed there to help protect their interests. Thus, formal diplomatic relations needed 
to be established.
1084
  
More important for this thesis, however, is not so much the Labour 
government’s formal recognition of Soviet Russia, as interesting as this is. Instead, it 
is the fact that after 1923, the majority of those who had directed Britain’s foreign 
policy since the First World War were no longer in government. Curzon, Lloyd 
George, Montagu, Chelmsford, Hardinge and Churchill – all had left office one way 
or another by 1924. It is true that the Labour government did not last for long, and 
that by the end of the year the Conservative party was back in power (helped by the 
Zinoviev scandal). Nevertheless, by this point Lloyd George and Montagu had been 
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forced to resign, while Chelmsford and Hardinge had retired. Churchill was one of 
the few who not only remained in government, but of course went on the greater 
things after the 1920s. By the time of the Second World War, Churchill would come 
to have his own problems with the Soviet government – and perhaps, just like 
Curzon, Churchill’s feelings towards Stalin and his regime were also influenced by 
his previous experiences of Russia.  
As for Curzon, his period of supremacy over Britain’s foreign relations ended 
in 1923 when he left the Foreign Office. He had already faced bitter disappointment 
when, upon Bonar Law’s retirement in May 1923, he had been passed over for prime 
minister in favour of Stanley Baldwin. In 1930, during the unveiling of a statue in 
London in Curzon’s honour, Baldwin would in fact pay homage to the man he 
believed was indeed more experienced than he when he took the position as prime 
minister seven years earlier. Despite his bitterness, however, at having been usurped 
by ‘a man of inferior claims’, Curzon begrudgingly agreed to continue on as foreign 
secretary under Baldwin until the appointment of the Labour government. However, 
on the Conservative’s resumption of government, Curzon was yet again disappointed 
when instead of being allowed to resume his position at the Foreign Office, Baldwin 
made him Lord President of the Council instead – a role he had occupied eight years 
previously. Although he acknowledged Curzon’s achievements, Baldwin believed 
that foreign policy needed ‘a fresh start’.1085 Despite his incredible talents of 
administration and his indefatigable work ethic, of which nearly all contemporaries 
acknowledged, Curzon had not only been denied the highest office of the country, 
but was effectively demoted. It was a hugely disappointing end to a career which had 
started with such promise.
1086
 Less than four months later, on 20
th
 March 1925, Lord 
George Nathaniel Curzon – probably the greatest of the Great Game players – died 
of a bladder haemorrhage. As one of his biographers has put it, ‘It was the death of a 
man, but it was also the end of an epoch’.1087 
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Appendix I  Letter from Loraine to Curzon, 2 Aug. 1920 
 
‘Miss P., a sad jade by the bye, formerly shared her favours between Nicolas 
Romanoff and John Bull, her nearest and richest neighbours: in everything but self-
respect, about which she did not worry overmuch, she made quite a good thing of it. 
One fine day Nicolas Romanoff is not only killed, but ruined: so she turns to John 
Bull and says, all the time it was only you I really loved, and now I am yours 
absolutely if you will maintain and protect me. John Bull however was a prudent 
fellow at bottom and soon found her a very expensive pet, so he cut down her 
allowance and reduced the establishment. She didn’t like this, but for the time there 
was no alternative. Later on, she found that Nicolas Romanoff’s power and riches, 
though sadly diminished, had fallen into the hands of a brigand, unscrupulous and 
uncouth, but willing to pay her attention, and hating John Bull. What a chance she 
said to herself, of getting back to the old game! I must look into this. So she asked 
John Bull to return her the latch-key she had given him: but John Bull, though he 
consented to this, was rather morose about the whole thing, declined further 
responsibility for the establishment and cut off the allowances. Miss P. pouted and 
made a scene and said “You’re no gentleman, and I’d rather have anybody in my 
house but you, and I object to your continuing to give orders to my servants”: and 
she very much resents being told by John Bull to keep her housebooks and accounts 
properly, diminish her expenditure, renounce extravagance, and even pay back part 
of the money she had received but had never expected to have to account for. 
Meanwhile however, Nicolas Romanoff’s hooligan successor had not played up very 
well and though he paid a little, he was stingy and unpromising: also he seemed to 
share some of the less desirable qualities of Nicolas Romanoff. Also meanwhile 
Uncle Sam, a gentleman of unbounded wealth, had seemed to cock a favourable eye 
on her, so she put on her best frock, and asked him to tea. She’s going to do her best 
to hook him, and has already offered him some special privileges but she is not quite 
confident of success, and therefore she cannot afford a definite quarrel with John 
Bull until the future is more certain. John Bull is after all the most convenient lover, 
but he is so stupid with his tiresome lectures and good advice, when all that is 
necessary is that he should pay, and take charge again of the household expenses as 
well as giving handsome pin-money. Then, so long as some rather nominal 
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appearances are kept up, he can do what he likes with the house: and in his own 
interest he must keep the hooligan aspirant at a safe distance.’ 
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